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 Abstract 
 
This research entails a constructive critique of communicative planning theory from a 
historical materialist perspective. Communicative planning theory views the role of a 
planner as an experiential learner, rather than a technocratic leader. In terms of 
rationality types,  it involves a shift away from instrumental rationality and towards 
communicative rationality. Communicative planning theory has been criticised on a 
number of grounds right from the start. These have ranged from an inadequate 
understanding of the generic structures of inequality and oppression in society to 
turning Habermas’ critical theory into a moralistic, normative objective. It has also been 
argued that communicative planning theory has been an unconscious theoretical vehicle 
for the justification of the forces of neoliberal urbanisation. While acknowleding both 
the potential of communicative planning theory as an appropriate planning theory for 
modern democratic societies and also the criticisms that have been launched against it, 
this research wishes to see the debate in the light of a serious lacuna in planning theory. 
This lacuna is the near complete absence of the historical experiences of third world 
democratic experiments as a contextual basis for the generation of mainstream planning 
theories. Almost all the major theories of planning have been generated from the 
historical and contextual experience of western capitalist democracies. This research 
argues that such a tendency leads to a major contradiction in communicative planning 
theory which becomes evident when it attempts to guide the creation of successful 
democratic planning alternatives to a global phenomenon like neoliberalism, while 
basing itself on a limited and narrow historical and geographical context. 
 
Contrary to mainstream planning theory, mainstream development theory has been 
more alert toward radical experiments with democratic planning in third world contexts. 
This research uses the experience of one such experiment – the decentralisation and 
democratisation of the planning and development structure in the city of Kolkata (the 
capital city of the state of West Bengal in India) – as a means of expanding the 
 iii
contextual base of communicative planning theory. In the course of the research it was 
discovered that creative democratisation experiments such as the one undertaken in 
Kolkata derived no inspiration or theoretical guidance from communicative planning 
theory. Let alone guide and inform such radical experiments, communicative planning 
theorists had not even been able to observe and comprehend them due to their 
inexcusable contextual bias. The experience of Kolkata shows that a more 
communicative and democratic planning structure can evolve out of a process that 
originated with completely opposite strategies of extra-parliamentary politics and open 
class-confrontation. Finally, it is argued that by broadening the contextual base of 
communicative planning theory and by learning from the real experience of 
democratisation experiments in third world contexts, its inner contradictions can be 
minimised and its capacity to inform genuinely democratic planning practice enhanced.   
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Part I 
Introduction 
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1. Partly an Introduction...Largely a 
Confession 
1.1 Practice to Theory to Practice 
Perhaps, the best way to introduce this research is by using the concept of ‘involution’, 
as described by the Indian monk and philosopher Swami Vivekananda. From the point 
of view of the non-dualistic strands of Indian philosophy, all evolution pre-supposes 
involution. Only that which has the potential to evolve into something, will be able to 
evolve. In other words, in order for a seed to evolve into the plant, the totality of the 
plant must have been involved in the seed. Vivekananda wrote: 
 
Evolution does not come out of zero; then, where does it come from? From previous 
involution. The child is the man involved, and the man is the child evolved. The seed is 
the tree involved, and the tree is the seed evolved. All the possibilities of life are in the 
germ. (Vivekananda: 1947, online source).  
 
When I look back at this whole research process, I could write in a similar way, that the 
seed of this research lay in a very basic and ordinary sounding question. The question 
was clearly articulated by the Indian economist and planner, Thomas Isaac, in an article 
written in 1998. 
 
‘Why are the people so alienated from the planned development process in our country 
?’ (Isaac: 1998) 
 
Using Vivekananda’s language, it can be written that this little, but deeply troubling 
question, was the PhD involved.  
 
Given the sheer extent of absolute poverty in the country, the glaring economic 
inequalities resulting from  the embracing of neoliberal policies, a rising agrarian crisis 
and the increase in communal and religious conflicts in the recent years, such an 
alienation and apathy seems not only tragic but also unacceptable. The intense desire to 
find a satisfactory answer to this question made me undertake a general search in the 
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twin fields of planning  practice and planning theory. This general search had three 
basic objectives - 
 
1. To identify the progressive trends in the fields of planning practice and planning 
theory which strive toward overcoming the tendencies of alienation, public apathy and 
the lack of a democratic spirit in planning and development. 
2. To identify the external and internal challenges and contradictions that these 
progressive trends face. 
3. To attempt to minimise the weaknesses and contradictions of these progressive trends 
and maximise their strength and consistency. 
 
The academic search for the answer to this basic question was preceded by a search in 
the area of practice, when I started working as an activist-planner in a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) in India. Apart from a variety of themes concerning social and 
economic justice, our NGO also played a crucial advocacy role. The intention was to 
generate increasing awareness among citizens and elected representatives of local 
government institutions about the provisions of two very important constitutional 
amendments, which were made in the year 1992. These ammendments aimed at 
empowering the local government bodies all over the country and turning them not only 
into vibrant institutions of self-government, but also into the main institutions 
responsible for local planning and development.  
 
The relevance of these amendments can be correctly appreciated only by understanding 
the  prime contradiction in the nature of India democracy, which has strongly 
contributed to the alienation of the masses from the planning process. Despite the robust 
tradition of democracy in India, the Indian government can be described as being 
democratic at the top and undemocratic at the bottom. Although the first two tiers of 
government  i.e. the central government and the various state governments, were 
recognised by the Constitution of India, the third tier, i.e. the local government, which is 
the tier closest to the common people, both geographically and functionally, was not 
recognised as an independent tier. Thus the structure of the Indian government became 
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that of democracy at the first two tiers and bureaucratic management and control at the 
bottom tier. 
 
An unfortunate result of this was that the local government institutions, which were 
ideally placed for discharging the important functions of local planning and 
development, could never get properly involved in that process at all. Until very 
recently, both the economic and spatial planning process in India, remained totally 
under the control of the bureaucrats and technocrats of the various sectoral departments 
and special purpose agencies of the state governments. Such a state of affairs ensured 
that the planning and development process largely operated outside any kind of local 
democratic control.   
 
In the course of working for the NGO I could get a first-hand glimpse of the 
contradictions inherent in our own approach towards fostering a more democratic 
planning practice in Indian cities. Through our experience of working with the citizens 
and the local government of a medium sized town in South India, we were realising 
more and more, that in order to turn the progressive democratic ideals of the Consti-
tutional amendments into a reality, we would require a radical change in the general 
mind-set of people, elected leaders, experts and bureaucrats, which can only be possible 
through strategies of mass participation and mobilisation. 
 
By virtue of being an NGO, with its usual limitations in resource and man-power, our 
advocacy and our campaigning could never reach the levels of a mass social movement. 
Moreover, being essentially an NGO and not a radical social or political movement, we 
didn’t really have the mandate to bypass the existing local leadership structure and 
initiate such activities of our own. Our limited resources were always tied to some 
national and international funding source which were provided for specific projects and 
campaigns, which had its own limits and restrictions when diverted to actions which 
were neither predictable nor driven towards a specific quantifiable goal. 
 
We were realising that the organisational form of the typical NGO was more suited to 
an approaches to participation and citizen engagement, which focussed on undertaking 
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small development projects at a very local level with a possibility for direct 
participation at every stage of the project. Such approaches were not primarily focussed 
towards a radical, political involvement with the agents of the state and contributing to 
the process of empowering the local government and turning them into responsive and 
responsible institutions for democratic planning. Though the wise and enlightened 
founder and coordinator of our own NGO had correctly identified the need to shift away 
from an explicit focus on local environmental and developmental concerns and toward a 
more politically conscious understanding of participation and citizen engagement, the 
form and manner of functioning of such organisations was clearly unfit for the task at 
hand. It was the realisation of this contradiction in the field of practice that prompted me 
to shift my place of operation and observation from the world of practice to the world of 
the academia. This was the point of time when this PhD research began.  
 
This research, naturally began with an exploration of those planning theories which 
were concerned with similar issues of trying to offer an explanation of what planning 
practice means and what it should mean in contemporary democratic societies. It was 
due to this reason that I focussed on the various strands of communicative planning 
theory, and especially on the one which had become very influential in both academic 
and policy circles - collaborative planning. From that point on, this research has 
essentially been a process of questioning both the descriptive and normative potential of 
communicative planning theory and identifying the intrinsic contradictions it contains, 
which prevent it from turning its comprehensive theoretical understanding and genuine 
commitment toward democratic planning into a truly democratic planning practice 
which would be able to resist the onslaught of neoliberal urbanisation.  
 
As the analysis of communicative planning theory proceeded, I attempted a slightly 
unconventional task of analysing the communicative turn in planning thought and 
practice by seeing it through the lens of a similar participatory turn in development 
thought and practice. There was a particular reason for pitting one theoretical field 
against another in this manner.  Mainstream planning theories, including the various 
strands of communicative planning theory, have all been developed based on the 
particular historical experiences of planning practice in North America and West 
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Europe. This contextual bias in mainstream planning theory alienates it from the 
democratic experiments and experiences of countries of the third world. This leads to a 
contradiction in communicative planning theory as it seeks to create a democratic 
alternative to a global phenomenon like neoliberalism by drawing on the experience of  
a limited geographical and historical context. 
 
Compared to mainstream planning theory, the field of development studies has always 
had a strong emphasis on third world contexts and experiences. This happened due to 
the simple reason, that development studies was particularly interested in those regions 
of the world were development was ‘not’ taking place in the pace and manner in which 
it should have. As a result of this, development theory could enrich itself with the recent 
experiments in third world countries which had a solid potential to resist neoliberalism 
as they had emerged in the context of real, and often brutal, conflicts with neoliberal 
forces which tend to reveal themselves with far greater ruthlessness in third world 
countries than in the first world ones. 
 
This investigation led me to the identification of certain progressive experiments aimed 
at democratising the planning and development process in India (especially those 
undertaken in the Indian states of Kerala and West Bengal), the details of which I had 
not been aware of till then, and which were far more intelligent and effective than the 
practical work that I had been personally involved in before beginning my PhD 
research.  
 
In this way, the world of practice and the innovative experiments happening  there was 
never too far from this research. I couldn’t but help noticing that many of these splendid 
experiments in the real world felt no need to derive any inspiration or guidance from 
mainstream communicative planning theory. Let alone guide such radical processes in 
the real world, communicative planning theorists had not even been able to observe and 
comprehend them due to their strange contextual bias, which sometimes borders on a 
kind of intellectual elitism. 
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This research, therefore, is primarily an attempt at making communicative planning 
theory catch up with and learn from creative and radical democratic planning 
experiments happening outside North America and West Europe. The argument is, that 
by broadening its contextual scope in this manner, communicative planning theories 
will be able to minimise their inner contradictions and weaknesses and enable them to 
generate truly successful alternatives to neoliberal urbanisation and move closer to their 
ideal of making sense together while living differently in contemporary urban 
environments. 
1.2 The Structure of the Thesis  
This thesis is divided into six parts. The first part introduces the research by elaborating 
why this research was undertaken in the first place, what were the root questions it 
sough to answer, which theoretical positions it criticised and what its arguments are 
based on such a critique. The second part consists of a detailed presentation, analysis 
and critique of the communicative turn in planning theory, seen in the light of the 
participatory turn in development theory and the real experience of innovative 
democratisation experiments in third world countries. This part ends with the 
formulation of the research question. The third part elaborates the main principles 
underlying the research methodology and why these were considered the most 
appropriate ones for the purpose of this research. The fourth part consists of three 
chapters and gives an account of the historical and geographical context within which 
the democratic decentralisation experiments of West Bengal have happened. The fifth 
part consists a detailed account of the planning and implementation of a large urban 
development project at the local level, which helps us to understand how the 
democratisation of planning through such radical experiments in west Bengal is getting 
reflected in the execution of real development projects. The sixth part consists of two 
chapters. The first one presents the findings and conclusions of the research and the way 
in which they reformulate certain key attributes and assumptions of communicative 
planning theory. The second one provides some ideas regarding the manner in which 
the modified communicative planning theory can provide guidance to genuinely 
democratic planning practices at the local level. 
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Part II 
Theory 
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2. Communicative Planning Theory 
 
2.1 The Communicative Turn in Planning Theory 
According to Patsy Healey, the communicative turn in planning theory is related to a 
‘broad wave of reflection on identity (ways of being - ontology) and the bases of 
knowledge (ways of knowing - epistemology) which is influencing western thought in 
general in these days.’ (ibid., p - 29). This intellectual wave’ which had been building 
since the 1970s  within planning theory is what came to be categorised as 
‘argumentative, communicative or interpretive planning theory.’ (ibid.). Although such 
theories have been developed by a number of theorists both from within the American 
and European planning traditions, Healey highlights certain key realisations that 
underlie this intellectual wave.  
 
1. A recognition that all forms of knowledge are socially constructed; and that the 
knowledge of science and technology of experts are not as different from ‘practical 
reasoning’ as the instrumental rationalists had claimed; 
2. A recognition that the development of communication of knowledge and reasoning 
take many forms, from rational systematic analysis, to storytelling, and expressive 
statements, in words, pictures or sound; 
3. A recognition, as a result, of the social context within which individuals form 
interests; individuals thus do not arrive at their ‘preferences’ independently, but learn 
from their views in social contexts and through interaction; 
4. A recognition that, in contemporary life, people have diverse interests and 
expectations, and that relations of power have the potential to oppress and dominate not 
merely through the distribution of material resources, but through the fine grain of 
taken-for-granted assumptions and practices; 
5. A realisation that public policies which are concerned with managing co-existence in 
shared spaces which seek to be efficient, effective and accountable to all those with a 
‘stake’ in a place need to draw upon, and spread ownership of, the above range of 
knowledge and reasoning; 
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6. A realisation that this leads away from competitive interest bargaining towards 
collaborative consensus-building. 
7. A realisation that, in this way, planning work is both embedded in its context of 
social relations through its day to day practices, and has the capacity to challenge and 
change these relations through the approach to these practices. 
(Healey: 1997, pp - 29-30)    
 
Over the years, this communicative turn in planning gained so much prominence in 
theoretical discussions, that Judith Innes referred to this phenomenon as ‘planning 
theory’s emerging paradigm.’ (Innes: 1995, p - 183, quoted in Fainstein: 2000, p - 454). 
Communicative planning sees the role of the planner as that of a mediator among 
different stakeholders. The planner’s primary function is to ‘listen to people’s stories 
and assist in the forging of consensus among different viewpoints.’ (Fainstein: 2000, p - 
454). The planner is not a technocratic leader but an ‘experiential learner’ who provides 
information to participants, but is primarily involved in being ‘sensitive to points of 
convergence’ to ensure that ‘whatever the position of participants within the socio-
economic hierarchy, no group’s interests will dominate.’ (ibid.). 
 
Brand and Gaffikin provide four reasons for the emergence and widespread acceptance 
of communicative planning theories. 
1. The post-modernist perspectives on the reduced certitudes and predictabilities of a 
complex world. 
2. Putative shifts to new modes of governance that acknowledges the need to involve 
multiple stakeholders. 
3. The cross-fertilisation among these stakeholders, supporting a creative milieu for the 
developing economy; and 
4. The increasing hegemony of neo-liberalism. 
(Brand and Gaffikin: 2007, p - 283). 
 
However, the authors clarify that communicative planning theories rest more on an ‘a-
modern’ ontology, rather than a post-modern one, as they reject both ‘modernistic 
reductionism and universalism, while also disowning post-modern relativism and hyper-
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individualism.’ (ibid., p - 286). Collaborative planning, which has been described by 
Brand and Gaffikin, as the ‘Healeyan incarnation of communicative planning’ (ibid., p - 
284), bases itself on two prominent theoretical positions of the twentieth century - 
Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration and Jürgen Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action.  
2.2 The Contradictions in Communicative Planning Theory and 
Implications for Practice 
Giddens’ theory of structuration is not very different from the Marxist position on the 
relationship between structures and individuals. Like Marx, Giddens argues that, ‘we 
are born into social relations and we live through them during out lives...through these 
relations we are linked to particular histories and geographies which constrain our 
material and conceptual resources and experiences.’ (Healey: 1997, p - 45). Similarly, 
he also agrees with the Marxist position, when he asserts that despite our lives being 
structured by processes that have happened before, ‘such structuring power over human 
existence’ is ‘never absolute’, and that ‘people had the potential to challenge power if 
they could get sufficient understanding to reflect on their conditions of existence and 
see their ‘structured oppression’ for what it was.’ (ibid., p - 46). Giddens went on to 
elaborate that although, we live and operate within structures that have been created and 
set in place before we came into being, they must have been created by human beings 
too.  
 
Describing the contribution that Giddens makes to the Marxist notion of structures, 
Healey writes, that while thinkers like Marx view structures as ‘external forces acting 
on individual subjects’, Giddens, on the other hand, argues, that ‘structural forces work 
through the relational webs within which we live, as we both use and constitute the 
structures that surround us.’ (ibid.). Not only are we living in structured relations, but 
the structures are also contained inside us  (ibid.). Based on such an understanding of 
the internalisation of structures within individuals, Healey writes, that the ‘micro-
practices of everyday life are thus key sites for the mobilisation of transformative 
forces.’ (ibid., p - 49)  
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Though, Marx and Engels stressed the externality of structures, they were not unaware 
of the enormously complex zone of inter-connection between structures and individuals. 
In a letter written to Joseph Bloc in 1890, Frederick Engels wrote the following lines, 
 
Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that the younger people sometimes 
lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasise the main 
principle, vis-à-vis our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the 
place or the opportunity to give their due to other factors involved in the interaction. 
(Engels: 1890, quoted in Namboodiripad: 1986, p - 7) 
 
Engels then went on to clarify, what he means by the ‘other factors’.  
 
The economic condition is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure - 
political forms of class struggle and its results, such as constitutions established by the 
victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and, especially the 
reflections of all these struggles in the brains of the participants, political, legal, philo-
sophical theories, religious views and their further development into systems of dogmas 
- also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many 
cases determine their form in particular. There is an interaction of all these elements in 
which, amid all the endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner 
interconnection is remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent 
and neglect it), the economic movement is finally bound to assert itself.  Otherwise the 
application of the theory to any period of history would be easier than the solution of a 
simple equation of the first degree. (ibid.) 
 
The above description shows that Engels had a clear understanding of the variety and 
subtlety with which structures interact with individuals. 
 
Where Marx’ and Engels’ thoughts on structures really diverge from that of Healey and 
Giddens, is regarding the ‘key sites’ at which one should act in order to bring about 
social transformation. By focussing primarily on the micro-processes of life as the sites 
of transformation one risks feeling empowered at the cost of under-estimating powerful 
adversaries. While it is true that we exist in relational webs, which are embedded in 
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particular social contexts, it is not a horizontal web or network, where everybody exerts 
an equal pull on everybody else. Tom Crumpacker writes, that as ‘social change is 
structural..it occurs by changing institutions rather than personalities. In order to make 
progressive change, we must first get back to reality...If we start from fantasy, change 
leads us only to another fantasy.’ (Crumpacker: 2002, p - 4). Such a focus on the realm 
of micro-processes becomes a natural consequence of the focus on cultural diversity as 
a thing in itself without adequately exploring the underlying causes of such diversity. 
Healey writes that although the challenge of  taking planning decisions in the context of 
cultural pluralism seems overwhelming at  the macro-level, we are negotiating with 
variety and difference all the time in our daily lives at the micro and individual level.  
 
Understood in this way, living with cultural difference is not something that is alien or 
new. We have been doing it all the time, with more or less success. Negotiating among 
diverse thought worlds is part of our daily life experience. Some of us are more aware 
of this than others, partly because our particular histories and geographies, or webs of 
relations, give us more experience of being ‘on the outside looking in’. We may be 
women in a man’s world, blacks in a white world, working-class people in a 
professional world, priests in a lay society...Yet we manage to ‘live with difference’ and 
to challenge and even change the culturally blind. (Healey: 1997, p - 48)  
 
Such an assumption is risky. By giving such a description of reality Healey, perhaps un-
knowingly, goes very close to the post-modern relativism and hyper-individualism that 
she herself criticises. Would it be believable for a poor house-maid living in the slums 
of Kolkata that the hard reality of existence she faces is created by and through a 
relational web in which she co-exists with many other actors, such as the CEOs of the 
major companies in the city who meet at the Kolkata Club to play golf, the political 
leaders of the nation, renowned scholars and advisors such as Patsy Healey and 
Anthony Giddens? Wouldn’t she find it ridiculously absurd if it be suggested to her that 
all that is needed to change that devil of a structure called urban poverty is a greater 
general awareness regarding the way such structural relations operate the actors ?  
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The other, theoretical position is that of communicative rationality developed by Jürgen 
Habermas. Habermas widens the concept of reasoning from that of a ‘self-conscious 
autonomous subject using principles of logic and scientifically formulated empirical 
knowledge to guide actions’ to one in which reasoning is based on a process of ‘inter-
subjective effort at mutual understanding.’ (Healey: 1996, p - 239, quoted in Fainstein: 
2000, p - 454). His approach can further be traced back to Hegelian idealism, Marxist 
critical analysis and then to Wittgenstein’s analysis of language. (Fainstein: 2000, p - 
454). 
 
Communicative action is guided by communicative rationality. According to Habermas, 
such rationality ‘is found in speech meeting the validity claims of comprehensibility, 
truth, rightness, and sincerity, and at the same time aiming at mutual understanding and 
agreement.’ (Sager: 1994, p - 6).  
 
Habermas summarises the five requirements of the ethics of discourse as follows - 
1. no party affected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse 
(the requirement of generality) 
2. all participants should have equal possibility to present and criticize validity claims in 
the process of discourse (autonomy) 
3. participants must be willing and able to empathize with each other’s validity claims 
(ideal role taking) 
4. existing power differences between participants must be neutralised such that these 
differences have no effect on the creation of consensus (power neutrality) 
5. participants must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection 
desist from strategic action (transparence) 
(Habermas: 1993, p - 35, in Flyvbjerg: 1998, p - 188) 
 
Flyvbjerg writes, that ‘in a society following this model, citizenship would be defined in 
terms of taking part in public debate. Participation is discursive participation.’ 
(Flyvbjerg: 1998, p - 188). Although Habermas describes such a speech situation as an 
ideal type he also writes in his elaboration of universal pragmatics, that he takes ‘the 
type of action aimed at reaching understanding to be fundamental...other forms of social 
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action - for example, conflict, competition, strategic action in general - are derivatives 
of action oriented to reach understanding.’ (Habermas: 1979, p - 1). He further writes, 
that ‘communicative reason is directly implicated in social life processes insofar as acts 
of mutual understanding take on the role of a mechanism for coordinating action.’ 
(Habermas: 1990, p - 316, quoted in Flyvbjerg: 1998, p - 187).  
 
In terms of the rationality types, such an application of the theory of communicative 
action to planning means a shift from instrumental rationality, which had dominated 
mainstream planning theories until then, toward communicative rationality. Healey 
wrote that ‘the planning tradition itself has generally been ‘trapped’ inside a modernist 
instrumental rationalism for many years, and is only now beginning to escape.’ (Healey: 
1997, p - 7). A theory of planning based on communicative rationality would be totally 
different from the conventional ones, where the scientific knowledge of the expert plays 
a crucial role in providing ‘an objective basis for identifying present problems and 
predicting future possibilities.’ (ibid., p - 9). 
 
An interesting application of communicative rationality to planning theory was made by 
Tore Sager, when he used it to contribute to the ‘synoptic-versus-incremental’ debate in 
planning theory, which he described as the ‘most important one (debate) in the theory of 
planning after Charles Lindblom had published his paper on ‘muddling through’ in 
1959.’ (Sager: 1994, p - 3). Sager argued, that disjointed incrementalism was not the 
perfect theoretical opposite of the synoptic ideal in planning theory, as the two were not 
based on two different types of rationality. Both disjointed incrementalism and synoptic 
planning had instrumental rationality as their base. In order to create the perfect 
theoretical opposite to synoptic planning, ‘the introduction of dialogue and the 
communicative rationality of Habermas’ was required (ibid., p - 1). Sager termed such a 
perfect theoretical opposite dialogical incrementalism. By applying communicative 
rationality as a base to incrementalism, the means-end scheme, which characterises 
synoptic planning,  becomes invalidated. This happens not just because ‘goals are too 
unclear and ambiguous to inform action - which they often are’, but essentially because 
‘the ulterior end is embedded in the activity itself’ as ‘dialogue, close ego-confirming 
relationships, and the experience of being able to make a difference when issues are 
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discussed (democracy)...have intrinsic value independent of any goal-oriented strategy.’ 
(ibid., p - 7). The introduction of dialogue as the basis for incremental planning theory 
also contributes to countering the usual critiques it has faced focussing on its lack of 
direction, a tendency to ‘serve those already in power’ (ibid., p - 19), its prioritisation of 
pragmatics over principles and vulnerability to opportunism (Forester: 1981, in ibid.).  
 
However, Sager is very clear in writing that the benefits of dialogical incrementalism 
‘will never be fully realised, because communicative rationality is a theoretical ideal to 
be completely fulfilled neither in practice nor in the proposed dialogical planning 
theory.’ (ibid., p 19 - 20). Regarding the impossibility of realising it even in theory, 
Sager clarifies that the ‘core ideas of incrementalism are incompatible with unbounded 
communicative rationality’ (ibid., p - 20). When it comes to the difficulties involved in 
realising it in practice, the ‘modest capacity of human beings for empathy...lack of will 
to reason behind a ‘veil of ignorance’’ (ibid.), and the ‘severe structural distortion and 
inequality’ (ibid., p - 19) in real society are enough to make it well-nigh impossible. The 
real benefit of dialogical incrementalism doesn’t lie in practical application to planning, 
as Sager elaborates in the following lines. Right at the start of his book on 
communicative planning theory Sager clarifies that ‘dialogical incrementalism is not a 
practical mode of planning but rather a theoretical and an analytic tool. This tool can be 
used when discussing planning theories and assessing planning in a communicative 
perspective’ (ibid., p - 1) and ‘provides unambiguous reference points for the analysis of 
planning behaviour.’ (ibid., p - 21).   
 
Susan Fainstein understands the contribution of Habermas’ communicative rationality 
to planning theory in a similar light. Just like Sager, she writes that Habermas ‘posits 
the ideal speech situation as a criterion by which to register the distortion inherent in 
most interactions’ and supplies a ‘vehicle for demystification.’ (Fainstein: 2000, p - 
455). Her main disagreement with the communicative turn in planning is not regarding 
the ideals of communicative rationality but regarding the process of turning this ‘vehicle 
of demystification’ into an ‘objective of planning’. This process creates theoretical 
problems, as instead of being a critique of existing distortions in communication it takes 
a ‘moralistic tone’ and its advocates ‘seem to forget the economic and social forces that 
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produce endemic social conflict and domination by the powerful.’ (ibid.). She writes, 
that ‘although their roots, via Habermas, are in critical theory, once the communicative 
theorists move away from critique and present a manual for action, their thought loses 
its edge.’ (ibid.). 
 
Fainstein agrees that many planning problems can indeed be resolved and gains for the 
weaker parties made through the process of negotiations and discussions between 
diverse stakeholders, however ‘persistent issues of displacement as a consequence of 
modernisation and siting of unwanted facilities proximate to weak constituencies are 
less susceptible to resolution. (ibid.). She further writes that ‘even if perceptions of 
interests are biased or mis-directed by distorted speech and even if structures are 
socially constructed, changing speech alone doesn’t transform structures.’ (ibid., p - 
458). For that to happen a phase of struggle and mobilisation becomes necessary.  
 
She further demonstrated, that in those situations where gains seemed to have been 
made for the less powerful in a communicative/collaborative process, the 
communication was restricted to issues which did not substantially challenge the status 
quo. While criticizing the same New Jersey state plan, which was praised by Judith 
Innes for being a good example of the communicative model, Fainstein wrote, that ‘the 
plan contained only weak requirements for the construction of affordable housing, 
suburban integration, and compact development even though lack of housing for low-
income residents, suburban exclusion of the poor and minorities, and lack of open space 
were identified as the principal problems that planning was supposed to overcome.’ 
(ibid., p - 459) 
 
Fainstein then goes on to list the various kinds of problems that arise, when 
communicative planning is put into practice. In practice, it often leads to the continued 
dominance of the powerful, extremely lengthy processes of discussions and 
deliberations (which, in one case referred to by the author, made the participants 
describe the policy forums as “talking shops”) (ibid.) and the problems which arise 
when planners play only a ‘non-directive role’ and ‘desist from agenda setting.’ (ibid., p 
- 460). She also brings forward one point which is ignored by communicative planners 
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as a rule - the potential role of the paternalistic and bureaucratic modes of planning in 
producing desirable outcomes for the people. She writes that ‘various studies of the 
European welfare states and the New Deal in the United States have concluded that the 
principle measure for ensuring health and welfare were generated by state officials with 
little reference to interested publics.’ (ibid., p - 457) 
 
Despite all these problems why has the appeal of the communicative model remained so 
strong? What explains this popularity of the model despite such concrete criticisms ? 
Various authors have come out with various explanations. Tore Sager summarised some 
of those explanations in the following points - 
 
 Many western societies and cities are becoming more multi-cultural, with a more 
diverse ethnic and cultural make up and thus increased need for negotiation and 
communication in the preparation of public plans and projects. 
 The citizenry is more educated than ever before and demands to be heard in public 
matters. 
 Civil society is thoroughly organized with a large number of interest organisations and 
social movements that are strong enough to challenge bureaucratic and political 
decisions. 
 The 1970s saw a large extension of the range of effects deemed relevant to the 
evaluation of plans and projects. There is a lack of objective standards for assessing 
many of the environmental and social consequences, in contrast to the traditional 
technical and economic ones, so the preferences of affected groups are needed in 
addition to expert calculations. 
(Sager: 2005, p - 3) 
 
The crisis of the welfare state which started setting in from the 1970s onwards, which 
coincided with the rise of the neo-liberal ideology is another reason. In fact, the rise of 
communicative planning coincides with the crisis of the welfare state and the rise of 
neo-liberal ideology. In their paper on collaborative planning and governance capacity, 
Judith Innes and David Booher had written that ‘we live in a time of crisis, uncertainty 
and change. We also live in a time when our institutions seem to lack the capacity to 
deal with those conditions.’ (Booher and Innes: 2003, p - 5). In such a world of 
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‘globalisation, rapid growth of technology, instantaneous worldwide communication, 
and fragmentation of institutions and communities...the familiar models of governance 
do not work because they depend on predictability, approach problems piece-meal, and 
presume experts can design workable solutions to meet recognized goals.’ (Friedman: 
2000 and Castells: 1996, in ibid.) 
 
This crisis of governance was recognised by other sources too, and was seen to be 
affecting the countries of the north and the south alike. For example, a study sponsored 
by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation pointed to the need to building a ‘new relationship 
between local government and local people’ in the UK (Clark and Stewart: 1998, p - 3, 
quoted in Gaventa: 2004, p - 26). The report went on to state the reasons for the need 
build such a new relationship in the following words, 
 
There are two reasons for this. The first has to do with alienation and apathy. There is a 
major issue about the attitudes of the public as customers or citizens, towards local 
government...This is a symptom of a deeper malaise, the weakness or lack of public 
commitment to local democracy. (ibid.)    
 
Booher and Innes write, that it is in this context, that ‘some new forms of collaborative 
dialogue, policy making, and action are filling the gaps left as our formal institutions of 
government are failing to carry out their responsibilities or where no agency has 
jurisdiction.’ (Booher and Innes: 2003, p - 6). Many of the experiments with discursive 
participation and institutional reforms, such as the democratic decentralisation processes 
initiated in scores of third world countries, can be seen as attempts to address the 
general crisis of governance and undermining of democratic processes by actually 
existing neoliberalism. Healey’s own motivation for developing the concept of 
collaborative planning was to contribute to the development of a more appropriate 
planning process for contemporary democratic societies, and enable it to face the twin 
challenges of post-modernism and neoliberalism.  
 
However, while communicative action in the form of discursive participation in the 
planning and development process might show a way to restore a democratic planning 
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process, Christer Bengs (2005), argues that instead of generating an alternative to 
neoliberalism, communicative planning becomes conducive to it. Brand and Gaffikin 
also draw attention to this point, when they write that ‘there is an apparent paradox in 
the promotion of collaborative practices rooted in values of cohesion, solidarity and 
inclusivity in a world that can be seen as ever more individualist, socially fragmented, 
competitive, or in other words, uncollaborative.’ (Brand and Gaffikin: 2007, p - 283).  
 
Bengs cannot find a satisfactory answer to the prevalence of communicative planning 
theories from the conventional reasons generally given to explain its rise. He makes the 
bold move of hurling a salvo at the relevance of planning theory in general by posing 
the following question - ‘If planning theory is of little use to practitioners, perhaps it is 
of some use for others?’ (Bengs: 2005, p - p - 3). Referring to John Friedmann’s 
assertion that planning theory ‘...is essential to the vitality and continued relevance of 
planning profession.’, Bengs comments on the material context within which such 
theories and arguments for them are generated by writing, that such a justification as 
provided by Friedmann, ‘is of course understandable coming from a university 
professor who earns his living by producing planning theory.’ (ibid.).  
 
He writes, that although ‘practical skills can be picked up in professional 
practice...professional skills include theoretical knowledge as well as particular ethical 
attitudes and aesthetic preferences, which form the core of a professions training 
programme.’ (ibid.). Bengs’ intention is not to prove the irrelevance of planning theory 
but to probe into the real reasons for its existence. If it is not substantially helping in a 
progressive professionalization of planning, then what or who is it helping ? 
 
Advancing this scepticism towards the particular arena of communicative planning 
theories, Bengs argues that the reason for the prevalence of communicative planning 
theory is that it ‘satisfies the need to establish social institutions consistent with the 
neoliberal society.’ (Bengs: 2005, p - 7). He writes that ‘a new planning regime with a 
minimum of predefined restrictions and guidelines and ample possibilities for striking 
deals on the local level is in conformity with neoliberal ideals.’ (ibid.).  
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According to Tore Sager ‘whether the explanation is right or wrong, it is certainly the 
most interesting and challenging hypothesis.’ (Sager: 2005, p - 3). In his reply to Bengs, 
Sager writes that it has never appeared to him from the works of any of the prominent 
communicative planning theorists that they wilfully intended to adapt the theory to the 
‘neoliberal realpolitik’ (ibid., p - 7). The correctness of Sager’s observation can be 
judged from the following lines that Patsy Healey wrote two years earlier expressing 
both her surprise and alarm concerning the manner in which the notion of collaborative 
planning has been used and misused. 
 
Six years after completing Collaborative Planning, I have been surprised, pleased and 
also a little alarmed by its reception. The metaphor ‘collaborative planning’ became 
used and misused by politicians and policy-makers in the UK from the mid-1990s 
onwards to describe their ambitions for a new form of governance, borrowing heavily 
from business management literature. Several groups promoting inclusive participative 
processes in project design and development were also using the collaborative label. By 
the late 1990s also, US concepts of consensus building were beginning to become 
known in Britain...These experiences raised questions about their ‘collaborative quali-
ties’. What had seemed a distant prospect in the late 1980s was beginning to look like a 
dominant rhetoric 10 years later. The practice, though, was often far from reflecting the 
inclusionary qualities of a potential collaborative process. (Healey: 2003, p - 108)   
 
However, Sager is aware of the fact, that the absence of such a tendency among the 
leading theorists is not a guarantee that the results of ‘public intervention’ would not 
turn out to be exactly opposite of what was expected. (ibid.). From the above lines of 
Healey, this is exactly what seems to have happened.  
 
This tension between the honest and sincere intention of the communicative planning 
theorists to create a theoretical platform for a truly inclusive and sensitive planning 
process which would be in tune with the spirit of modern democratic societies, and the 
inherent potential of such planning theories to be misused by the proponents of neo-
liberal ideology to function as a legitimisation for highly un-democratic economic 
strategies constitutes one the most challenging contradictions in communicative 
planning theory. 
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 3. Communicative Planning and the 
Neoliberal Challenge 
3.1 The Contradiction in Neoliberal Ideology 
The challenge that is posed by neoliberal urbanisation to communicative planning 
experiments has its roots in the contradiction that lies between neoliberal ideology and 
what analysts have described as ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ (Brenner and 
Theodore: 2002, p - 2). According to Brenner and Theodore, ‘the linchpin of neoliberal 
ideology is the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all 
forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic 
development.’ (ibid.). The intellectual roots of neoliberal ideology lay in the post-war 
writings of the Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek and the economist 
Milton Friedmann. However, the concept didn’t gain in prominence until the global 
recession, that set in at the end of the 1960s and continued through the 1970s, 
threatened and exhausted the embedded liberalism of the industrialised countries of the 
west.  Embedded liberalism refers to how ‘market processes and entrepreneurial and 
corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints and a 
regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in other instances led the way in 
economic and industrial strategy.’ (Harvey: 2005, p - 11) 
 
The experience of the second world war and the eagerness to prevent a recurrence of the 
devastating economic depression that preceded it, led to the belief that ‘to ensure 
domestic peace and tranquillity, some sort of class compromise between capital and 
labour had to be constructed.’ (ibid., p - 10). At the international level, this 
understanding led to the creation of a New World Order, ‘through the Bretton Woods 
agreements, and various institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the 
IMF, and the bank of International Settlements in Basle’, and keeping it under the 
‘umbrella protection of US military power.’ (ibid.). At the national level this system led 
to the creation of a variety of state forms, all of which agreed on the pivotal role that the 
state must play in the generation of ‘full employment, economic growth, and the welfare 
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of its citizens.’ (ibid.) It was when the economic crisis of 1960s set in and the Keynesian 
policies stopped working that ‘the capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalisation as 
the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments.’ (ibid., p - 13)   
 
There were various factors that contributed to the rise of the neoliberal ideology, but 
Harvey wishes to draw attention to one particular element in the period which marked 
the transition from embedded liberalism to neoliberalism. He writes that the widespread 
discontent that was caused by the crisis of capital accumulation led to the strengthening 
of communist and socialist parties in Europe, the US and in many third world countries. 
This trend pointed to the ‘emergence of a socialist alternative to the social compromise 
between capital and labour that grounded capital accumulation so successfully in the 
post war period.’ (ibid., p - 15) 
 
Interestingly, just before the emergence of the economic crisis in the western capitalist 
countries there was a strengthening of the position of the Left parties in India, led by the 
undivided Communist Party. The realisation of emerging crisis of capitalism and the 
perceived influence of socialism was so strong that even the bourgeois-landlord 
alliance, that characterised the ruling Congress Party of India at the time, was compelled 
to invite the noted socialist planner and economist Oskar Lange as an advisor during the 
preparation of the second five year plan (1956 - 1961) for the country. 
 
Harvey’s assertion is that this resurgence of socialist and communist parties in so many 
countries posed a ‘clear political threat to economic elites and ruling classes 
everywhere.’ (ibid., p - 15). The earnings of the top 1 percent of income earners in the 
US comprised a chunk as high as 16 percent in the national income of the country 
before the second world war. This share fell to 8 percent in the post-war period due to 
restraints imposed upon this class (ibid.). However, as long as the economic growth and 
capital accumulation happened at a steady pace ‘to have a stable share of an increasing 
pie’ was not a problem (ibid.). However, with the stalling of capital accumulation and 
the rise of socialist tendencies the upper classes felt the need to organise and exert 
themselves. Referring to the careful analysis done by Gerard Dumenil and Dominique 
Levy, Harvey writes, that ‘after the implementation of neo-liberal policies in the late 
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1970s, the share of the top 1 percent of income earners in the US soared, reaching 15 
percent (very close to its pre-Second world war share) by the end of the century.’ (ibid., 
p - 16) 
 
Similar trends were observed in India after the influence of neoliberalism picked up in 
the country since the mid-1990s. P. Sainath, noted Indian journalist and winner of the 
Ramon Magsaysay award for being one of the very few journalists to cover the agrarian 
crisis in the country, wrote in 2005, that the ‘collective worth of 311 Indian billionaires 
is now Rs. 3.64 trillion. This is up 71 per cent from last year, when it was a paltry Rs. 
2.33 trillion.’ (Sainath: 2005, p - 1). According to the Business Standard, the magazine 
which tracks this elite class in India, ‘India’s billionaires have never had it so good.’ 
(Business Standard, Nov 9, 2005, quoted in ibid.). Sainath rounded up his critical 
account of the state of things in India by writing that, ‘some hundreds of millions might 
never have had it so bad either.’ (ibid.) 
 
Harvey writes that ‘redistributive effects (in favour of economic elites) and increasing 
social inequality have in fact been such a persistent feature of neoliberalisation as to be 
regarded as structural to the whole project.’ (Harvey: 2005, p - 16). Based on his 
observations regarding the actual effect of neoliberal policies he makes the following 
argument. 
 
We can, therefore, interpret neoliberalisation either as a utopian project to realize a 
theoretical design for the reorganization of international capitalism or as a political 
project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power 
of economic elites. In what follows I shall argue that the second of these objectives has 
in practice dominated. (ibid., p - 19). 
 
Advocates of neoliberal ideology are ‘assiduous in seeking the privatization of assets’ 
and see ‘the absence of clear private property rights - as in many developing 
countries...as one of the greatest of all institutional barriers to economic development 
and the improvement of human welfare.’ (ibid., p - 65).  However, neoliberal theorists 
are also ‘profoundly suspicious’ of representative democracy and see ‘governance by 
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majority rule’ as a ‘potential threat to individual rights and constitutional liberties.’ 
(ibid., p - 66). As a result of this, neoliberal theorists ‘tend to favour the governance of 
experts’ and show a strong preference for ‘government by executive order and by 
judicial decision rather than democratic and parliamentary decision-making.’ (ibid.). 
This manifests itself in reality in the eagerness to privatize public assets and the rolling 
back of the nation state, particularly from areas of social and economic development. 
From this perspective the concept of communicative planning would not seem 
unsettling to neoliberal theorists as it can be seen both as a strategy for and 
legitimisation of the weakening of representative democracy by focussing on the 
nurturing of a broader and more flexible political society inspired by the theories of 
structuration and communicative action. 
3.2 Characteristics of Neoliberal Urbanisation and Implications 
for Communicative Planning 
Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez describe the characteristcs of neoliberal 
urbanisation in Europe through their study of large urban development projects. These 
authors assert that as a result of the influence of neoliberal ideology in urban planning 
and development, there has been a steady shift of emphasis from planning to projects 
and from people to places. Rather than being directly involved in comprehensive 
planning of the city and the welfare of the socially and economically weaker sections of 
the city, neoliberal ideology preferred the withdrawal of the state from these arenas. 
Instead of the comprehensive plan, ‘large scale projects and events are perceived as 
strategic instruments aiming at reshaping the city.’ (Swyngedouw et al.: 2002, p - 215). 
However, the irony of the situation is that when it comes to ‘actually existing 
neoliberalism’ instead of neoliberal ideology, the role of state planning remains pivotal. 
Rather than rolling back entirely, the state rolls back from planning for the sake of 
welfare and regulation of market forces and re-orients itself towards creating ‘the social, 
physical, and geographical infra- and superstructures that support, finance, subsidize, or 
otherwise promote new forms of capital accumulation.’ (ibid., p - 200). 
 
‘Re-centring the city’ became the focus of the new urban policy which developed 
parallel to the neoliberal economic policy. (Swyngedouw, Moulaert and Rodriguez: 
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2002, p 198). In the face of increasingly globalised economic processes, cities and 
regions competed with each other to ‘carve out their niche’ within the emerging new 
patterns of divisions of labour, production, consumption and political transformations. 
(ibid.) Moreover, this re-centring, re-structuring and re-imagination of the city was done 
not just for the ‘eyes of the master planners and city fathers and mothers, but primarily 
for the outsider, the investor, developer, businesswoman or -man, or the money packed 
tourist.’ (ibid.). The creation of monumental projects, such as ‘EU’s encroaching office 
expansion in Brussels, the Guugenheim museum in Bilbao, the new financial district in 
the Dublin dockyards, the science-university complex Adlershof in Berlin, 
Copenhagen’s Orestaden project...testify to the unshakable belief of the city elites in the 
healing effects that the production of new urban complexes promises for the city’s 
vitality.’ (ibid.) 
 
The concepts of participatory governance, bottom-up planning and decentralisation all 
assume roles that are favourable to the project of neoliberal urbanisation. In a context of 
urbanisation dominated by ‘project-focussed and market-led initiatives’(ibid., p - 215) 
where ‘the assumed trickle-down mechanisms, occasionally accompanied by targeted 
policies to facilitate social inclusion processes, are considered of sufficient strength to 
permit a socially balanced and successful development’ (ibid., p - 216), the role of 
communication in planning and democracy in decentralisation is acceptable only to the 
extent that it frees the market from the fetters of state control while keeping aloft a 
superficial image of cherished political ideals. As David Harvey notes at the start of his 
book ‘A brief history of neoliberalism’,  
 
For any way of though to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has to be advanced 
that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and our desires, as well as to 
the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit. If successful, this conceptual 
apparatus becomes so embedded in common sense as to be taken for granted and not 
open to question. The founding figures of neoliberal thought took political ideals of 
human dignity and individual freedom as fundamental, as ‘the central values of 
civilisation’. In so doing they chose wisely, for these are indeed compelling and 
seductive ideals. (Harvey: 2005, p - 5)   
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 Swyngedouw et al., for example, describe how the creation of new institutional 
arrangements based on the ideas of pluralistic governance and stakeholder participation 
are typically projected as the establishment of a ‘democratic forum that permits open 
and non-distorted communication and action’, whereas, in their investigations they 
discovered ‘an extra-ordinary degree of selectivity’, where, ‘although a varying 
choreography of state, private sector, and non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
participation is usually present, these forms of urban governance show a significant 
deficit with respect to accountability, representation and the presence of formal rules of 
inclusion or participation.’ (Swyngedouw et al.: 2002, p - 209). Participation in such 
contexts often boils down to being operated through co-optation and invitation and 
‘public-private partnerships epitomise the ideal of this cooperative and coordinated 
mode of “pluralistic” governance.’ (ibid., p - 214).  
 
Peck and Tickell write that such competition between cities has a ‘powerful disciplinary 
effect.’ (Peck and Tickell: 2002, p - 46). Harvey describes the challenge of such a 
disciplinary effect when he writes the following lines. 
 
It is by no means clear that even the most progressive urban government can resist 
[social polarisation]when embedded in the logic of capitalist spatial development in 
which competition seems to operate not as a beneficial hidden hand, but as an external 
coercive law forcing the lowest common denominator of social responsibility and 
welfare provision within a competitively organised urban system. (Harvey: 1989, p - 12, 
quoted in ibid.) 
3.3 Understanding the Contextual Bias and the Need for 
Internationalisation of Communicative Planning Theory 
From the point of view of this research the problem with communicative planning 
theory, as it exists today, is not just regarding the contradictions it has and the way such 
contradictions have an effect on planning practice, as described in the previous section. 
The inadequacy of the theory, which this research is more interested in, arises from the 
fact, that all the mainstream theories of planning, including the theory of communicative 
planning have been generated within the historical context of West Europe and North 
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America. Such a geographic focus becomes conspicuous in the following elaboration of 
Tore Sager regarding the relationship between mainstream planning theories and the 
political contexts within which they were developed. 
 
Synoptic planning was associated with the technical-economic enterprise valued in the 
reconstruction period following World War II. Disjointed incrementalism was seen as a 
translation of economic market logic to the ‘market of ideas’ laying the basis for 
planned intervention. Advocacy planning was a response to the degeneration of many 
US inner cities in the early 1960s. Moreover, the transactive planning of John 
Friedmann (1973) reflected the radical trends and the quest for more participation of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s. (Sager: 2005, p - 2) 
 
Communicative planning seeks to create an appropriate planning process for democratic 
societies in an ever globalizing world. It has already been seen that it wishes to resist, 
but often ends up being misused, neoliberal trends in urban planning and development, 
and neoliberalism is a global phenomenon. Given such obvious realities, communicative 
planning theory is strangely quiet about the world outside Europe and North America. 
This silence is both regarding the numerous democratic experiments with planning and 
development being undertaken in the various countries of the third world and also the 
democratic heritage of such countries, which was often built through painful struggles 
against the imperial ambitions of those very countries who cannot praise themselves 
enough for being the direct descendents of European Enlightenment.   
 
In her elaboration of the communicative turn in planning theory, Patsy Healey refers to 
the experience of ‘planners in Britain, in planning schools and planning practice, who 
have shared a particular experience of the 1970s and 1980s.’ (Healey: 1996, p - 234). 
She traces the idea of planning to the ‘enlightenment tradition of “modernity”’, which is 
the source of ‘so much of Western culture.’ (ibid., p - 236). This connection of planning 
in Western democratic countries to the enlightenment project is so firmly established in 
the writing, that the assault of the French ‘deconstructionists’ on the project of 
‘modernity’, is described by her in the following words, 
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Whereas post-modernism in architecture is primarily a critique of a particular paradigm 
and style within Western art and architecture, philosophical postmodernism challenges 
the foundation of two hundred years of Western thought. (ibid., p - 237) 
 
What is important to note is not just the substance of what Healey is writing but also the 
feeling of a sense of grand loss and crisis that marks the tone of the lines. It makes one 
wonder if at all a world exists outside Western Europe and North America and if that 
alien world has ever made even the slightest contribution to the idea and practice of 
democracy. The enlightenment is described in a way which borders on  religious faith 
and the historical phenomenon gets a mystical aura.  
 
Such selective amnesia regarding the historical development of ones own society is not 
something peculiar to the authors of mainstream planning theory. While seeking the 
causes for the non-emergence of capitalism in India, Max Weber had concluded that it 
was due to the absence of a Puritan ethic in the belief and function of the religious sects 
in India. The presence of such a Puritan ethic in Christianity, which ‘favoured frugality, 
saving and investment of wealth, a commitment to a vocation and a concern for the 
salvation of soul...was the crucial factor in the emergence of capitalism in Europe.’ 
(Thapar: 2002, p - 8). Not only was Weber’s analysis of Indian religious sects 
erroneous, the eminent Indian historian Romila Thapar also points out, that ‘curiously, 
the contribution of colonialism to the emergence of capitalism in Europe was given no 
attention in this analysis.’ (ibid., p - 9). Similarly, economist Utsa Patnaik observes, that 
as Britain’s most prized colony, Indian alone was earning 71 million pounds sterling 
through exports  before the outbreak of the first world war (the second largest export 
earnings in the world) and ‘these earnings were siphons off to Britain to pay for its own 
deficits.’ (Patnaik: 2003, p - 11) 
 
Already by the late nineteenth century, the eminent Indian scholar and political activist 
Dadabhai Naoroji was developing the ‘drain theory’, which argued, that a significant 
part of India’s national income, or the material values produced every year by the 
working people of India, is taken away from, or ‘drained’ out of the country and used by 
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Englishmen for their own purposes.’ (Namboodiripad: 1966, p - 15). This is how 
Naoroji himself explained the process of economic drain . 
 
Whatever revenue is raised by other countries, for instance, the £ 70 million in England, 
the whole of it returns back to the people and remains in the country; and therefore, the 
national capital, upon which the production of the country depends, does not suffer 
diminution, while, on account of India being subjected to a foreign rule, out of £ 50 
million of revenue raised every year, some £ 20 million or more are carried away to 
England and the national capital - or in other words, its capability of production is 
continually diminished year after year. (quoted in ibid.)  
 
Naoroji had aptly named his book ‘Poverty and Un-British Rule’ in India. Karl Marx 
was far more direct when he lashed out at the double standards resorted to by the 
European nations in their interaction with the colonies, 
 
The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled 
before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the 
colonies, where it goes naked. They are the defenders of property, but did any 
revolutionary party ever originate agrarian revolutions like those in Bengal, in Madras, 
and in Bombay? Did they not, in India, to borrow an expression of. that great robber, 
Lord Clive himself, resort to atrocious extortion, when simple corruption could not keep 
pace with their rapacity? While they prated in Europe about the inviolable sanctity of 
the national debt, did they not confiscate in India the dividends of the rajahs, 171 who 
had invested their private savings in the Company’s own funds? (Marx: 1853, online 
source)  
 
Even if one talks just of Europe, leaving the colonial question aside, it is possible to 
have an idea of the high degree of awareness regarding the bourgeois appropriation and 
perversion of the ideals of enlightenment and the articulation of the critique mounted 
against such appropriation had both reached by the late nineteenth century, from the 
following lines of Frederick Engels, 
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We know today that this kingdom of reason was nothing more than the idealised 
kingdom of the bourgeoisie; that this eternal Right found its realisation in bourgeois 
justice; that this equality reduced itself to bourgeois equality before the law; that 
bourgeois property was proclaimed as one of the essential rights of man; and that the 
government of reason, the Contrat Social of Rousseau, came into being, and only could 
come into being, as a democratic bourgeois republic. The great thinkers of the 18th 
century could, no more than their predecessors, go beyond the limits imposed upon 
them by their epoch. (Engels: 1880, online source)    
 
All these observations point towards the need to not only understand the role played by 
capitalism in shaping the ideas and processes of planning, but to add an international 
dimension to such understanding. 
 
In this regard, the critics of communicative planning theory often fare no better. Susan 
Fainstein, who provided a sharp and clear critique to communicative planning theories, 
also fails to cross over this contextual barrier. In her account of the ‘Just City’ theory, 
she refers to the argument put forward by Frederick Engels in his classic work 
Socialism: Utopian and Scientific that with the  ‘recognition at last of the real nature of 
productive forces of today, the social anarchy of production gives place to a social 
regulation and production upon a definite plan, according to the needs of the community 
and of each individual.’ (Engels: 1935 [1892], pp 68-69, quoted in Fainstein: 2000, p - 
466). Fainstein then immediately goes on to write that ‘at the millennium’s end, one can 
hardly be sanguine that the hegemony of any social grouping will produce outcomes 
that will fulfil “the needs of the community and of each individual”.’ (Fainstein: 2000, p 
- 466).  
 
Here again there is a selective amnesia and a huge leap in historical time - but with 
respect to classical Marxist writing, rather than the enlightenment. Such an analysis of 
Engels violates the basic tenets of dialectic and historical materialism which sees reality 
as an ‘eternal coming into being and going out of being, in a ceaseless flux’ (Engels: 
1883, quoted in Stalin 1938, online source), and therefore urges the agents of social 
transformation to base their orientation not on those ‘strate of society which are no 
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longer developing, even though they at present constitute the predominant force, but on 
those strate which are developing and have a future before them, even though they at 
present do not constitute the predominant force.’ (Stalin:1938, online source). Fainstein’s 
analysis too ignores the role of imperialism and of colonial transfers in the creation of 
an ‘aristocracy of labour’ in Europe and the role it played in the ‘conflict between the 
reformist and revolutionary sections of European social democracy’ in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. (Namboodiripad: 1966, p - 278). 
 
Although Marx and Engels didn’t live to see the full manifestation of imperialism on a 
world stage, they were keenly aware of the trends. In a letter dated October 7, 1858, 
Engels wrote to Marx that, 
 
‘...The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this 
most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a 
bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. For a nation 
which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable.’ (Engels: 
1858, online source). 
 
Similarly, in a letter to Karl Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote the 
following lines. 
 
You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the 
same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers’ party here, there are 
only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals and the workers gaily share the feast of 
England’s monopoly of the world market and the colonies. (Engels: 1882, quoted in 
ibid.)   
 
Rather than observing, like Healey, that ‘these days, such broad structural struggles (e.g. 
between labour and capital) are less clear-cut and less visible’ (Healey: 1997, p - 32) or 
be less ‘sanguine’ about the ‘hegemony of any social grouping’ like Fainstein 
(Fainstein: 2000, p - 466), Engels appears to be quite clear on the fact that structural 
struggles were less visible in England already by the 1880s because there simply was no 
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workers’ party worth the name there as a consequence of dominant position the country 
had among all the imperialist powers in Europe.  
 
Similarly, Isaac and Franke write, that the much discussed phenomenon of globalisation 
is essentially a process of ‘centralisation of international economic power in the hands 
of First World appointed bureaucrats’ operating through agencies such as the World 
Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund etc (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 
250). In such a context of the widespread globalisation of capital and of the exploitation 
of people and resources that has gone along with it, it is but obvious that the progressive 
forces and sites of resistance would also be scattered around the globe. Rather than 
being less sanguine about the writings of Engels and Marx, scholars like Aijaz Ahmad 
find them to be more relevant than ever before in the current conditions. Ahmad writes 
that,  
 
It is only after the Second World War that we can speak of a united global capital and a 
singular global empire, over and above nationally based capitals and colonial empires 
like those of Britain and France. For the first time in human history, Marx’s prediction 
comes true: capital and labour face each other on a world scale. (Interview by Seemin 
Qayum, North American Congress on Latin America, online source)  
 
This conspicuous absence of the third world in mainstream planning theory is all the 
more unfortunate considering the fact that many of the bold experiments with 
democratic governance, in the recent decades, have been undertaken in the third world 
countries. The wave of democratic decentralisation experiments, the particular 
experiences of the oft referred (though not in planning theory) cases of the states of 
Kerala and West Bengal in India, the ability of the economically poor but politically 
mature electorate of India to vote out of power a right-wing neo-liberal regime and the 
experiments with radical democracy in Venezuela and Bolivia seem to be largely alien 
events to the champions and saviours of planning in ‘western democratic societies.’  
 
These points are not being raised to create an argument that the ideals of communicative 
planning  are not relevant for third world countries. In the present times the need for 
 33
making sense while living differently in our cities is a pressing necessity. The 
fragmentation of urban society as a result of incessant competition between different 
urban centres becomes all the more tragic in the case of third world cities where the 
differences are not just in terms of religious or cultural identity but in terms of extreme 
economic inequality. The year 2007, was a landmark year in the history of urbanisation, 
as for the first time the size of the urban population of the world equalled that of the 
rural population. The ‘State of the World’s Cities 2006-2007’ report published by the 
UN - Habitat which made the above observation also stated that much of urban growth 
in the future shall be concentrated in the countries of the third world. The colonial 
experience, the absence of successful ‘embedded liberalism’ as in the case of post-war 
Europe and North-America, the declining faith in state-led and expert driven modes of 
development and the sheer extent and intensity of urban poverty create a greater 
demand for innovative, inclusive and democratic forms of planning in these cities than 
in the cities of the first world. 
 
It is argued here that although the ideals of communicative planning are not only 
desirable but necessary in current times, the theoretical base that exists so far is so 
riddled with contradictions that it is hard to be sure whether it has a greater potential for 
democratic planning or fostering neo-liberal urbanisation when it is put in practice. It 
has been shown in the previous sections that although neoliberal urbanisation often ends 
up co-opting communicative planning practice or certainly has the potential to do so, the 
communicative planning theorists are genuinely committed to the fostering of 
democratic ideals in planning and through that, to resist neoliberal influences. In this 
section it has been argued that such a weakness of communicative planning theory 
perhaps stems from a contextual bias which leads to an explicit focus on the democratic 
heritage and planning experience of West Europe and North America (i.e. the bulk of 
the first world nations)and a near absence of similar experiences in third world 
countries. 
 
Throughout the post-war years, cities in the third world have tried to import first-world 
planning theories and techniques to find solutions to the urban challenges that they face. 
This research attempts a reversal of the process and seeks to enlighten first world 
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planning theories on democratic and communicative planning with the historical 
experience gathered from a third world context. Such a reversal is tantamount to 
broadening the base of communicative planning theory and correcting the contextual 
bias that it suffers from. With the continuation of such a process communicative 
planning theory may be better capable of weakness vis-à-vis anti-democratic forces of 
both unbridled capitalism and political totalitarianism. 
 
As the third world contexts are nearly absent from the literature of mainstream planning 
theories, I had to move out of planning theory and undertake a review of a related 
discipline where the third world context lies at the very heart of things - development 
studies. Such a situation was only to be expected, as development studies in the post-
war decades has been pre-occupied with the investigation of countries and regions 
where development was ‘not’ taking place. A parallel to the communicative turn in 
planning theory and practice can be found in the participatory turn in development 
theory and practice. Interestingly, they originated and rose to prominence at around the 
same time, provided similar reasons for coming into being and faced similar criticisms 
of being too naive and apolitical to be able to resist structures of political and economic 
power. 
 
4. Communicative Planning in the Third 
World Context 
4.1 The Crisis of Participatory Development 
The notion of direct participation started gaining importance in the field of development 
from the 1980s onwards. Just like in the case of the communicative turn in planning, the 
rise of post-structural and post-modern social theories played a role in the participatory 
turn in development. Peet and Hartwick write that, 
 
In the context of the growth of post-colonial studies and the indigenisation of 
knowledge, and with reference also to post-structural and post-modern social theory, the 
field of development studies has undergone a significant critique and re-thinking. 
 35
Indeed, the very notion of development has increasingly been challenged. (Peet and 
Hartwick: 1999, p - 138) 
 
By the 1980s, there was a clear recognition of the inadequacies of top-down, centralised 
and expert driven development approaches. The alleged ineffectiveness and insensitivity 
of this kind of development created the conditions for more participatory approaches. 
Rather than official agencies and institutions like the World Bank, United Nations, or 
the independent nation states, ‘voluntary groups or non- governmental organisations 
(NGOs), were seen as having greater diversity, credibility and creativity’ to bring about 
‘just development’ (ibid., p - 139). According to Cooke and Kothari, ‘the ostensible aim 
of participatory approaches to development was to make ‘people’ central to 
development by encouraging beneficiary involvement in interventions that affect them 
and over which they previously had limited control or influence.’ (Cooke and Kothari: 
2002, p - 5). The authors further wrote that the work of Robert Chambers, ‘which built 
from an interest in participatory rural development, and an advocacy of Participatory 
Rural Appraisal (PRA) to participatory development more generally’ (ibid.) was 
particularly influential in the popularisation of such approaches.  
 
Chambers himself described the spread of participatory approaches as a paradigm 
change in development. This is how he understood and described the phenomenon, 
 
The paradigm of things was dominant in development in the 1950s and 1960s, with 
emphasis placed on big infrastructure, industrialisation and irrigation works. 
Economists and engineers, and their top-down physical and mathematical paradigm, 
determined norms, procedures and styles. Economic analysis continues in the 1990s to 
be the dominant mode of development thinking and practice, but the paradigm of people 
has come to be increasingly influential. This is shown by the burgeoning literature on 
people and participation, by the increase in numbers of non-economist social sciences in 
some aid agencies, notably Overseas Development Administration, and by the 
development and spread of participatory approaches and methods. (Chambers: 1995, p - 
33) 
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However, it was clear to Chambers, that increasingly influential though it may be, the 
paradigm of the people was certainly not the dominant paradigm at the time he was 
writing. He wrote that there are three main ways in which participation is used in 
development. He writes, 
 
First, it is used as a cosmetic label, to make whatever is proposed appear good...Second, 
it describes a co-opting practice, to mobilise local labour and reduce cost. Communities 
contribute their time and effort to self-help projects with some outside assistance. Often 
this means that ‘they’ (local people) participate in ‘our’ project. This, it is used to 
describe an empowering process which enables local people to do their own analysis, to 
take command, to gain in confidence, and to make their own decisions. (ibid., p - 30) 
 
Moreover, it must be noted that he was aware of the fact that paradigm shifts in 
development thought and practice must be seen differently from similar shifts in the 
physical sciences. He stated his views by writing that ‘in the physical sciences, one new 
paradigm tends to replace an old one. In development thinking, paradigms tend to 
coexist, overlap, coalesce and separate.’ (ibid., p - 32). Yet, he preferred to use this in 
order to ‘illuminate major trends’ by setting out ‘polarized extremes’. (ibid.). 
Furthermore, an intelligent and compassionate practitioner like him was also aware, 
that, although the paradigm has shifted in theory, the conventional approaches still 
remain strong in practice. He gave a number of reasons as to why that happens. 
 
The first reason, according to Chambers is, that major infrastructure projects, which 
inevitably involve heavy financing and expert steering, are truly very much in need in 
the third world. The second cluster of reasons is a set of ‘normals’ such as normal 
professionalism, normal bureaucracy, normal careers and normal teaching. This cluster 
of ‘normals’ creates a vicious cycle, where normal professionalism ‘seeks and values 
controlled conditions and universal truths’, the normal bureaucracy champions the 
values of ‘centralisation and standardisation’, normal careers that creates distances from 
field realities and finally normal teaching, which contributes to reproducing all this. 
(ibid., p - 33). However, Chambers doesn’t really go on to explain why and how these 
‘normal’ situations come into being in the first place.   
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 Over the years, participatory development had indeed moved from the periphery to the 
mainstream of development thought and practice. This had happened mainly in the form 
of major donor agencies embracing these approaches. By this time, participation, rather 
than being perceived as a threat by development institutions and governments, was seen 
as ‘politically and economically attractive, a good fund raising device, and...in keeping 
with a move toward the privatisation if development as part of neoliberalism.’ (Peet and 
Hartwick: 1999, p - 141). The development process thus acquired a ‘new face’ - ‘the 
face of a repentant saint, ready to amend, to work in a new fashion with the poor, and 
even to learn from them.’ (Rahnema: 1990, p - 201, quoted in ibid.) 
 
Yet, the participatory turn in development was not free from criticism. The sincerity and 
integrity of the practitioners of participatory development notwithstanding, ‘Rahnema 
asked whether the change agents had really embarked on a learning journey into the 
unknown, or were they more concerned with finding ways of convincing the 
“uneducated” of the merits of their own educated views? In the latter case their scenario 
was hardly different from the conventional approach to development.’ (ibid.). During 
the 1990s the voices of criticism against the overwhelming fascination with 
participatory approaches were getting stronger. Hickey and Mohan summarised the key 
arguments that developed against participatory development during this decade include, 
as follows - 
 
 An obsession with the ‘local’ as opposed to wider structures of injustice and 
oppression. 
 Insufficiently sophisticated understanding of how power operates and is constituted. 
 Inadequate understanding of the role of structure and agency in social change. 
 A tendency to treat participatory development as a technical method of project work, 
rather than as a political methodology of empowerment.  
(Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 11) 
 
In 1995, a collection of papers edited by Nelson and Wright, encouraged a critical 
discussion on the theories and practice of participatory development. Incidentally, this 
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was the same collection in which Chambers’ above mentioned article was also 
published. The editors and the various contributors acknowledged that, ‘participation, if 
it has to be more than a palliative, involves shifts in power. These occur within 
communities, between ‘people’ and policy-making and resource holding institutions, 
and within the structure of those organisations.’ (Nelson and Wright :  1995, p - 1) 
4.2 Is Participatory Development Tyrannical ? 
The critical discussions regarding participation reached a high-point with the 
publication of the collection - ‘Participation-The new Tyranny?’ (henceforth called ‘the 
tyranny collection’). Till the publication of this book, the critique of participatory 
development, referred to as ‘internal critique’ by the editors of the tyranny collection, 
took two main forms - 
 
1. those that focussed on the technical limitations of the approach and stressed the need 
for a re-examination of the methodological tools used e.g. PRA, and, 
2. those that focussed on the theoretical, conceptual and political limitations of 
participation. 
(Cooke and Kothari: 2002, p - 5) 
 
The idea of the book was to provide a platform to deepen and sharpen the emerging 
critiques of participatory development. The editors wrote, that ‘the manner in which 
participation has been critiqued, and the language with which this has been done, has 
clearly thus far failed to affect, quantitatively or qualitatively, the apparently inexorable 
spread of participation in development.’ (ibid., p - 3). The reason why an apparently 
good thing such as the ‘inexorable spread of participation’, was seen as a cause for 
concern was, that participation was seen no longer to have the ‘radical connotations it 
once had.’ (Mosse: 2002, p - 16). Mosse wrote that the reasons and consequences of the 
embracing of participation by mainstream development institutions were pragmatic 
policy interests such as ‘greater productivity at lower cost’, rather than radical social 
change or material well-being of the poor.  
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Cleaver, another contributor to the collection, writes, that, despite the ‘heroic claims 
made for participatory approaches to development...there is little evidence of the long-
term effectiveness of participation in materially improving the conditions of the most 
vulnerable people or as a strategy for social change.’ Cleaver: 2002, p - 36). Hickey and 
Mohan wrote that this was a period when there was a ‘growing backlash against the 
ways in which participation managed to ‘tyrannise’ development debates without 
sufficient evidence that participatory approaches were living up to the promise of 
empowerment and transformative development for marginal peoples.’ (Hickey and 
Mohan: 2004, p - 3)  
 
The editors of the collection used the word ‘tyranny’ to serve two purposes. One was to 
use a ‘language that would be harder to ignore’, as the strong internal critiques by 
scholars and practitioners such as Stirrat and Mosse ‘had little or no apparent impact on 
mainstream discourse and practice.’ (Cooke and Kothari: 2002, p - 3). However, the 
main reason for using the word was the fact that the editors of and contributors to the 
collection believed, ‘that tyranny is both a real and a potential consequence of partic-
ipatory development, counter-intuitive and contrary to its rhetoric of empowerment 
though this may be.’ (ibid). The editors further argued that the tyrannical potential of 
participation is systemic and not just a function of operational and technical details. 
Linking their main arguments to the literal meaning of the word ‘tyranny’, they wrote,  
 
‘In sum, then, tyranny is the illegitimate and/or unjust exercise of power; this book is 
about how participatory development facilitates this.’ (ibid., p - 4) 
 
This general definition of tyranny was then broken down into three particular sets of 
tyrannies, under  which the main questions were arranged. These are listed below - 
 
1. The tyranny of decision-making and control - The main question asked with respect 
to this kind of tyranny was, whether ‘participatory facilitators override existing 
legitimate decision-making processes?’ (ibid., p - 7) 
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2. The tyranny of the group - The main question asked here was, whether group 
dynamics ‘lead to participatory decisions that reinforce the interests of the already 
powerful.’ (ibid.) 
3. The tyranny of method - The question here was, whether participatory methods have 
‘driven out others which have advantages participation cannot provide ?’ (ibid., p - 8) 
 
Right in the introductory chapter of the book, the editors made it clear, that ‘between 
them, the chapters in this book suggest that the answer to each of these questions is, or 
can be in some circumstances, ‘Yes’.’ (ibid., p - 9)  Glyn Williams summarises the 
arguments forming the tyranny critique in the following words, 
 
The argument is that participation actively ‘depoliticizes’ development; incorporating 
marginalized individuals in development projects that they are unable to question; 
producing grass-roots knowledge ignorant of its own partiality; and foreclosing 
discussion of alternative visions of development. (Williams: 2004, p - 93)  
 
However, the editors of the collection make it very clear that despite the assertions 
made in the various articles, they would ‘resist being labelled anti-participation’ (ibid., p 
- 13). They agree that there are aspects of participation which are impossible not to 
acknowledge, such as sharing of knowledge, political activism, participation in social 
movements etc. These processes, ‘are about challenges to day-to-day and structural (for 
want of a better word) oppressions and injustices within societies.’ (ibid.) Having 
clarified their position the editors go on to state that,  ‘acts and processes of 
participation described in the same way...can both conceal and reinforce oppressions 
and injustices in the various manifestations.’ (ibid.) 
 
The attacks of the tyranny critique came from diverse positions. Henkel and Stirrat, 
wrote that despite the espousal of participation by every major bilateral development 
agency, the new orthodoxy of development lacks any systematic ideology. (Henkel and 
Stirrat: 2002, p - 168). This observation of the authors was better articulated by Mohan 
and Hickey in their contribution to the collection that came as a reply to and a 
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continuation of the critique of conventional participation. According to Hickey and 
Mohan,  
 
The absence of a coherent theory of participation that seeks to explain and articulate the 
role of agency within development processes closely informs the limitations of the 
participatory movement, and helps explain the ideological malleability that has beset 
participation in practice. (Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 59) 
 
I will get back to Hockey and Mohan’s position at a later section. But it helps us to 
understand the observation Henkel and Stirrat made as they embarked on their 
anthropological analysis of participatory development. (Henkel and Stirrat: 2002, p - 
169). These authors set out to describe, not that which participation fails to do, but that 
which it succeeds in doing. The authors argued that the genealogies of participation are 
primarily religious and were a ‘key issue in the reformation movement’ (ibid., p - 173). 
They emphasised that having derived out of  its roots in the Protestant movement of the 
sixteenth century and the social reforms during the enlightenment, participation is not 
just viewed as a right, but also as a duty - something morally superior and imperative. 
Such an analysis of participation led to the conclusion, that ‘the concept of participation 
as it is used in contemporary development discourse is a culturally specific concept 
rather than a matter of universal common sense.’ (ibid., p - 175) 
 
According to Uma Kothari, although PRA seeks to reveal the realities of the day to day 
life of poor people and discover local knowledge, paradoxically, its public nature also 
ensures that the local power structures remain masked and misunderstood. Taking a 
Foucauldian approach she criticises the dichotomous approach to power, which is so 
often assumed in conventional participatory development. She writes, that ‘within 
participatory discourse a number of binaries or opposites are presented, such as ‘uppers’ 
and ‘lowers’, North and South, professional knowledge and local knowledge’ (Kothari: 
2002, p - 140). The tendency is to view local knowledge as something people 
‘intrinsically have and own’. (ibid.). Kothari argues that, ‘knowledge is culturally, 
socially and politically produced and is continuously reformulated as a powerful 
normative construct.’ (ibid.) Such a dichotomous view of power ‘allows the revealing of 
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power not as a social and political discourse or as embodied practice, but only as 
manifest in material realities.’ (ibid.)  
 
Similarly, David Mosse, uses his analysis of a donor funded Indo-British farming 
project (the Kribhco Indo British Farming Project), to challenge the notion of the purity 
of local knowledge and the ‘potential that a PRA-based focus on ‘people’s knowledge’ 
has to provide a radical challenge to existing power structures, professional positions 
and knowledge systems.’ (Mosse: 2002, p - 17). He shows through his accounts that 
what is taken as people’s knowledge is itself generated in the context of the  planning 
process, as the people try to gauge what the agency would succeed in delivering in 
terms of benefits. This quest for people’s knowledge, therefore ends up generating a 
unique kind of planning knowledge, which reflects more the planning process and the 
context within which it took place, rather than some exclusive knowledge possessed by 
the people.  
 
Francis Cleaver focuses on the ‘blindness to historical and social context’ (Cleaver: 
2002, p - 42), that characterises participatory development and argues that there is a 
vague understanding of what motivates people to participate, but nonetheless, simplistic 
assumptions are made regarding the ‘rationality inherent in participating, and the 
irresponsibility of not doing so.’ (Cooke and Kothari: 2002, p - 9)  
 
John Hailey takes the example of the development and growth of NGOs in South Asia 
that have succeeded in ensuring people’s participation without resorting the typical set 
of formal tools or participatory techniques. Hailey argues, that ‘formal participative 
tools and techniques may play less of a role than has otherwise been expected.’ (Hailey: 
2002, p - 89). Success of these NGOs was achieved through long durations of 
engagement of the people, building up personal ties, keeping regular contact etc. (ibid., 
p - 90)  
 
Bill Cooke takes a unique position and criticises participatory development using four 
concepts of social psychology viz., risky shift, Abilene paradox, groupthink and 
coercive persuasion. (Cooke: 2002, p - 106). Risky shift happens when people are led to 
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take collective decisions that are more risky to them, than those they would have taken 
individually. Abilene paradox, leads people to ‘second-guess’ what everybody else 
wants and opt for it, while the truth may be exactly the reverse of it. Group think 
involves the taking of wrong decisions due to a conviction in the ‘inherent morality’ of 
what is being done and the consequent employment of ‘self-censorship’. Coercive 
persuasion refers to the forced shaping of a group process to achieve a particular 
objective. Cooke argues, that all these concepts can come into play in the context of the 
public and face to face interactions, which are a defining feature of participatory 
development and all these four can threaten and jeopardise the empowering mission of 
participation.  
 
One of the most comprehensive and articulate papers in the collection was that of Giles 
Mohan, who was also one of the editors of the book ‘Participation: From Tyranny to 
Transformation?’  (henceforth referred to as the transformation collection), which came 
as the main answer to the tyranny collection two years later. Mohan used concepts from 
the field of post-colonial studies to criticise conventional participation and also identify 
the arenas where alternative strands of participation are achieving success in 
overcoming the tyrannical tendencies. Mohan argues that a ‘subtle Euro centrism infects 
and shapes the interventions of non-local development workers despite claims to the 
contrary.’ (Mohan: 2002, p - 158) 
 
Mohan attacks the concept of ‘local knowledge’ too as being an outcome of the West’s 
‘current fascination with the local...which reflects both older traits and newer concerns 
of Western society in the way it confronts the non-West.’ (ibid.)  He quotes Chabal, 
whose lines explain beautifully the tendency to view non-Western contexts, in this case 
Africa, as mysterious and exotic, and therefore un-knowable. 
 
Mysteries not just in the sense that we do not understand its reality well but also in that 
its reality is not really amenable to our understanding. Exotic in that it fulfils in us the 
most enduring need to find in some (suitably distant) ‘other’ that quality of 
inexplicability which is both frightening in its apparent irrationality and reassuring in 
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that it highlights our own rationality. (Chabal: 1996, p - 41, quoted in Mohan: 2002, p - 
159) 
 
According to Kanneh, this ‘predication of mystery allows the obliteration of dialogue.’ 
(Kanneh: 1995, p - 5, quoted in Mohan: 2002, p - 159). The concept of the exotic also 
leads conventional participation to treat people’s knowledge as something more 
‘organic’. (Mohan: 2002, p - 159). Mohan tries to hit home the obvious but often 
disregarded point that, ‘what appears to be less energy-intensive technology may be not 
born out of an innate wisdom resulting from their relationship to nature, but a result of 
necessity.’ (ibid.) Campbell is even more candid when he criticises the perverse 
identification of sustainability in a situation that is not a voluntary reflection of the 
culture of the people but the result of the brutal coercion of poverty. 
 
Interpreting African dire necessity as a product of “indigenous knowledge” rather than a 
product of grinding poverty, the concept of indigenism can then be served up to gullible 
Westerners, as a “sustainable” system that they should be proud to live by. (Campbell: 
1997, p 50-51, quoted in Mohan: 2002, p - 159) 
 
Mohan identifies in this process a ‘privileging of the cultural realm over the material 
and its appropriation by Westerners.’ (Mohan; 2002, p - 159) 
 
By throwing the cover of culture over material relationships, as if the two had little to 
do with each other, such a focus diverts criticism of capitalism to the criticism of 
Eurocentric ideology [and] provides an alibi for inequality, exploitation, and oppression 
in their modern guises. (Dirlik: 1994, p - 346, quoted in Mohan: 2002, p - 159) 
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4.3 Politicising Participatory Development and the Growing 
Influence of Critical Modernism 
The tyranny collection was a very important  not just because it marked the high-point 
of the critique against participatory development, but also because it marked the turning 
point. Although, the critiques come from a wide variety of positions a shift can be 
noticed from the post-modern and post-structural theoretical positions, which were so 
influential when participatory development first came into prominence, towards a 
critical modernist position, as seen in the critique put forward by authors like Mohan, 
Charbal etc. The response to the tyranny critique came in the form of another collection 
titled ‘Participation : from Tyranny to Transformation ?’ (henceforth referred to as the 
transformation collection) in which the critical modernist position got further 
emphasised. 
 
In the transformation collection one can identify a clear departure from an exclusive 
focus on PRA based approaches to a search for transformation in more politicized 
arenas. In fact, one of the critiques that the transformation collection had against the 
tyranny collection was the latter’s exclusive focus on the work of Robert Chambers. 
This, according to the editors, of the transformation collection, leads to two distinct 
problems. One is the reduction of participation of one ‘particularly visible’ and ‘main-
streamed’ variant, which fails to capture the diverse approaches of participation that 
have developed historically and also the current experiments, which can offer a way 
round the failures of the populist approaches.  The second is a tendency to take Robert 
Chambers’ work on ‘face value’ and therefore attacking even those aspects of PRA, 
which have a potential to be extremely useful for marginal people. (Hickey and Mohan: 
2004, p - 12)  
 
The editors and contributors agreed to the allegation made by the tyranny critique that 
participatory development has often failed to understand adequately and engage 
effectively with issues of politics and power. This inability to grapple successfully with 
power and politics turned participation into a purely technical approach and 
depoliticised that, which should have been an ‘explicitly political process.’ (Hickey and 
Mohan: 2004, p - 4)  
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 The editors emphasised the difference between ‘immanent development’ and ‘imminent 
development’. According to Hickey and Mohan, ‘immanent development’ refers to 
development ‘as a historical process of social change’, whereas ‘imminent 
development’ refers to development in the form of ‘specific interventions’ which 
‘emerged over the past two centuries largely as a means of managing those ‘surplus 
populations’ that have either been excluded from or ‘adversely incorporated’ into 
processes of immanent development.’ (Cowen and Shenton: 1996, quoted in Hickey and 
Mohan: 2004, p 10) 
 
One of the characteristics of development studies had been to focus on imminent 
development rather than on immanent development. According to the authors, this 
happened due to two main reasons. The first was the failure of classic development 
theory to fully understand and predict these historical processes of change, and the 
second was the need that was felt to make development research ‘more ‘relevant’ in 
terms of directly informing interventions.’ (Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 10) However, 
this wish to create relevance by undertaking specific interventions has contributed to the 
de-politicization of development in developing countries, thus creating another kind of 
irrelevance. It is these various kinds of ‘irrelevancies’ that the populist approaches to 
participatory development that arose in the 1980s claimed to overcome. (ibid.). Much of 
the assumptions and strategies of PRA based approaches have stemmed from this wish 
to make the already depoliticised ‘imminent development’ more participatory and 
empowering. However, the authors observe, wherever one finds examples of 
empowerment and transformation happening as a result of participation, it has been a 
result of an ‘engagement with development as an underlying process, rather than as a 
series of technical interventions, and are tied into broader projects of social justice and 
radical social change.’ (ibid., p - 13)  
 
Apart from this emphasis on imminent development, the other shortcoming of 
conventional participatory development approaches, according to the transformation 
collection, was, ‘the absence of a coherent theory of participation that seeks to explore 
and articulate the role of agency within development processes.’ (Hickey and Mohan: 
 47
2004, p - 59). The authors argued that such a failure to theorize has led to the 
‘ideological malleability that has beset participation in practice.’ (ibid.)  
 
The critique of conventional development, which led to the participatory turn, was 
primarily inspired and guided by postmodern social theories. Peet and Hartwick write, 
that the critique of development from the left, in general, come from two different 
theoretical positions - ‘critical modernism (sometimes called radical humanism or 
socialist feminism, both generally inspired by socialist ideas); and postmodernism 
(including many post structural ideas, much of post colonialism and parts of feminism)’ 
(Peet and Hartwick: 1999, p - 199). At the time when participatory development rose to 
prominence it was postmodernism, which had become the dominant theoretical position 
criticising development. 
 
Despite the contributions of postmodernism towards the participatory turn, it focussed 
primarily on ‘development as discourse’ and engaged in a rigorous critique of the 
‘discourses and ideas to undermine their certainty’ (ibid.). A never-ending investigation 
of the micro-practices of everyday life, the fine-grain of taken for granted assumptions 
and of the circularity and omnipresence of power has often affected the ability of the 
agents of social transformation to acquire sufficient theoretical clarity and consistency 
to generate relevant and effective strategies for action. Peet and Hartwick write that, 
 
The post structural critique overemphasizes representation at  the expense of practice, as 
though words were the main problems in life: Change the word, and the world will 
change. As a result of overvaluing words, too many postmodern critiques end in a 
nihilistic never-never land, where nothing is proposed, and little gets done in anything 
approaching real terms. (ibid.). 
 
They further write, that ‘there is a disturbing tendency for post structural discussions to 
see poverty in terms of the social construction of a deficient term, rather than in terms of 
the material reality of massive and absolute deprivation.’ (ibid., p - 202).  
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If poverty is considered purely as a social construct, or something that has entirely 
different meanings depending on the cultural context, then simplicity, dignity, and the 
discovery of inner richness may have some validity as responses. But if poverty is 
considered materially as the absolute lack of inputs vital to continued existence, such as 
not enough food (of any kind) to keep people alive, as a far too universal reality, then 
postmodern ethical advocacy is a cruel hoax: it amounts to telling those who are about 
to expire that they are (astonishingly !) rich, that they should die with “dignity” rather 
than struggle for life. Here “dignity” is the postmodern equivalent of the myth of 
heaven, “put up and shut up”. (ibid., p - 203) 
 
Critical modernism is theoretically rooted in Marxism and Feminism along with post 
structuralism. Critical modernists attempt to revive the classical Marxist critique of 
capitalism and urged a separation of modernity and capitalism in analysis and critique. 
Synthesizing the various theoretical positions it is rooted in, critical modernism ‘entails 
a critique of capitalist power systems in traditional Marxist terms of class ownership of 
productive resources, in feminine terms of male dominance, and in post structural terms 
of the hegemony of elite discourses.’ (ibid., p - 198). 
 
Rather than abandoning the development project and modernity, it seeks to criticise 
them constructively. Peet and Hartwick summarise the critical modernist position 
brilliantly in the following line. 
 
‘Criticize everything, convert critique into proposal, criticize the proposal, but still do 
something - that is the critical modernist credo.’ (ibid., p - 198) 
 
Such a renewed emphasis on material conditions of poverty, need to politicise 
participatory development and a general shift towards critical modernism was caused by 
the continued existence of widespread poverty on the one hand and the increasing 
significance of neoliberalism on the other hand. The shift in the theoretical position 
coincided with a search for cases, which had used participation in radical and politically 
conscious ways, and thereby, moving beyond the problems that were identified in the 
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tyranny collection. Hickey and Mohan, draw their empirical evidence from ‘a selection 
of the fields of  policy and practice, where participation forms a key element’ - 
1. Participatory poverty assessments of the World Bank and their further formalisation 
through the poverty reduction strategy paper initiative. 
2. Participatory governance and democratic decentralisation. 
3. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Participatory development. 
4. Social Movements.   
(Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 159) 
 
From among the above four areas, all of which have their own potentials and 
challenges, this research focuses on democratic decentralisation, as it has been the 
preferred strategy of the proponents of some of the most pro-poor and egalitarian 
planning and development endeavours in India. Most notable among these experiments 
were those initiated by left coalition governments in the states of Kerala and West 
Bengal in southern and eastern India respectively. Partly inspired by these regional 
experiments, there was a substantial scaling up of such democratic decentralisation 
initiatives when they were initiated at a nationwide level through two important 
amendments to the Indian Constitution in 1992. The tyranny collection too focussed on 
the experiments undertaken in Kerala and West Bengal and observed that that the goal 
of transformation can be reached by democratic decentralisation experiments only when 
certain conditions are fulfilled. Interestingly, while highlighting these pre-conditions 
Hickey and Mohan refer to Crook and Sverrisson’s research findings from the 
decentralisation experiments in West Bengal, Kerala and Brazil. Hickey and Mohan list 
the factors responsible for the success of these experiments as follows - 
(i) they were pursued as part of a wider (radical) political project. 
(ii) they were aimed specifically at securing citizenship rights and participation for 
marginal and subordinate groups. 
(iii) they sough to engage with development as an underlying process of social change 
rather than in the form of discrete technocratic interventions. 
(Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 159) 
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The following section takes a deeper look at the concept of democratic decentralisation, 
the theoretical rationale underlying it and the challenges it faces in providing new 
avenues of citizen participation. 
4.4 Democratic Decentralisation - A Communicative Turn in 
Indian Planning ? 
‘Democratic decentralisation is the process of devolving the functions and resources of 
the state from the centre to the elected representatives at the lower levels so as to 
facilitate greater direct participation by the citizens in governance.’ (Isaac: 2000, p - 1). 
According to Thomas Isaac, the main principle behind the concept is that of 
‘subsidiarity’, i.e. matters that are best resolved at a certain level, should be resolved at 
that level and not passed on to higher levels (ibid.). Hickey and Mohan, further describe 
the concept as a ‘key aspect of participatory governance agenda, and is associated with 
the institutionalisation of participation through regular elections, council hearings, and, 
more recently, participatory budgeting.’ (Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 161). John 
Gaventa, another contributor to the transformation collection writes, that increasingly, 
‘the concept of participation is being related to rights of citizenship and to democratic 
governance’, and ‘nowhere is the intersection of community participation and citizen-
ship seen more clearly than in the multitude of programmes for decentralised 
governance that are found in both southern and northern countries.’ (Gaventa: 2004., p - 
25) 
 
The wave of decentralisation which we are familiar with today, started in the 1980s. 
Since that time, the spread of decentralisation around the world has been tremendous. 
According to Faguet, ‘over the past two decades decentralisation has become one of the 
broadest movements, and most debated policy issues, in the world of development’ 
(Faguet: 2004, p - 867). A study by Dillinger stated, that 63 out of 75 developing 
countries with a population of over 5 million had experimented with some form of 
decentralisation. (Dillinger: 1998, p - 8, in Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 230). It is not just 
the number of countries that bears testimony to the popularity of the concept, but the 
range of regime types which have embraced it as a political strategy. Crook and 
Sverrisson write that ‘since the mid-1980s decentralisation reforms have been 
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introduced in states rules by virtually all varieties of regime, from military dictatorships, 
authoritarian presidencies and monarchies through single party or dominant party 
regimes to multi-party competitive democracies.’ (Crook and Sverrisson: 2001, p - 1) 
 
These various experiments with decentralisation happening around the world have been 
categorised into four broad types which are listed below. 
 
 Deconcentration - This is the weakest and least radical form of decentralisation and 
involves just an ‘administrative re-shuffling’(Thörlind: 2000, p - 36) where ‘the 
central offices of line ministries transfer certain decision-making authority to 
regional or sub-regional offices.’ (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 232) 
 
 Delegation - In this form of decentralisation some government authority for 
managing and undertaking specific tasks is transferred to  organisations outside the 
formal bureaucratic structure such as ‘public corporations, regional development 
agencies, special function authorities, semi-autonomous project implementation 
units, and a variety of para-statal organisations.’ (Rondinelli et al.: 1983, p - 19) 
 
 Privatisation - In this form of decentralisation, the governments hands over the 
responsibility of undertaking some of its functions to voluntary organisations, 
private organisations and ‘parallel organisations’ such as ‘national industrial and 
trade associations, professional groups, religious organisations, political parties and 
cooperatives.’ (ibid., p - 28) 
 
 Devolution or Democratic Decentralisation - This is the most radical form of 
decentralisation and is described as ‘...reciprocal and mutually benefitting 
relationships between central and local governments (that) are not merely 
subordinate administrative units, but...have the ability to interact reciprocally with 
other units of government.’ (Rondinelli et al. : 1984, p - 20, quoted in Franke and 
Isaac: 200, p - 233) 
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According to Franke and Isaac, deconcentration is the most frequently occurring type 
and devolution the most rarely occurring type of decentralisation encountered in 
different countries. (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 232) 
 
It is interesting to note that this was the second wave of decentralisation to hit the third 
world. The first wave had come in the 1950s, in the period immediately following the 
gaining of political independence by many of these countries. According to Crooke and 
Manor, ‘by the 1970s, most of these initiatives had been vitiated by distrust and 
interference from above, and by infighting and shortages of resources and expertise in 
elected councils and local communities.’ (Crooke and Manor: 1998, p - 1 and 2). 
 
Yet, the failure of the first wave didn’t prevent the second one to be ushered in with 
great enthusiasm. Different researchers provide different reasons for the renewed thrust 
on decentralisation from the 1980s onwards. Crooke and Manor described how the 
notion of decentralisation appealed to different sets of people ‘who often disagreed on 
other issues.’ (ibid., p - 1). 
 
Economists who had been influenced by neo-liberal ideas saw it as a way of shifting 
power away from the centralised state which had discredited itself in their eyes through 
voracious rent seeking and other abuses. Advocates of pluralist, competitive politics 
regarded it as a device for prying open closed systems, to give interest groups space in 
which to organise, compete and otherwise assert themselves. Enthusiasts for efforts by 
village communities to achieve things through co-operation rather than competition 
viewed it as a means to that end. The leaders of some autocratic regimes in Asia and 
Africa saw it as a substitute for democratisation at the national level, as a safe way to 
acquire much-needed legitimacy and grass-roots support. Democratic politicians in less-
developed countries regarded it as a way to make government more responsive to local 
needs and preferences. Taken together, these diverse groups represented a potent 
coalition for change. (ibid.) 
 
The authors further elaborated that by the 1980s, ‘every sort of critique of the state - 
Friedmanite, Gandhian or whatever - seemed plausible.’ (ibid., p - 2). It is 
acknowledged by the various researchers and commentators that the reasons for 
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undertaking decentralisation are specific to the different nations and governments where 
it has happened. However, according to Shah, ‘generic catalysts for change include the 
demise of communism, desire to breakaway from vestiges of colonialism as in Africa, 
national government failures, sub national government failures, assertion of basic rights 
by the courts, globalisation of economic activities and the demonstration effects of the 
European Union and Latin America.’ (Shah: 1998, p - 1). 
 
Crook and Manor also stress the importance of the feeling of ownership that third world 
states feels towards the concept of decentralisation. According to the authors, most 
governments have turned towards decentralisation by their own choice and using the 
experiments of other third world countries as models. Neither was the concept borrowed 
from experiments in the first world nor from the various international development 
agencies. The authors further elaborate, that ‘in fact, most international agencies lagged 
behind a number of developing country governments in recognising the benefits of 
decentralisation.’ (Crook and Manor: 2000, p - 3). However, once the first wave of 
decentralisation had come and gone the development agencies and first world interest 
groups woke up to the phenomenon very actively, and not always in the interests of the 
third world states.  
 
However, it would not be possible to say that any of the above causes played the critical 
role to the exclusion of others in the tremendous spread of decentralisation the world 
over. In all probability it is, as Crook and Manor write, a combined effect of all these 
multiple causes. But still one can’t help noticing the fact that the voices that appear 
earlier on in the current section belong to scholars from the first world who have been 
keen observers of decentralisation experiments but have neither been directly involved 
in the planning and execution of any nor have forfeited their basic platforms of 
employment in the Universities of northern countries for the sake of studying or 
implementing these experiments. Authors like Thomas Isaac and Patnaik have been 
personally involved in the planning and execution of the massive decentralisation 
experiment in Kerala and are as much observing academics as they are practitioners of 
decentralisation, who face the full brunt of reaction when things go wrong in reality. 
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May be that explains the blatant and focussed manner in which they call a spade - a 
spade. 
 
At first glance, the whole concept of decentralisation seems very effective in making 
any system more efficient, accountable and participatory. From the standpoint of 
economic theory, the argument in favour of decentralisation is that ‘only by providing 
services consistent with the spatially differentiated tastes and preferences of the people 
can welfare be maximised.’ (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 2). From the political 
standpoint, ‘decentralisation is typically viewed as an important element of participatory 
democracy that allows citizens to have an opportunity to communicate their preferences 
and views to elected officials who are subsequently rendered accountable for their 
performance to citizens.’ (Bardhan and Mookherjee: 2006, p - 4)  
 
The process is believed, by many, to be able to invariably increase the participation of 
the local people and especially of the poor in the political and developmental process. 
According to Robert Thörlind,  
 
Decentralisation is seen by scholars as one of the most necessary steps towards 
sustainable development. Consequently, popular participation in local development 
planning, decision-making, and implementation is viewed as the most crucial element 
needed to efficiently link people’s needs and frustrations into popular demands and thus 
ensure effective participation and grassroots influence over local policy-making. 
(Thörlind: 2000, p - 36) 
 
James Manor, who is no blind admirer of the process, lists all the things that the process 
can lead to if it works well. ‘When it works well’, he writes, ‘popular participation in 
the policy process and in local politics almost always increases. More people 
participate, more often and in more ways – campaigning, contacting bureaucrats and 
elected representatives, protesting, petitioning etc. Civil society is galvanized – more 
people join voluntary associations which become more active and numerous and do 
more things…transparency increases.’ (Manor : 2003, p –5). However, in the very next 
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page of the report he claims that ‘democratic decentralisation often fails to work’ (ibid., 
p – 6) 
 
In the context of developing countries, the same logic quickly builds up to the claim that 
democratic decentralization makes governments more responsive to the needs of the 
poor. Crook explains this connection by writing, that, ‘insofar as the majority of the 
population in developing countries is both poor and excluded from elite politics, any 
scheme that appears to offer greater political participation to ordinary citizens seems 
likely to increase their ‘voice’ and hence (it is hoped) the relevance and effectiveness of 
the government’s policy.’ (Crook : 2003, p – 77) 
 
The evidence collected by various authors on the subject divides them into two camps. 
The first camp, comprising of the proponents of decentralization, arguing that ‘because 
decentralization brings government closer to the governed, both spatially and 
institutionally, government will be more knowledgeable about and responsive to the 
needs of the poor’ (ibid., p – 77). The other camp argues that, ‘decentralisation schemes 
cannot be treated as technically neutral devices which can be ‘implemented’ without 
constraint…different governments have different political purposes and motives for 
introducing decentralisation’ and ‘these intentions are embodied in the structure and 
form of decentralisation, or more subtly, are revealed in how the system functions after 
it is introduced.’ (ibid., , p – 78) 
 
However, the point on which both the camps agree, is that there isn’t substantial data on 
the process so far to say conclusively which claim is true. Jean-Paul Faguet, whose 
research findings certainly put him in the first camp, writes that, ’50 years of research 
has failed to establish clearly whether decentralisation makes government more or less 
responsive to citizens.’ (Faguet : 2004, p – 869). After undertaking a detailed study, 
using econometrics, of the Bolivian decentralisation experiment, he concludes, that 
‘decentralisation significantly changed public investment patterns in Bolivia…and these 
shifts are strongly and positively related to local needs…decentralisation thus led to 
higher investment in human capital and social services as the poorest regions of the 
country chose projects according to their greatest needs’ (ibid., p – 886) 
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 Interestingly, Crook and Sverrisson seem to have given a pre-emptive rebuttal to 
Faguet’s claim when they explained the essential difference between, what they 
categorised as the successful and unsuccessful examples of decentralisation, by writing 
that, ‘the essential difference, therefore, between West Bengal and the Brazilian states 
on the one hand, and Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico on the other, is not that the latter 
countries did not allocate sufficient funds to the decentralised authorities, or that they 
lacked centrally-funded development and anti-poverty programs. The real difference 
was that the latter group failed to ensure that central funds were used in a responsible 
and accountable manner, and failed to ensure implementation of pro-poor policies, 
where they existed, if only formally.’ (Crook and Sverrisson : 2001, p – 27) 
 
What then could be a reasonable framework for understanding the link between 
democratic decentralisation and the needs of poor people, according to the researchers 
of the second camp ?  
 
To answer this question Crook describes, what he terms as the ‘West Bengal’ model, 
and writes that, ‘decentralisation is most likely to result in pro-poor outcomes where it 
has been designed by a central government (including a state within a federal system) 
intent on challenging conservative local elites, and which has a strong ideological 
commitment to anti-poverty politics.’ (Crook : 2003, p – 85) Thus, according to Crook, 
the politics of local-central relations creates the proper framework for understanding the 
link between democratic decentralisation and the needs of the poor.  
 
In both the successful cases in India (the Kerala and West Bengal experiments), the 
process was part of the political project of the Left parties, and especially of the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist). Thomas Isaac, who was one of the architects of the 
famous ‘People’s Campaign for Decentralised Planning’ in Kerala, writes that, as ‘the 
Kerala experiment is part of a political project of the left parties, and because those 
parties hold to a program of ending inequalities to the greatest extent possible, we see in 
the Kerala experiment a far larger set of goals than to develop a mere administrative 
design.’ (Isaac and Frank: 2000, p – 253) 
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 In the case of West Bengal, the process of decentralisation was linked to the wider mass 
mobilisation for land reforms in the rural areas. The empowered local governments 
became the platform at the local level to support the massive land-reform campaign 
known as ‘Operation Barga’.  
 
A similar observation is made by Crook in the case of Brazil. He writes, that ‘in Brazil, 
in spite of radical autonomy given to local government by the 1988 Constitution, the 
most positive anti-poverty outcomes have been associated with either federally funded 
rural development programs (most notably the North-East Rural Development Program) 
or state and city level programs launched by progressive reforming parties -- the PSDB 
(Brazilian Social Democratic Party) and the PT (Workers Party) – in Ceara, Minas 
Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul.’ (Crook : 2003, p – 84) 
 
A very important feature of the decentralisation experiments in West Bengal and 
Kerala, was, that a simultaneous process of democratising the development planning 
structure in the rural areas and the spatial planning structure in the urban areas, was 
initiated alongside the devolution of power, resources and functions to the lower tiers of 
government. This process was later granted Constitutional recognition and initiated at a 
national level through the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian Constitution. In 
relation to the specific conditions existing in India, such a democratisation was 
attempted by taking the crucial function of planning away from the bureaucratic line 
departments and special purpose agencies, both of which were outside local democratic 
control, and delegating them to democratically elected local government institutions. 
 
The fact that such a process of decentralisation and democratisation of the planning 
process was being championed by the leftist parties, led by the communists, who 
usually tend to favour centralised planning, was mysterious to many observers. Though 
the reasons for such a favouring of decentralisation by the leftist parties are complex, 
and shall be explored in detail in a later chapter, one cannot but fail to observe the 
similarities between what they had set out to achieve through such a process and the 
ideals of communicative planning.  
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 Mark the language used by one of India’s most accomplished Communist leaders and 
one of the main architects of the decentralisation experiment in Kerala, as he gave the 
following Presidential address at the International Congress of Kerala Studies, 
 
‘Our greatest assets are our mass organisations and the democratic consciousness of our 
people. The combined strength of all mass organisation in the state is about ten million. 
Besides, there is a vast network of co-operative organisations and movements, such as 
the organisations of the library and the literacy movements. I am aware that there are 
some people who consider all these to be the bane of Kerala society. I have devoted my 
life to mobilising the people for the radical transformation of our society, and I cannot 
but disagree with such perceptions. I feel that one big question that we face is whether 
the organised strength and political consciousness of our people can be used to increase 
production and productivity. I want to answer in the affirmative. But there is a 
precondition: the government and the ruling classes must change their attitude to the 
organisations of the people and their demands. Instead of suppressing people’s struggles 
and adopting negative attitudes, amicable solutions should be found through collective 
bargaining and discussions. Further, institutions and social mechanisms have to be 
developed to ensure that the toilers get their due share from increased production. I must 
emphasize the importance of democratic decentralisation in this context.’ 
(Namboodiripad: 1994, in Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 26) 
 
This text is interesting because it contains almost all the ideas and concepts that have 
been discussed in this chapter thus far. The faith in the ‘democratic consciousness’ of 
the people of the state irrespective of their structural position, the mobilisation of 
diverse kinds of civil society organisations, the appeal to the ruling classes to discard 
‘negative attitudes’ to find ‘amicable solutions’ all point to the wish to create an ‘inter-
subjective understanding’ which communicative planning theorists are talking about. 
 
Democratic decentralisation is emphasised as it is considered to be an effective process 
to create the appropriate institutional environment for pursuing such a development 
strategy. Devolution of power and finances to the local government and opening them 
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up for multi-party elections is seen as a way of deepening democracy and ensuring that 
the people can take ownership of the democratic institutions at the level where it is 
closest to them both functionally and territorially. 
 
Thus, it can be argued that by studying these experiments in democratic decentralisation 
in Kerala and West Bengal one can contribute to the understanding of how a 
communicative turn in actual planning practice has been attempted in a developing 
country context. But such attempts towards communicative planning through 
democratic decentralisation face a difficult challenge in the current times. It is inter-
esting to note that exactly the same critique that Christer Bengs had against 
communicative planning theory, that it serves to establish social institutions consistent 
with the neo-liberal society, has been raised against the concept of democratic 
decentralisation also.   
4.5 Decentralisation Experiments in India - Communicative 
Islands in Neoliberal Waters ? 
Isaac and Franke note that all the major international development agencies such as the 
World Bank, The International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the USAID, all actively ‘promote, finance 
and evaluate decentralisation experiments.’ (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 231) and, 
incidentally, these are the very agencies, which subjected more than 70 third world 
countries to 566 structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) between 1978 and 1992, in 
order to ‘help’ them to recover from their debt crises. These adjustment programmes  
have the effect of radically reducing government spending, ‘including education and 
health spending, liberalise imports, remove restrictions on foreign investment, privatise 
state enterprises, devalue currency, and freeze or cut wages.’ (Bello: 2003, p - 12-13, 
quoted in Franke and Isaac: 2000, p- 248). These programmes had a devastating effect 
in terms of reduction in per capita incomes, increase in child mortality and percentage 
of underweight children, declining life expectancy etc. in these countries. 
 
Since the championing of decentralisation, especially in the form of privatization, was 
done by these agencies at the same time as the SAPs were been promoted, Franke and 
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Isaac wrote that, ‘it would not be surprising if many in the South suspected 
decentralisation of being part of a grander scheme to weaken third world states in order 
to gain greater access to cheap labour and raw materials.’ (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p 
247) 
 
The noted Indian economist Prabhat Patnaik is even more direct, when he distinguishes 
between decentralised planning campaigns and experiments launched in third world 
countries by coalitions of leftist political parties and that which he describes as the 
‘world bank-style decentralisation’ (Patnaik: 2004, p - 1). Referring to the famous 
People’s Plan Campaign, which was launched in the Indian state of Kerala in 1996 by 
the Left Democratic Front (LDF) he wrote that, 
 
‘The decentralization proposed by the Left, propagated by the People’s Plan campaign, 
and implemented during the years of the LDF rule is fundamentally different from the 
“decentralisation” promoted by the World Bank and other imperialist agencies. While 
the “decentralisation” agenda of the left is a means of carrying class-struggle forward, 
of buttressing the class-struggle of the rural poor by developing institutions where they 
can, in principle, assert themselves directly and hence more effectively, the 
“decentralisation” promoted by the imperialist agencies has precisely the opposite 
objective, of blunting class-struggle, of encouraging a scenario of “obedient-and-suppli-
cant-villagers-being-patronised-by-NGOs”, and of substituting the concept of the 
“Rights” of the people by the concept of  “Self-Help”.’ (ibid.) 
 
He also offers a bold explanation to the tremendous championing of the concept of 
decentralisation by the international development agencies from the 1980s onwards. 
Whether his assertion is entirely correct or not is neither within the scope of this 
research nor within the capacity of the researcher to investigate. But it is worthwhile to 
pay attention to it simply to add some spice to the prevalent literature on subjects like 
participation, democratisation and role of international development agencies in 
furthering the cause of decentralisation. Patnaik writes, that, 
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‘It is a deliberate ploy of imperialism to borrow concepts from the Left and incorporate 
them into its own lexicon after giving them a different meaning. This habit of borrowing 
concepts serves many purposes: first, the analytical depth that is usually associated with 
any Left concept is mistakenly attributed to the imperialist concept as well and imparts a 
prestige to imperialist theory; secondly, since the same concept is used by the enemies 
of the Left as by the Left itself, it creates confusion in Left ranks, and blunts a basic 
weapon of the latter, namely theoretical clarity ; thirdly, by creating fuzziness around 
basic concepts imperialism seeks to destroy clarity of thinking in society as a whole, 
which helps to establish and perpetuate its hegemony.’ (ibid.)  
 
These arguments presented above point to two things. Both the concepts of 
communicative planning and democratic decentralisation are susceptible to subversion 
and co-optation by the neo-liberal ideology. Yet, at the same time, communicative 
planning and democratic decentralisation both have the potential to set in motion a 
participatory process which can lead to the creation of a truly democratic planning 
process rather than one where the market forces have the last word. The challenge of 
neoliberalism becomes all the more serious because the decentralisation experiments of 
the two state governments have to be ultimately undertaken within the overall economic 
environment of India and are bound to be affected by macro-economic conditions 
prevailing at the national level.  
 
Thinking in these lines one cannot disagree with Bengs’ arguments against 
communicative planning theory. But such arguments hold only if communicative 
planning and democratic decentralisation are seen as technically neutral devices 
functioning independently of the specific contexts in which they were attempted. As we 
have already seen in the case of democratic decentralisation, such an assumption of 
technical neutrality does not hold and the through the analysis of the politics of central-
local relations Crook and Sverrisson have shown the circumstances in which democratic 
decentralisation can truly hold its ground against the influence of social and economic 
elites. This is exactly how the noted economist Thomas Isaac, who was one of the 
architects of the Kerala decentralisation experiment and the Finance Minister of the 
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state of Kerala, replied to the threat of neoliberal subversion of decentralisation 
experiments, 
 
If decentralisation can be part of the neoliberal strategy to weaken Third World states 
and assist in selling off the people’s assets through privatisation, can it also be an 
alternative mechanism of development and therefore a means of resistance to First 
World dominated globalisation? (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 251) 
4.6 Formulating the Research Questions 
Through this analysis of recent debates within planning theory and development studies, 
we have seen that there is much in common between the communicative turn in 
planning thought and practice and the participatory turn in development thought and 
practice. Both positions originated through a critique of conventional, expert driven 
forms of planning and development, and were strongly affected by the rising influence 
of postmodern social theories. Both were hailed as paradigmatic changes in planning 
and development respectively. By the turn of the last century both had to face stern 
critique from diverse quarters for a failure to grapple successfully with issues of power 
and politics, and for containing intrinsic potential of being co-opted by neoliberalism 
rather than of being able to resist it. However, the critique of participatory development 
could develop further than the critique of communicative planning, through the 
observation of processes and experiments with participation in various third world 
countries which were able to overcome many of the typical problems that beset 
participatory development during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
As the majority of the people affected most strongly by processes of globalisation and 
neoliberalism lived in third world countries, the new sites of democratic resistance also 
developed in these parts. The scholars and researchers of development studies, who, in 
general, have focussed on these countries, could begin the process of identifying and 
theorizing these alternative experiments. Contrary to that, the proponents of 
communicative planning theory, with their explicit focus on the West European and 
North American contexts, failed to accommodate the experiences of such radical 
experiments in their own theoretical formulations. As a consequence of this, it can be 
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argued, they denied themselves a greater possibility to correct the contradiction in 
communicative planning theory, which stems from a wish to resist global processes 
such as neoliberalism by generating democratic planning alternatives drawn from a very 
limited geographical and historical context.  
 
Earlier in this chapter, we had seen that if we put the normative ambitions of 
communicative planning theory aside, a strong critical function which it can play is that 
of acting as a ‘vehicle for demystification’ for real life planning and development 
processes. This is what some authors such as Sager (Sager: 1994; analysis of the 
Trondheim toll ring case) and Brand and Gaffikin (Brand and Gaffikin: 2007; analysis 
of collaborative planning cases from Northern Ireland) have attempted.  
 
What this research attempts to do is to contribute to communicative planning theory by 
doing exactly the opposite. It attempts a reverse-demystification of the assumptions and 
arguments of communicative planning theory, through an analysis of the historical 
evolution and generation of democratic planning structures in a third world country like 
India. As we have seen earlier in the analysis of communicative planning theory, that, 
despite its intention to foster a genuinely democratic planning process, its proponents 
also have a tendency to follow an idealistic approach to understanding and analysing the 
historical context of their democratic heritage on which they base their primary 
assumptions and predictions of success. A process of reverse-demystification of 
informing communicative planning theory, developed out of a first world historical 
context, by analysing democratic planning experiments being undertaken in a third 
world country and based on its own historical context and democratic heritage, could 
correct such idealistic tendencies.  
 
The research wishes to accomplish this task by answering the following three research 
questions - 
 
1.Has the creation of the democratic planning structure in the city of Kolkata made 
the local planning and development process in the city more communicative? 
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2. What was the historical process involved in the creation of such a planning 
structure? 
 
3. Does the process of creating a more communicative planning process through a 
democratisation of the planning structure increase the capacity of the poor citizens of 
the city to resist the trends of neoliberal urbanisation in Kolkata? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 65
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III 
Methodology 
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5. Research Methodology 
 
5.1 In Search of the Appropriate Methodology 
A number of factors have gone into the selection of the appropriate methodology for 
this research. In fact, it would not be correct to say that it was a ‘selection’ at all. It is 
more correct to say, that the methodology evolved over time as the research progressed 
and eventually acquired a certain form which was the most appropriate one for 
answering the research questions.  
 
As has been written in the previous chapter, what this research attempts to accomplish is 
a reverse de-mystification of communicative planning theory using the real experience 
of the democratic decentralisation experiment in West Bengal and the consequent 
democratisation of the urban planning structure in Kolkata. The research questions that I 
had formulated, therefore, craved for a detailed and in-depth understanding of the 
historical and geographical context in which the democratisation of the planning 
structure in Kolkata was taking place, how such structures were operating on the ground 
in the planning and implementation process and how such a historical process of 
structural transformation was interacting with the processes of neoliberal urbanisation.  
 
The peculiarity of the democratisation experiments being undertaken in the city of 
Kolkata had to be considered while deliberating on the methodology. The first thing one 
notices about the experiment in West Bengal, is that any meaningful study of the effects 
of democratic decentralisation on the planning and development process would 
inevitably have to be multi-disciplinary. The processes of institutional reform, re-
structuring of property relations in urban and rural areas, politicisation of the 
development process, increasing the responsiveness of the development process to the 
poor etc., were all happening simultaneously and were completely interlinked with each 
other. It is not possible in such a situation to study the process of decentralisation, 
without also studying the process of land reforms, and these two again cannot be 
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separated from a study of the pro-poor development strategy of the Left Front. In fact, it 
is not even possible to study one of the processes, through the lens of the other. They 
have to be studied in the whole - with full awareness of the way in which they are linked 
to each other.  
 
Thus, the challenge of creating the appropriate methodology for this research, became 
the challenge for discovering or generating a methodology which would allow for such 
a holistic investigation and analysis to be undertaken without leading to a dilution of the 
empirical content. I had begun to appreciate the need for such an approach already when 
I began the literature study for the research. The existing studies on the decentralisation 
experiment in West Bengal were spread over multiple disciplinary areas, such as 
political science, development geography, planning theory, public finance and 
international studies; and sub-disciplinary thematic areas such as participatory 
development, deliberative democracy, decentralised planning,  local government reform 
etc. Yet, each of these accounts described the overall experiment only partially. If the 
institutional analysis was solid then the analysis of the decentralised planning aspect 
was weak; if the decentralised planning aspect was well analysed in economic terms 
then the spatial aspect of such a planning process was missing; if the analysis was 
strong from a political science perspective, then both the economic and spatial aspects 
of planning were missing, and so on. 
 
Such a problem of viewing complex social experiments through the lens of this or the 
other discipline or thematic area was described splendidly by Albert Einstein in the 
following lines, 
 
The area of scientific knowledge has been enormously extended, and theoretical 
knowledge has become vastly more profound in every department of science. But the 
assimilative power of the human intellect is and remains strictly limited. Hence it was 
inevitable, that the activity of the individual researcher should be confined to a smaller 
and smaller section of human knowledge. Worse still, this specialisation makes it 
increasingly difficult to keep even our general understanding of science as a whole, 
without which the true spirit of research is inevitably handicapped, in step with 
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scientific progress. Every serious scientific worker is painfully conscious of this 
involuntary relegation to an ever-narrowing sphere of knowledge, which threatens to 
deprive the investigator of his broad horizon and degrades him to the level of a 
mechanic...It is just as important to make knowledge live and to keep it alive as to solve 
specific problems.  
(Quotes by Albert Einstein, online source) 
 
In the above lines Einstein emphasised exactly those three things which were at the 
heart of the dilemma I was facing regarding the development of my research 
methodology - a painful consciousness of the negative effects of ever-narrowing spheres 
of specialised knowledge, the limited assimilative power of the human intellect and the 
importance of keeping scientific knowledge alive despite such obvious limitations. It is 
interesting to note, that rather than giving any mechanical solution to the problem by 
suggesting strategies for inter-disciplinary research, cross-disciplinary research etc., 
Einstein simply mentions the word ‘alive’. Despite, all the genuine need for creating 
areas of specialisation for managing the vast amounts of knowledge gathered, it was 
extremely crucial for him to keep this knowledge alive. In order to do so it was 
necessary to have a ‘general understanding of science as whole’ and any unreflected 
‘relegation to an ever-narrowing sphere of knowledge’ was equal to making knowledge 
lifeless.  
 
In which way, then, could I keep the knowledge alive and holistic in my research ? How 
could I avoid the narrowness of specialisation without sacrificing its depth ? How could 
the assimilative powers of the researcher’s intellect be enhanced so that he or she is 
capable of undertaking such a holistic investigation and analysis ? These became the 
prime questions I sought to answer in the process of creating the methodology.  
 
Side by side with this felt need for a holistic methodology was the painful realisation of 
the inadequateness of the methodology adopted by me in the initial phases of the 
research. I couldn’t help noticing that it had many of the same characteristics for which 
the conventional participatory development approaches of the 1980s and 1990s were 
criticised. The salient features of the critique against such approaches, as highlighted by 
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authors like Hickey and Mohan, could as well be the features of a critique against my 
first research methodology - 
1. An obsession with the ‘local’ as opposed to wider structures of injustice and 
oppression. 
2. An insufficiently sophisticated understanding of how power operates and is 
constituted. 
3.   An inadequate understanding of the role of structure and agency in social change. 
(Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 11) 
 
Such characteristics of the first methodology were a result of restricting the 
geographical focus of my analysis to a single slum settlement within the city of Kolkata, 
and restricting the contextual analysis to just the processes of local government reform 
and pressing urban issues within the city. Such an approach would certainly have 
allowed me to have a very in-depth analysis of how the democratised planning structure 
actually interacts with the lives of the poor citizens of Kolkata, but it wouldn’t have 
helped me to understand how and why such structures came into being in the first place 
and, therefore, not enable me to answer why exactly do they interact in that particular 
manner.   
 
Another aspect missing from that methodology was the dimension of time, which was 
crucial to understanding the processes of the West Bengal experiment from a historical 
perspective. In order to understand the ‘why’ and ‘how’ of things, I had to get a proper 
understanding of the ‘when’ of things. The importance of the time dimension is 
explained in a very simple and clear fashion in the following lines of Einstein, 
 
The non-mathematician is seized by a mysterious shuddering when he hears of ‘four 
dimensional’ things, by a feeling not unlike that awakened by thoughts of the occult. 
And yet, there is no more common-place statement than that the world in which we live 
is a four-dimensional space-time continuum. Space is a three-dimensional contin-
uum...Similarly, the world of physical phenomena which was briefly called ‘world’ by 
Minkowski is naturally four dimensional in the space-time sense. For it is composed of 
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individual events, each of which is described by four numbers, namely, three space 
coordinates x,y,z, and the time co-ordinate t. 
(Quotes by Albert Einstein, online source)  
 
Yet, despite having an understanding of all these factors, I couldn’t radically alter the 
methodology at that time. The inability to do so was caused by a kind of fear. The 
limited time available for completing the research, the rigorous requirements of a 
successful PhD research and the mystic aura of mainstream academia all played a role 
in my opting for a safe methodology aimed at completing the research on time and 
satisfying the basic requirements of a PhD research, rather than a correct methodology 
aimed at reaching the truth that mattered - the knowledge which could inform correct 
practice.  
 
Interestingly, this inappropriate methodology received its death blow not at the hands of 
the academic community, which had actually given a very positive feedback to the 
research proposal I had submitted, but at the hands of those very people who were at the 
very heart of this research - the citizens of Kolkata. My field work for the research was 
undertaken in two phases of a few months each, spread over the first two years of the 
research. During the first phase of my field work, I supplemented my field work in the 
selected slum with evening walks through the many middle- and lower-middle class 
neighbourhoods in the dense central parts of Kolkata. This dense clustering of land-uses 
of all kinds and the hustle and bustle of human activity seemed far more interesting than 
and a far cry from the well-planned and sterile methodology I had trapped my research 
process into. It was during one of these walks through the famous boi-para or book-
neighbourhood (so named, due to the existence of book sellers all over that 
neighbourhood) of College Square, that I ventured into a neighbourhood called 
Jalwatoli and met a unique man who played a key role in demolishing the stagnant 
methodology. 
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5.2 Mastaan Baba’s Katsu 
Jalwatoli lies in ward 44 of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation. The neighbourhood is 
largely inhabited by Muslims and it is an extremely dense and lively area. I found a 
diverse range of economic activities going on right on or along the narrow streets - tea 
and snack stalls, sweet shops, shops for kitchen utensils and other house-hold wares, 
general stores, garment stores etc. As I tried to inquire about the neighbourhood from 
some by-standers, I was spotted and invited into a tiny room, which functioned as the 
local office of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), for a conversation. The 
discussions were mainly in Hindi and Urdu, but the residents could speak Bengali with 
equal ease. Though originally from the neighbouring state of Bihar, the families of 
residents I talked to had been living in Kolkata for many generations.  
 
The room was occupied by a college student called Shabbir, two shop-keepers called 
Israel and Billal and another person who, considering his dense beard, a physique which 
was thin almost to the point of emaciation and his shabby clothing, could best be 
described as a combination of a beggar and a fakir. This man was lying flat on one 
bench in the corner of the room when I entered. It did turn out that this man, called 
Mastaan Baba, was a beggar, albeit a highly respected one in the neighbourhood. In the 
words of Billal, “Mastaan Baba has the skill of turning a lifeless mind back to life and 
vitality.”  
 
None of these people seemed to be members of the party. Apart from being the local 
party office, this little room also functioned as an informal meeting place for the 
residents of the area. On being asked, I gave a short introduction of myself and my 
research. The responses to my introduction were diverse. Shabbir was listening 
throughout with great interest. Billal listened throughout with a smile but uttered 
nothing. Israel went into the offensive. 
 
“What is all this research for ? This is where we were born, this is where we spend each 
hour of our lives just to earn a decent living for our families, and this is where we will 
die. That’s it! The whole story of our lives! All this urban planning and urban 
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development are high concepts for people who are sitting high up. Nothing changes or 
will ever  change in our lives.” 
 
Billal and Shabbir nodded in agreement. It was at this moment that Mastaan Baba got 
up and looked at me with his piercing, bloodshot eyes. 
 
“Pooh ! That’s not why nothing changes here ! Do you know why nothing changes here 
? Because the people here have become like vegetables. Their consciousness has fallen 
asleep…nay…it has died!! They are thirsty but they wouldn’t even open their own 
mouths to sip the water…you will have to put it using a needle into their bodies. But 
hey! Just put their hospital beds on fire and you will find them running with the vitality 
of an Olympic athlete. This is not the life of a human! This is the consciousness of an 
animal. The only time they truly participate in social activity of any kind is when 
someone puts their beds on fire !” 
 
The rest of the listeners seemed positively delighted to hear Mastaan Baba speak again 
and I was amused to hear such a solution to the problems of the poor in Kolkata. 
Shabbir ordered tea for everyone, and insisted on paying for me, as I was their guest. 
 
After sipping the tea Mastaan Baba continued. 
 
“Ahh! I was dead before I sipped the tea. But now I am back on my feet because of this 
hot tea. What tea can you researchers bring to this city that it can become alive and 
fresh? If you can bring such a tea then you will pass…if not, then your research may 
pass in the university, but you will still fail here !” 
 
As the discussion went on, Mastaan Baba started talking on the topic of citizen 
participation and communication in planning and development.  
 
“What is development, without power? What is this ‘participation’ of yours without 
power? Do you have any idea of what is power?”, he boomed. 
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The force of his voice and the red, piercing eyes peering out of his bony, bearded face 
quite caught me unawares. As I was struggling to find an equally forceful answer, the 
Baba continued. 
 
“I will tell you what is power? It is not just about politics and being in power. To have 
eyes and be able to see…that is also power. To have ears and to be able to hear…that is 
also power. To be able to hold your tea cup firmly with your five fingers…that is also 
power !” 
 
The last line was directed at my own fingers, which, I must admit, had slackened a bit 
surrounded by such forceful pessimism. But Mastaan Baba was relentless. 
 
“Haha…look how you are holding your tea cup ! You are not able to assert your point 
of view and your reason for being, just as you are not able to hold the tea cup firmly. 
What change can you possibly bring, being so powerless as you are ? You are part of a 
game and so is your professor and so is your university - the game of surviving and 
earning a living. Your professor is earning his living in the university, you are earning 
your living studying our lives and we will earn our living doing what we do. All this is 
not about making a change, you are too powerless to bring about that change. Accept it 
!” 
 
By this time I was getting more and more curious about Mastaan Baba’s thoughts than 
trying to contradict them. Seeing the researcher from a European university cornered in 
this way by the street fakir, Billal started laughing, “Haha….I knew from the beginning 
that nothing comes out of these studies. These studies and researches are all useless 
things for us”. Mr. Israel didn’t laugh but agreed with Mr. Billal. Quite surprisingly, 
these words of contempt brought out a totally unexpected reaction from Mastaan,  
 
“Shut Up you fools!! It is you who are useless. It is you who will remain helplessly in 
despair, because you have turned into burnt out pessimists. I only wanted to question 
this young guy and crush his university pride. But I will never become a pessimist!” 
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Mr. Israel had had enough of Mastaan’s dramatics.  
“One day I will shoot this Mastaan with a gun !!” 
 
Mastaan thrust out his bony chest and thundered, “Shoot me and be damned!! Who is 
afraid to die?” 
 
All the people in the room laughed out at this serio-comic outburst. As the mood 
became slightly lighter I asked Mastaan Baba, how he earned his living. 
 
“How does a bird learn to fly? Don’t ask me stupid questions!”, he replied without 
batting an eyelid.  
 
Evidently Mastaan Baba was far more interested in talking about power, participation 
and development, than about himself. As he spoke on, the rest of the people in the room 
seemed pretty bored and annoyed by his continuous talking. When they saw no chance 
of Mastaan stopping to talk anytime soon, they started leaving the room one by one. 
 
At the sight of the four men leaving, Mastaan Baba seemed very happy. He said,  
 
“Look !! Five minutes ago, these fools were brooding…they were dead ! But now they 
are running. One of them will eat, one will drink, one will talk to his wife, will work, or 
do whatever. Four dead people just got alive !!” 
 
From the point of view of the research process, my encounter with Mastaan Baba, could 
perhaps be best described by a term from Zen Buddhism called Katsu. The word doesn’t 
have any exact meaning. It rather refers to a word that a teacher often shouts out in a 
loud and sharp manner to startle a distracted or deluded student back into focus and 
attention. It refers to a process of being stunned out of stupor and into enlightened 
action.  
 
I never met Mastaan Baba after that day, but he had thrown a clear challenge to me as a 
researcher. I could also realise that I couldn’t hold my ground against him because I was 
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myself not convinced by the methodology I had adopted. The fears and doubts within 
me, which I had somehow hidden away inside a safe methodology had not been 
obliterated and were affecting my ability to be confident and articulate about my 
research aims and ambitions.  
 
Mastaan Baba’s katsu encouraged me to completely overhaul my first methodology and 
also to inquire deeper into the nature of the kind of research through which one could 
generate knowledge which was relevant enough to inspire social change. It was also 
interesting for me to note, that in his own language and style, Mastaan Baba was 
describing the kind of change initiating knowledge that was described by the Marxist 
geographer David Harvey in his splendid description of revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary theory in the social sciences. 
 
The voices of Mastaan, in the streets of Kolkata, and Harvey, in the 
intellectual/academic world, seemed to merge in the following lines by the renowned 
geographer , 
 
‘...there is a clear disparity between the sophisticated theoretical and methodological 
framework which we are using and our ability to say anything really meaningful about 
events as they unfold around us. There are two many anomalies between what we 
purport to explain and manipulate and what actually happens...There is an ecological 
problem, an urban problem, an international trade problem, and yet we seem incapable 
of saying anything of depth or profundity about any of them. When we do say 
something, it appears trite and rather ludicrous.’ (Harvey: 1988, p - 128)   
5.3 Revolutionary and Counter-revolutionary Theory 
In his well known book Social Justice and the City Harvey provides a very interesting 
critique of Kuhn’s analysis of revolutions in the natural sciences. According to Kuhn, 
the practice of ‘normal science’, over time, gives rise to certain anomalies i.e. 
‘observations or paradoxes which cannot be resolved within an existing paradigm...(a 
paradigm being a set of concepts, categories, relationships and methods which are 
generally accepted throughout a given community at a given point of time)’ (Harvey: 
1988, p - 120). If these anomalies persist, then they become the focus of increasing 
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attention and develop into a full fledged crisis. The attempts to sort out these anomalies 
finally gives rise to a whole new set of concepts, categories, relationships and methods 
‘which successfully both resolves the existing dilemmas and incorporates the 
worthwhile aspects of the old paradigm (ibid.). 
 
According to Harvey, Kuhn’s analysis fails to generate satisfactory answers to the 
following two questions - 
1. How do anomalies rise in the first place, and how, once they have risen, do they 
generate a crisis ? 
2. In which way does a new paradigm get accepted ? 
(ibid., p - 121) 
 
Harvey himself provides an answer to the first question by distinguishing between 
significant and insignificant anomalies. He gives the example of Newtonian physics and 
writes that although ‘it was known for many years that the orbit of Mercury did not fit 
Newton’s calculations, yet this anomaly was insignificant because it had no relevance to 
the use of the Newtonian system in an everyday context.’ (ibid., p - 121). However, if 
anomalies had risen in activities of great practical importance e.g. bridge construction, 
then such anomalies would be deemed highly significant. Regarding the second 
question Kuhn explains, that the acceptance of a new paradigm is ‘not a matter of 
logic’, but rather, ‘involves a leap of faith’ (ibid., p - 121). 
 
Harvey is not satisfied with such an explanation and writes that, 
 
‘The central criticism of Kuhn, which these two cases point out, is his abstraction of 
scientific knowledge from its materialistic base. Kuhn provides an idealist’s 
interpretation of scientific advancement, while it is clear that scientific thought is 
fundamentally geared to material activities.’ (ibid.) 
 
Material activities involve the understanding, control and management of nature in the 
interests of mankind. However, Harvey writes that ‘at this juncture, we are forced to add 
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a further perspective because “the interest of man” is subject to a variety of 
interpretations, depending on which sector of society we are thinking of.’ (ibid.) 
 
‘The coalition of industry and government heavily directs scientific activity.  
Consequently, “manipulation and control” means manipulation and control in the 
interests of particular groups in society (specifically, the industrial and financial 
community together with the middle class) rather than the interests of society as a 
whole. With these perspectives we are better able to understand the general thrust of 
scientific advancement hidden within the recurrent scientific revolutions which Kuhn 
has so perceptively described.’ (ibid., p - 122) 
 
Harvey undertakes a Marxist, class-based analysis of revolutions in the natural and 
social sciences and agrees with Marx’s and Engel’s position, as put forward in The 
German Ideology, ‘that the ruling class produces the ruling ideas of society’ (ibid., p - 
147). This production of the ruling ideas is not a simple or pre-meditated process. 
Harvey writes, that ‘there is no necessary plot involved (although the control of the 
media, indoctrination and propaganda often suppress potentially revolutionary ideas)’ 
and that ‘the “hidden hand” is fairly effective at ruling our thoughts as well as our 
economy.’ (ibid.). The production of ideas extends itself to the production of knowledge 
in mainstream academia also. 
 
‘The whole organisation of knowledge (the organisation of the learning process, the 
structure of the educational system, the division of knowledge into distinctive 
disciplines, and so on) also reflects the ruling interests in society, for these are all part of 
the process which contributes to the reproduction of society. Graduate students are thus 
“produced”, as are geographers, planners, chemists, doctors, teachers, and the like...This 
means that in general all knowledge is suffused with apologetics for the status quo and 
with counter-revolutionary formulations which function to frustrate the investigation of 
alternatives. It also means that the organisation of knowledge (including disciplinary 
divisions) has an inherently status quo or counter-revolutionary posture. The pursuit of 
knowledge and the organisation and dissemination of it are inherently conservative.’ 
(ibid.)  
 
 78 
This is not to say that radical and revolutionary turns in thought do not occur within the 
confines of the academia. In fact, such revolutions in thought are ‘necessary to maintain 
manipulation and control under changed circumstances for those in control of the means 
of production.’ (ibid., p - 148). To illustrate this point Harvey gives the example of the 
Keynesian revolution, which became necessary, because the status quo theories were 
failing completely to grapple with the crisis generated by the great depression. It was 
revolutionary in the sense that ‘it completely threw overboard the theoretical basis of 
Classical (Bourgeois) Political economy.’ (Namboodiripad: 1966, p - 87). However, in 
the real sense, it was no revolution at all, as ‘it did not touch the essentials of the 
capitalist system in whose defence bourgeois political economy had originally risen.’ 
(ibid.). From this illustration of the Keynesian revolution, Harvey concludes, that 
‘revolutions in thought are thus possible and necessary without real revolutions in social 
practice.’ (Harvey: 1988, p - 148). 
 
Seen from this perspective, the revolutionary nature of a theory can be truly judged only 
from the influence it has on revolutionising practice. Harvey writes, that ‘if such 
revolutions in thought are to be anything more than adaptations whereby those in 
control in society perpetuate their ability to control, they must be viewed as the 
beginning of a struggle to bring into being a more complete revolutionary theory which 
can be validated through revolutionary practice.’ (ibid.). Namboodiripad expresses a 
very similar view in his analysis of the particular example referred to by Harvey, 
 
‘The ‘Keynesian Revolution’ in bourgeois Political economy, and the policy of state 
intervention and planning which follow there from, are therefore neither progressive or 
democratic, nor reactionary, in themselves. The whole thing depends on how far the 
progressive democratic forces are able to use them in order to strengthen the positive 
features and undermine the negative features of the bourgeois character of state 
intervention and control enjoined on the economy by the Keynesians.’ (Namboodiripad: 
1966, p 92)  
 
Harvey then goes on to elaborate the main features of status quo, counter-revolutionary 
and revolutionary theory. 
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 (i) Status quo theory - a theory which is grounded in the reality it seeks to portray and 
which accurately represents the phenomena with which it deals at a particular moment 
in time. But, by having ascribed a universal truth status to the propositions it contains, it 
is capable of yielding prescriptive policies which can result only in the perpetuation of 
the status quo. 
(ii) Counter-revolutionary theory  - a theory which may or may not appear grounded in 
the reality it seeks to portray, but which obscures, be-clouds and generally obfuscates 
(either by design or accident) our ability to comprehend that reality. Such a theory is 
usually attractive and hence gains currency because it is logically coherent, easily 
manipulable, aesthetically appealing, or just new and fashionable...A counter-
revolutionary theory automatically frustrates either the creation or the implementation 
of viable policies. It is therefore a perfect device for non-decision making, for it diverts 
attention from fundamental issues to superficial or non-existent issues. 
(iii) Revolutionary theory - a theory which is firmly grounded in the reality it seeks to 
represent, the individual propositions of which are ascribed a contingent truth status 
(they are in the process of becoming true or false depending upon the circumstances). A 
revolutionary theory is dialectically formulated and it can encompass conflict and 
contradiction within itself. A revolutionary theory offers real choices for future 
moments in the social process by identifying immanent choices in an existing situation. 
..A revolutionary theory consequently holds out the prospect for creating truth rather 
than finding it. 
(Harvey: 1988, pp 150-151) 
 
From a Marxist view-point, which Harvey himself subscribes to, it is only the third 
kind, which would be considered as a theory at all. This view-point is further clarified in 
the article On Practice written by Mao Tse-tung in 1937. 
 
‘Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide 
action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not 
put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance. Knowledge 
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begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must 
then return to practice.’ (Mao Tse-tung: 1937, online source). 
 
Seen in the context of this conflict between genuinely revolutionary and counter-
revolutionary theory in the social sciences, the trend towards over specialisation of 
knowledge and its confinement to ever narrowing spheres, so lamented by Einstein, 
starts playing a deliberate counter-revolutionary role rather than just being a natural 
consequence of the vastness of hitherto accumulated knowledge. This counter-
revolutionary role is explained by Harvey, 
 
‘...it has to be first realised that all disciplinary boundaries are themselves counter-
revolutionary. The division of knowledge allows the body politic to divide and rule as 
far as the application of knowledge is concerned. It also renders much of the academic 
community impotent, for it traps us into thinking that we can understand reality only 
through a synthesis of what each discipline has to say about its particular segment and 
we quickly shrink away from what is so clearly an impossible task. Inter-, multi-, and 
cross-disciplinary studies are potentially revolutionary, but never really succeed - the 
odds against them working are just too great.’ (Harvey: 1988, p - 149) 
 
As a way out of such a state of affairs, Harvey writes, that ‘reality, has therefore, to be 
approached directly rather than through the formulations of academic disciplines.’ 
(ibid.).  
5.4 Dialectical Materialism and the Holistic Methodology 
Harvey’s description of revolutionary theory clearly highlighted the need for it to be 
formulated dialectically through a process of approaching reality directly. Such a 
methodology would necessarily acquire the characteristics of dialectical materialism. In 
classical Marxist literature, the dialectical mode of reasoning is distinguished from the 
metaphysical mode of reasoning. Engels draws a connection between the negative 
effects of over-specialisation of knowledge and the metaphysical mode of reasoning. 
Describing the tendency of specialisation in a very similar language as Einstein’s and 
Harvey’s, Engels wrote that ‘the analysis of Nature into its individual parts, the 
grouping of the different natural processes and objects in definite classes’ had ‘also left 
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us a legacy of observing natural objects and processes in isolation, apart from their 
connection with the vast whole; of observing them in repose, not in motion...in their 
death, not in their life.’ (Engels: 1880). However, he went a step further to write that 
‘when this way of looking at things was transferred by Bacon and Locke from natural 
science to philosophy, it begot the narrow, metaphysical mode of thought.’ (ibid.). 
 
The metaphysical mode of thought described by Engels has exactly the same 
characteristics, which, according to Harvey, prevents the inter-, multi- and cross-
disciplinary experiments in mainstream academia to generate revolutionary theory - a 
tendency to view things in isolation, one after the other and apart from each other. 
Engels wrote, that to a metaphysician, ‘a thing either exists or does not exist; a thing 
cannot at the same time be itself and something else.’ (ibid.). According to Engels, such 
a manner of viewing the world was bound to be a failure as it negated the very nature of 
nature itself.   
 
‘All nature, from the smallest thing to the biggest, from grains of sand to suns, from 
protista to man, has its existence in eternal coming into being and going out of being, in 
a ceaseless flux, in unresting motion and change.’ (Engels: 1883, online source)  
 
The dialectical mode of thinking and reasoning was, of course, not an invention of Marx 
and Engels. The philosophers of most ancient and medieval civilisations had used it. 
According to Engels, the ancient Greek philosophers, in general, and philosophers like 
Aristotle and Heraclitus, in particular were ‘born natural dialecticians’ (Engels: 1880, 
online source). The word itself comes from the Greek word dialego (to discourse, de-
bate) which ‘was the art of arriving at the truth by disclosing the contradictions in the 
argument of an opponent and overcoming these contradictions.’ (Stalin: 1938, online 
source). Similarly, in the case of Indian philosophy, the almost forgotten and lost 
writings of the lokayatikas (ancient Indian materialists), the concept of the trinity (co-
existence of creation, preservation and destruction symbolised by the three gods 
Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva respectively) and even the concept of relative-idealism (the 
world is essentially an illusion but it is also real as long as ignorance remains) of the 
non-dualistic school of Vedanta had strands of dialectical thought. In the far east, the 
 82 
writings of Japanese philosopher Takuan Soho (1573-1645) were highly dialectical. 
This is how Takuan described the notion of immovable wisdom : 
 
‘Although wisdom is called immovable, this does not signify any insentient thing, like 
wood or stone. It moves as the mind is wont to move: forward or back, to the left, to the 
right, in the ten directions and to the eight points; and the mind that does not stop at all 
is called immovable wisdom.’ (Takuan Soho, translated by William Scott Wilson, online 
source) 
 
The contribution of Marx and Engels was to separate the dialectical mode of reasoning 
from the idealistic world view that it had been associated with in the past, and base it on 
a materialistic world view. According to Marxist dialectics the causes for the emergence 
and disappearance of human ideas was not to be sought in the ideas themselves, but in 
the material conditions which gave rise to them. The recognition of movement, 
contradictions, continuous change are at the heart of dialectics. Lenin wrote that, 
 
‘Dialectics is the teaching which shows how opposites can be and how they happen to 
be (how they become) identical, - under what conditions they are identical, becoming 
transformed into one another, why the human mind should grasp these opposites not as 
dead, rigid, but as living, conditional, mobile, becoming transformed into one another.’ 
(Lenin: 1914, online source). 
 
In his brilliant article titled Dialectical and Historical Materialism Joseph Stalin listed 
the essential characteristics of Marxist dialectical materialism which I attempted to 
integrate into my revised research methodology. These characteristics have been listed 
below. 
(Stalin: 1938, online source) 
 
1. Nature Connected and Determined - The first characteristic of the dialectical method 
is the viewing of nature not as an ‘accidental agglomeration of things’ which are 
‘unconnected with, isolated from and independent of each other’, but as a ‘connected 
and integral whole.’ (Stalin: 1938, online source). Stalin wrote that a phenomenon can 
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only be understood completely and correctly if it is seen in the context of the conditions 
that it is surrounded by and connected to. 
 
2. Nature is in a State of Continuous Motion and Change - The second important 
characteristic builds on the first one. Dialectics views nature not only as a connected 
and integral whole but also as an entity which is in a ‘state of continuous movement and 
change, of continuous renewal and development, where something is always arising and 
developing, and something always disintegrating and dying away.’ (ibid.).  
This feature has very significant consequences for the generation of revolutionary 
theory, which can lead to social change, as it urges us to ‘not base our orientation on the 
strata of society which are no longer developing, even though they at present constitute 
the predominant force, but on those strata which are developing and have a future 
before them, even though they at present do not constitute the predominant force.’ 
(ibid.)  
 
3. Natural Quantitative Change leads to Qualitative Change - The dialectical method 
views development as a process ‘which passes from insignificant and imperceptible 
quantitative changes ...to qualitative changes; a development in which the qualitative 
changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from 
one state to another; they occur not accidentally but as the result of an accumulation of 
imperceptible and gradual quantitative changes.’ (ibid.) 
 
4. Contradictions inherent in Nature - ‘Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that 
internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature, for they all 
have their negative and positive sides, a past and a future, something dying away and 
something developing; and that the struggle between the opposites, the struggle between 
the old and the new, between that which is dying away and that which is being born, 
between that which is disappearing and that which is developing, constitutes the internal 
content of the process of development, the internal content of the transformation of 
quantitative changes into the qualitative changes.’ (ibid.) 
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These above four characteristics were further condensed by Stalin by writing that 
‘everything depends on the conditions, time and place.’ (ibid.) 
5.5 Specific Modifications to the Research Methodology 
The first visible modification to the initial research methodology was in the form of a 
move away from the ‘obsession with the local’. An investigation focussed on just one 
slum neighbourhood, no matter how deep would not give me a balanced understanding 
of the overall nature of the West Bengal experiment. Instead of that the methodology 
was widened to undertake a historical analysis of the West Bengal experiment at three 
geographical levels - 
  
1. The State Level - The investigations and analyses at this level would focus on the 
effects of democratic decentralisation on the planning and development process in the 
rural areas of West Bengal. To include this level becomes crucial because the alterations 
to the planning structure in Kolkata were done in the context of the combined processes 
of decentralisation and land-reform in the countryside. Moreover, as the countryside 
constitutes the larger part of the state both in terms of the general population and the be-
low poverty line population, the performance of the democratisation experiment in the 
city is bound to be dependent on and connected to the performance of the experiment in 
the countryside. 
 
2. The City Level - The investigations and analyses at this level would focus on the 
effects of the West Bengal experiment on the democratisation of the planning structure 
in the city of Kolkata. 
 
3. The local (sub-city level) - The investigations and analyses at this level would focus 
on the manner in which these macro-processes of structural and institutional change 
were getting manifested at the local level in the planning and implementation of large 
development projects in Kolkata. 
 
Such a historical dialectical method seemed to be the only method by which I could 
properly understand the particular attributes of the democratic decentralisation 
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experiment in West Bengal. Simply put, all that I really needed to do was to investigate 
the conditions in which a particular event happened, the location where it happened and 
the particular point of time in which it happened in order to get the holistic 
understanding that I needed. 
 
The data for the first two levels was to be collected from a variety of secondary sources 
- historical accounts, government reports and documents, media reports, reminisces of 
professionals involved in the decentralisation experiment and the research undertaken 
on the West Bengal experiment within various disciplinary areas. For the third level, I 
selected the case of a cluster of highly controversial environmental improvement 
projects being undertaken on and along a prominent inland waterway system in the city, 
which put the achievements and ambitions of the democratic planning structure in 
Kolkata to the severest test. The specific methods used in the study and analysis of this 
local level case shall be elaborated in the chapter devoted to it. 
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6. The Quest for Decentralisation in 
India 
 
Urban planning in India has been known to be top-down, bureaucratic and centralised in 
nature, and generally exclusive of the socially and economically poorer sections of 
society. This condition afflicts the national economic planning process too. According 
to Annapurna Shaw, ‘both economic planning and urban planning, was essentially a 
top-down process, bureaucratically implemented’ (Shaw : 2004, p - 5), and the 
evolution of urban planning has ‘invariably excluded the poor from adequate access to 
basic civic amenities.’ (ibid., p - 11).  
 
The roots of both modern urban planning and modern local government lay in the 
colonial period. To understand why the urban planning and development process is so 
exclusive of the poor in our cities it is important to have a certain understanding of how 
this process came into being and evolved over time. While undertaking an analysis of 
the planned development process in India, the noted political activist and theoretician 
E.M.S. Namboodiripad had written, that answers to the most critical questions regarding 
the short-comings of economic planning in India ‘cannot be found in the realm of 
economics pure and simple...the basic issues involved in answering them are as much 
political as economic.’ (Namboodiripad: 1966, p - 274) In the same manner I would like 
to say that the answers to the most critical questions that plague the urban planning and 
development processes are not to be found in the realm of urban planning - pure and 
simple. The causes are an amalgamation of historical, cultural, political and economic 
factors, and a brief elaboration of these is essential to put the specific theories that this 
research uses, in context.  
6.1 Society and Local Government in Pre-British India  
Modern local government in India started before modern urban planning. Therefore this 
historical account has to start with an account of those institutions. Although, modern 
local government as we find it today was a creation of the British, India had her own 
indigenous system of local government in the villages in the pre-British times. In 
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traditional Indian society it was the village which was the unit of social and economic 
life. The indigenous system of local government existing in the Indian villages was 
called the panchayat. The popular translation of ‘panchayat’ is a council of five village 
elders. But the literal translation would, most probably be ‘what the five believe in’. 1
 
The panchayat ‘looked after the common affairs of the villagers without interference 
from outside.’ (Mathew: 2004, p - 7). This local government system has often been 
romantically described as ‘little republics’, ‘idyllic republics’ etc.   
 
According to Charles Metcalfe, the acting governor general of India in 1830,  
 
The village communities are little republics, having nearly everything they can want 
within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last 
where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds 
revolution...but the village community remains the same... This union of the village 
communities, each one forming a separate little state in itself, has, I conceive, 
contributed more than any other cause to the preservation of the peoples of India, 
through all the revolutions and changes which they have suffered. It is in a high degree 
conducive to their happiness, and to the enjoyment of a great portion of freedom and 
independence. I wish, therefore, that the village constitutions may never be disturbed 
and I dread everything that has a tendency to break them up. (Kalyanaraman: 2003, 
online source) 
 
The account of Metcalfe is very interesting, and if it is true then one has to accept that 
India had a very strong tradition of democratic self-government, which put the people at 
the local level at the centre. It was essentially a bottom-bottom approach if not a 
bottom-up one. Due to some reason the Indian village communities clung to their 
philosophy of local self-government, no matter what kind of political change and 
                                                 
1 In his analysis of ancient Indian materialism the historian Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya had 
written that the word ‘Lokayata’ is actually formed by joining two words - Lok, which means 
‘people’ and ayatah, which means ‘believe in’. I have used the same method to divide the word 
panchayat into ‘panch’ and ‘ayatah’. (Chattopadhyaya: 1978) 
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turmoil affected the Government at the national level. How can one explain the 
transformation of such passionate and eternal champions of the ‘little republics’ into 
people, who, on the eve of their political independence from colonial rule ended up 
adopting a Constitution, which gave absolutely no recognition to the local government 
institutions as the third tier of government ? Either, something happened during the 
colonial rule that totally wiped out not only the institutions of local democracy but also 
the idea of local democracy from the minds of the Indian people, or, there must be some 
inconsistency in Metcalfe’s account of the ‘little republics’. Metcalfe’s lines are often 
quoted in any description of the traditional Indian panchayats, but there have been many 
skeptics also. According to Hugh Tinker, Metcalfe based his comment on his 
observations of a very limited geographical area in north India at a particular period of 
time. 
 
From his Delhi experiences, Metcalfe drew his famous picture of the ‘little republics’ 
which has often been loosely applied to the whole of the sub-continent; had Metcalfe’s 
service lain some leagues to the east, he would have written otherwise. (Tinker : 1968, p 
- 21) 
 
According to A.S. Altekar, ‘observations made by early writers like Metcalfe and Maine 
about Indian village community being unchanging have to be accepted with great 
reservations.’ (quoted in Desai : 1959, p - 215, quoted in Namboodiripad : 1966, p - 
328). He goes on to write, that ‘in the Vedic times it appears probable enough that each 
village community was an independent republic, but throughout the historical period, 
the community was always subordinate to and constituent of larger political units.’ 
(ibid., p - 329). However, the most important finding of Altekar was regarding the 
appropriateness of calling these pre-British village communities ‘republics’. He writes - 
 
The word republic again is very unfortunate; it conveys notions of democracy, of equal 
rights, of general election and so on. Nothing of this kind took place in our village 
communities. There was no idea of equality. We in modern times should never forget 
that democratic notions were never prevalent in our village communities. (ibid.) 
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These findings raise serious questions regarding the ‘democratic’ nature of the village 
governments in pre-British India. Even the authors who wished to revive the ancient 
local government institutions of the villages in the context of post-colonial India and 
couldn’t come to disregard the findings of Metcalfe, had to admit that although these 
institutions ‘were vibrant with energy in the early stages’, ‘in later times...the essential 
changes were not brought about in their pattern in accordance with changed circum-
stances, social, political and economic, and they tended to become stationary and 
vegetative, giving the society an economic basis akin to feudalism...and this timeless 
base of Indian economic life received the mortal shock of its life when the British 
came.’ (Malaviya, p - 95, quoted in Namboodiripad : 1966, p - 326) 
 
Whatever the true causes, the fact remains that the local government system introduced 
by the British in India, was a clear break from the indigenous system that she had 
earlier. Regarding this radical break with the indigenous system in the creation of 
modern local government in India by the British, two authors give two different reasons. 
According to Tinker, the period of political and military chaos that followed the fall of 
the Mughal empire and continued till the restoration of political control by the British, 
the new rulers of India didn’t get the opportunity to fully appreciate and incorporate the 
useful features of the indigenous local government institutions into the modern system.  
 
Throughout the wide areas of India a period of anarchy or military despotism intervened 
between the breakdown of Mughal rule and annexation by the East India Company. In 
this interregnum the ties of the social framework were loosened, and in many places 
local institutions had been perverted or sapped  before British officials had any 
opportunity to assess their value. In Bengal almost all traces of village autonomy were 
obliterated; in the ceded districts of Oudh only the shell remained of the centralised 
municipal organisation of the Mughal times. (Tinker: 1968, p - 15) 
 
George Mathew added that, ‘the role the village institution like panchayat was playing 
in local governance was found to be incongruous in the context of the new system of 
law, administrative structures, judiciary and other public institutions introduced by the 
British, especially after the establishment of the direct rule of the crown in 1858.’ 
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(Mathew: 2004, p - 7). And yet it was very important for the colonial rulers to manage 
and administer the affairs of the innumerable villages of the country, as they ‘provided 
the supply base of their trade and commerce.’ (ibid.) 
6.2 The Rise of the Efficiency-Democracy Conflict 
The first local government institution created by the British in India, was the municipal 
corporation of Madras (now Chennai) in 1688. By 1762 municipal corporations were set 
up in the cities of Bombay (now Mumbai) and Calcutta (now Kolkata). According to 
Mathew, ‘these institutions were no doubt ‘local’ in nature, but they were by no means 
institutions of ‘self-government’, as the committees consisted of official and non-
official members, the latter being nominated and endorsed with limited powers.’ 
(Mathew: 2004, p - 7). Moreover, the emphasis was on the creation of urban local 
governments rather than rural ones. This was in line with the priorities of the colonial 
administration. 
 
In fact, a constant conflict between the proponents of local democracy and the 
proponents of administrative efficiency became a defining feature of the evolution of 
modern local government in India. This conflict is a very important one as in this 
historical process one can find the roots of the top-down, bureaucratic system of 
planning and development that one finds in the country today. Though, modern local 
government institutions had seen the light of day long before the late 19th century, it 
was in this period that a resolution was passed which gave ‘for the first time a 
comprehensive theory of local government.’ (ibid.). The resolution was officially 
known as the ‘Resolution on Local Self-Government of 18 May, 1882’, and unofficially 
as the resolution of Lord Ripon, who was the Viceroy of India during that period.  
 
Describing the kind of person that Lord Ripon was, Hugh Tinker writes that he ‘has an 
honoured place in Indian affections as almost the only viceroy who did not 
automatically assume that an Olympian hauteur and omniscience was an essential part 
of his office’ and ‘brought an open liberal mind to political and social questions instead 
of the ‘two nations’ attitude which was an almost inevitable component of British-
Indian relationships in the late nineteenth century.’ (Tinker: 1968, p - 43) 
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 Based on his experience from an ‘unusually full public life in England’, Ripon argued 
that ‘if local government is to have any vitality, then it should evolve out of local 
circumstances; if it has to be created artificially, at least it should be planned in detail by 
local administrators, and not to be imposed ready-made by the central government.’ 
(ibid.) The political reasoning of Ripon was very clearly spelt out in the various 
paragraphs of the resolution. Paragraph five of the resolution read as follows, 
 
It is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put 
forward and supported. It is chiefly designed as an instrument of political and popular 
education. (ibid., p 44)  
 
In framing the resolution Ripon also expressed his concern about an ‘apparent 
confusion by British administrators in India of ‘means’ and ‘ends’, producing a cult of 
efficiency for its own sake.’ (ibid., p - 45). This shows that already by the late 19th 
century the tendency of focussing on efficiency at the cost of democracy was becoming 
strong in India. Tinker goes as far as to say that ‘in the India of 1882, the Viceroy was 
almost alone in his liberalism’, as the ‘vast majority of local Anglo-Indian officials were 
conservatives, supporters of ‘paternal’ administration’ (ibid., p - 43). However, it would 
be seen that the causes for the bias towards efficiency were more complex than the 
conservatism of local Anglo-Indian officials. 
 
Added to this genuine interest in creating vibrant local self-government in India was the 
pragmatism expressed in the sixth paragraph of the resolution, which read as follows: 
‘As education advances there is rapidly growing up all over the country an intelligent 
class of public spirited men who it is not only bad policy, but sheer waste of power to 
fail to utilise.’ (ibid., p - 44). It was in this regard, that O’ Malley found a ‘remarkable 
similarity in the language used by Lord Ripon and A.O. Hume2.’ (O’Malley : 1941, p - 
745-6, quoted in ibid.) 
                                                 
2Allan Octavian Hume was a retired Indian official, who spent a huge amount of energy and resource to 
encourage and organise Indians to express their national feelings and views politically and was the 
founder of the Indian National Congress, which, in course of time, became the strongest political 
organisation fighting British imperialism in India 
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 Along with municipal boards in the cities, rural boards were to be set up in the villages. 
This was another unique development considering the times, as the decision to set up a 
network of rural local bodies was taken by Ripon six years before there were any rural 
councils in England (ibid., p - 52). Ripon was keen ‘to revive and extend the indigenous 
system of the country’ and ‘to make full use of what remains of the village system.’ 
(Wolf : 1921, p - 100, quoted in Tinker: 1966, p - 45)  
 
It was further provided in the resolution that all local government boards must contain a 
two-third majority of non-officials, and these members must be elected whenever 
possible. Regarding regular elections, it was provided that they were to ‘begin 
immediately in more progressive towns; gradually and by informal experimental 
methods in smaller towns and the countryside.’ (ibid., p - 52).  
 
Ripon’s reforms were heartily welcomed by certain British governors and all the 
prominent political leaders among the Indians at the time, such as Surendranath 
Bannerjee, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Pheroze Shah Mehta and Raja Peari Mohan 
Mukherjee (ibid., p - 58). However, the governors of most of the provinces in India 
remained strongly against the liberal principles of Ripon and the Government of India 
on the whole was reluctant to let the resolution be a complete success in reality. 
According to Tinker, Ripon’s own personality was partly responsible for the failures 
too. Describing the individual person, he wrote, that ‘a wide experience of affairs, 
sensitivity and intellect, were unfortunately accompanied by a lack of stamina, an inner 
uncertainty, which prevented Ripon from fully carrying through the large schemes of 
his imagination.’ (ibid., p - 43). Apart from that, the elective system failed to become 
widespread. The percentage of people who could vote in municipal elections was ‘less 
than two per cent’ in most provinces with the exception of the Bengal province, where it 
was ‘perhaps five percent’ but embraced mostly the ‘bhadralok or middle and clerical 
classes.’ (ibid., p - 50).   
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As is often the case with local governments, the most effective check on the enthusiasm 
of the small minority of progressive local government bodies was kept through financial 
constraints. Tinker writes, that ‘the prices of export goods had fallen in the 1870’s, the 
value of silver sank steadily, and the Indian national income fell to a low level, while 
the expenses of the Government of India were constantly rising; annexation of Upper 
Burma in 1886 proved a particularly costly luxury.’ (ibid., p - 59). Here was another 
splendid example of how global trends and events and the imperial designs of the 
British empire had direct consequence on the development and strengthening of local 
democratic institutions.   
 
The influence of officials remained strong and kept on growing. This was the time, 
when instead of allowing the local governments to become deliberative and regulatory 
bodies taking decisions on the welfare and development of the local areas, a ‘new 
hierarchy’ of ‘experts’ was allowed to grow and become powerful. These were the 
bureaucratic line departments and offices of the Government, such as ‘the Public Works 
Department, the Education Department, the Sanitary Commissioner, the Accountant 
General’ etc. ‘In time all came to have a say in local government affairs. As a result, a 
rigid system of supervision was created, which ran from the smallest municipality up to 
the Secretary of State.’ (ibid.) 
 
Ripon’s idea was to provide a space for the ‘western-educated middle classes’ of India 
in the Government, but the rise of the non-officials in the local government ‘was 
continually deplored by officials’ (ibid., p - 60). The conflict between the ideas of 
efficiency and ideas of local democracy was illustrated very clearly by Tinker through 
an example from the province of Bengal, which was progressive enough to have 
municipal boards which ‘ would reject suggestions from the District Magistrate as a 
matter of course’ (ibid., p - 67). Even in this progressive province, in 1892,   
 
The Bengal Government put forward a scheme to restrict the powers of municipal 
boards, to tighten government control, and to raise the qualifications for the franchise. A 
considerable campaign was waged, led by S.N. Bannerjee, in which the political 
associations and newspapers of the province joined in unison. It was said that the new 
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proposals would reduce the electorate to about 0.3 per cent and disfranchise the great 
majority of Muslims. The proposals were completely re-written as a result of the 
protest. (ibid.) 
 
The grand ideas of reform, therefore, largely failed to have a solid impact on the reality 
on the ground. If it was so difficult for the elite of the city to participate in the decision 
making process, then one can well imagine the impossibility of participation on the part 
of the poorer sections of the population. Following the Ripon resolution, a Royal 
Commission on Decentralisation was set up, which again stressed on the need to 
involve the local people in the ‘local tasks of the administration’ (Mathew : 2004, p - 7). 
These findings were taken up seriously in the Constitutional reforms of 1918. 
 
The activities of the liberal and progressive elements of the Government of British India 
to revive the local governments of the country, have to be seen in the light of the 
activities of the leaders of the national movement that had been growing steadily since 
the formation of the Indian National Congress in 1885. The Lahore session of the Indian 
National Congress in 1909 articulated the interests of the growing national movement of 
India in matters concerning local government. Gandhi tried to evoke the memory of the 
independent village republics of India and turn it into an ideal for the freedom struggle. 
I have written about the debates regarding the democratic nature of pre-British Indian 
villages earlier in this chapter. Though, the historical research done in modern times 
sheds a much clearer light on the exact nature of rural society in pre-British times, in the 
early 20th century the context was totally different. It was important for the politically 
active Indians to show that Indians were as capable as the British in running a 
democratic government of their own and take charge of their country. To do this they 
also tried to show that, in fact, such systems had been prevalent in Indian villages since 
ancient times.  
 
Very crucial to this struggle was the publication of two books by eminent Indian 
historians of the time. These were ‘Hindu Polity’ by Jayaswal and ‘Corporate Life in 
Ancient India’ by Majumdar. The former was published in 1924 and the latter in 1919. 
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, one of the most eminent modern historians of India wrote 
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that ‘these dates are important. For there was something more than mere historical 
enthusiasm behind these works.’ (Chattopadhyaya : 1978, p - 151) 
 
According to Dange, 
 
The celebrated volume of Jayaswal on Hindu-Polity was written with the motive to 
refute the assertion of the British ruling class that India was unfit for parliamentary 
democratic institutions, by showing that India had republics and ‘self-governing 
democracies’. (Dange : 1949, p - 3, quoted in Chattopadhyaya : 1978, p - 151) 
 
The important political consciousness and motive behind this work of history was 
confirmed when the author Jayaswal himself ‘noted with gratification’ that, 
 
The book was cited by Sir Sankaran Nair from the manuscript in his note to the 
Government of India’s First Despatch on Constitutional Reforms (dated 5th March, 
1919). (Chattopadhyaya : 1978, p - 151) 
 
Describing the relevance of the book for the political movement for freedom 
Chattopadhyaya wrote, 
 
It is no wonder, therefore, that the book should show tremendous enthusiasm to 
discover in the ancient ganas (tribal councils of ancient India) such minute details of 
parliamentary democracy as seats in the republics, motion, resolution, quorum, whips, 
votes, votes of absentees, ballot voting, procedure of majority, principle of referendum, 
basis of franchise and citizenship, judicial representation and laws of republics, etc., 
etc.; in short, practically everything that our national movement was trying to achieve in 
those days. (ibid.)  
 
While accepting the role and value of the books as ideological weapons for the freedom 
struggle of India, Chattopadhyaya refuted the conclusions made by Jayaswal. But the 
examples of these two books shows the range of inter-disciplinary activities that were 
going on and which led to the articulation of the ideal of Gram Swaraj (village self-rule) 
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as the national ideal championed by the Indian National Congress under the leadership 
of Gandhi.  
 
The struggle bore fruit after the first world war, when, under the Montegu-Chelmsford 
reforms, the subject of ‘local self government’ was transferred to the Indian ministries 
in the various provinces of the country. Yet, despite all these efforts,  
 
The local bodies at the end of the colonial rule were characterised by low resource 
capability, little functional devolution other than civic duties, excessive control by the 
bureaucracy and over-representation of the landed gentry and upper castes. (Isaac : 
2000, p - 5) 
 
Isaac’s observation is supported by Mathew according to whom, despite the lofty claims 
made by the British about the introduction of modern local government institutions to 
India, ‘the Indian leaders held the same low esteem’, as ‘the local bodies had to work 
under the surveillance of the bureaucracy and were denied the administrative and 
financial resources that jeopardized their effectiveness.’ (ibid., p - 8) 
 
Mathew described the situation as ‘two local governments’ existing at the local level, 
where, ideally, the elected local self-government should have been the sole responsible 
government. Instead, ‘in reality, only weak bodies with representatives drawn from 
restricted electorates were superimposed upon an essentially bureaucratic structure of 
district administration.’ (ibid.).  
 
This system of ‘two local governments’ dominated by the bureaucracy rather than the 
elected council of the local people continued well into politically independent India too. 
India won political freedom from British rule in 1947, and became a republic in 1950. It 
was in the same year that it adopted the Constitution of India, which was ‘oriented 
towards a strong centre and weak subordinate states’ (Bhattacharya: 1992, quoted in 
ibid.). According to noted economist Arun Ghosh, although ‘they (the founding fathers 
of India’s Constitution) were conscious of the wide diversity - in matters of resource 
endowment, levels of living, literacy and education, and indeed even in regard to 
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cultural mores - in the different regions and states, which suggested a Federal 
Constitution for India’, the reason that lay behind opting for a ‘union of states’ rather 
than a ‘federal entity’ was ‘the trauma of India’s Partition embedded in their con-
sciousness.’ (Ghosh: 2001). 
 
Indeed, a perusal of the debates on the draft Constitution makes it clear that the 
founding fathers of the Constitution resiled from opting for a Federal Constitution only 
because Partition made them concerned about the danger of a further dismemberment 
under a Federal Constitution. Some part of the wide powers of the Centre is obviously 
the result of that apprehension. (ibid.) 
 
6.3 Centralisation Intensifies - Local (non) Government in 
Independent India 
Though India achieved political independence on 15th August, 1947, in many ways the 
influence of colonial times continued unabated. According to historian Suranjan Das, 
 
It can be reasonably argued that despite certain obvious outward changes in forms of 
governance or employment of new political hyperbolas, the Indian Government under 
Jawaharlal Nehru represented in many respects a continuation of British attitudes both 
in form and substance. (Das: 2001, p - 7) 
 
Instead of developing an alternate state which would be a clear break from the 
repressive apparatus built up by the British imperialists the new rulers of India largely 
kept the colonial system intact. It was due to this reason, that, despite all the socialist 
intentions and rhetoric of Prime Minister Nehru, the Indian people were ‘confronted 
with the same civil servants, the same policemen who treated them with the same scorn 
and brutality as under British rule.’ (ibid.) 
 
N.K. Bose explained the character of the independent government in the following 
words, 
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Its idea became, not to disrupt the status quo, but to build up its ‘socialist pattern’ of 
economy on the foundation of the existing order without a violent disturbance...In this 
prosaic task of reformation, the Congress Party...had tried to convert every problem of 
national reconstruction into an administrative problem. (Bose: 1958, quoted in Das: 
2001, p - 7) 
 
The consequence of this legacy of bureaucratic centralisation in the colonial period was 
summarised by Franke and Isaac. 
 
Indian democracy is highly centralised. The Union Government holds most of the 
powers and the rights of the federated states are very weak...even its most ardent 
admirers have described the Constitution as quasi-federal...Until recently, it was not 
mandatory to elect office holders below the state level at district, sub-district, village or 
municipal levels. In other words, Indian democracy was a parliamentary system at the 
central and state levels with bureaucratic governance at the lower levels. This current 
power pyramid needs to be reversed. (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 2)  
 
It is an ironic situation that the party which was in the forefront of the freedom struggle 
of India and which raised the slogan of ‘village self-rule’ under the leadership of 
Gandhi, would become the most steadfast champion of centralised governance and 
planning after the goal of political independence had been achieved. Despite Gandhi’s 
efforts and interventions the authors of the Indian Constitution were hesitant to devolve 
powers to lower tiers of the government and absolutely refused to give constitutional 
recognition to the local government.  
 
Franke and Isaac gives a list of five reasons that explains the continued tendency 
towards centralisation in independent India.  
 
A number of factors have contributed to the highly centralised state structures in the 
Third World, even among those nations like India that have a track record of 
representative democracy. Firstly, colonialism bequeathed a historical legacy of 
centralised government. Secondly, social and economic crises in these countries during 
the post-colonial period have been powerful stimuli for centralisation. Thirdly, powerful 
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political and bureaucratic vested interests have consciously thwarted attempts to 
decentralise. Fourthly, successful decentralisation requires certain pre-conditions such 
as an appropriate legal and administrative framework, a local information base, 
capacity-building programmes and civic culture. To make the fulfilment of these 
preconditions a requirement for introducing democratic decentralisation can become an 
argument for postponing devolution of powers to the lower levels. Such postponement 
has been the major feature of decentralisation in India. (Franke and Isaac : 2000, p - 4) 
 
The Constitution of India did not recognise the local government bodies as a third tier of 
government. There was only a provision in the non-enforceable ‘directive principles’ of 
the Constitution which instructed the individual states to develop urban and rural local 
governments as institutions of self-government. However, the tendency of the state 
governments apart from very few exceptions has been exactly the opposite i.e. to curb 
the powers and resources of the local governments and in many instances  to supersede 
them completely. The tragic situation was summarised by Girijapati Mukharji in the 
following lines. 
 
A direct consequence of this situation (of not granting Constitutional status to the local 
governments and their progressive neglect at the hands of both central and state 
governments) is the absence of the emergence of any positive and purposeful 
relationship among the three tiers of government...It has to be realised that urban 
governments are created by elections and they are, thus, in every sense political entities, 
and must therefore be allowed to function as such...Thus, urban government with 
functions which affect the citizen in practically all facets of his life has been left neither 
with political stature nor that amount of administrative and financial power as would 
enable it to render service to the people. (Mukharji: 1972, p - 4 to 6) 
 
In most states the urban and rural local governments remained suspended for long 
periods of time, losing the capacity, experience and confidence to tackle the ever 
growing challenges of urban India. It was an ironic situation indeed that the local 
governments were more effective at a time when the urban situation was relatively 
unproblematic, and became steadily ineffective when their political vision and 
managerial capacity were seriously needed to face the urban problems. Girijapati, after 
 101
having given a thorough account of the urban challenges and the powerlessness of the 
local governments wrote that, ‘the community is thereby deprived of its organ of 
government at the local level; the punishment is not meted out to the elected councillors 
but to the whole lot of citizens.’ (Mukharji : 1972, p - 6) 
 
In the decades following independence there have been three major attempts officially 
to empower the urban and rural local governments. The first of these were the 
institutional changes that were introduced following the recommendations of the 
Balwantrai Mehta committee in the early 1950s. This was followed by the 
recommendations of the Ashok Mehta Committee in 1978 and finally, the 73rd and 74th 
Constitutional Amendments Act in 1992. Before introducing the extremely important 
connection between these attempts towards empowerment of local government and 
urban planning in India, it would be useful to give an account of the salient features of 
these empowerment waves. 
6.4 The Steps to Decentralisation 
According to George Mathew, the report of the Balwantrai Mehta team and the actions 
taken as a response to its findings formed the ‘first major attempt to institutionalise’ 
rural local government institutions in India (Mathew: 2004, p - 8). Though Mathew 
writes specifically about rural local governments in his paper these major attempts at 
institutionalisation and empowerment were just as crucial for urban local governments.  
 
The need to study the local government system of the country was felt in the light of the 
massive community development programme (CDP), that was launched as part of the 
first five year plan (1951-1956). The scale of the programme was vast. The country was 
divided into approximately 35000 administrative blocks through which the plan funds 
were to be channelised for undertaking rural development projects. However, in the 
absence of any elected representatives at the local level it became progressively difficult 
to assess or ensure any effective participation of the people in the programme. 
 
In the course of its investigations, the team concluded that ‘CDP could not succeed, if 
the people did not own them’ and that the revival and empowerment of the local 
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government institutions was necessary to create such an ownership. Based on their 
findings, ‘the team pleaded for democratic decentralisation and went on to recommend 
the constitution of a three-tier structure of panchayats with gram panchayat at the 
bottom covering a single or a group of villages, panchayat samiti at the level of 
community development block and zilla parishad at the district level. The principal 
functions would be to conduct the community development programme with people’s 
participation.’ (Government of India: 1957, quoted in ibid.) 
 
It was thus observed that democratic decentralisation had a direct and important role to 
play to make people’s participation in the planning and execution of development 
projects effective. The first Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru gave 
‘enthusiastic support’ to the recommendations of the team and naming the new system 
as ‘Panchayati Raj’. (ibid.) All the states of the country passed new panchayati raj Acts 
and by the mid 1960s the three tier structure was in place in most states. However, it 
came to be known that it was the enthusiasm of the Prime Minister which was behind 
much of the progressive action by the states and not a general realisation of the 
importance of local government institutions. The system began to stagnate after the 
demise of Nehru and ‘by the end of 1960s, the system collapsed in nearly all the states.’ 
(ibid., p - 9) 
 
Apart from the death of Nehru, the other factor was a deep agrarian crisis that hit the 
country in the mid-1960s, which prompted the central government to launch the 
‘Intensive Agricultural District Programme’ (IADP) which effectively by-passed the 
local self-government institutions and the Community Development Programme. 
(Franke and Isaac : 2000, p - 6) 
 
The next major initiative at revitalising the local government institutions was in the late 
1970s with the submission of the Ashok Mehta Committee Report in 1978. The political 
context of the country was favourable for such a committee to be set up. The 
centralising tendency of the Congress party culminated in a national emergency which 
lasted from 1975 to 1977. When elections were finally held, the  Janata Party swept the 
polls and removed the Congress party from office. A committee was set up by the 
 103
Government of India, under the chairmanship of Ashok Mehta, for the revival of local 
government institutions. According to the committee the local government institutions 
‘had both an instrumental value and an end value.’ (Mathew: 2004, p - 9). The 
committee listed down why these institutions should be seen as appropriate instruments 
of development. 
 
First, through these institutions the planning processes and the development activities 
can be decentralised. Second, these institutions provide appropriate forums for people’s 
participation in the development process. Third, an institution like panchayat provides 
opportunity to the people to have a say in the future of their own communities and thus 
fulfils a basic development need. (ibid.) 
 
The committee also admitted that over the years the political consciousness of the 
people had increased and they were demanding a greater involvement in the 
management of local affairs. As regarding the local government institutions as ends in 
themselves the committee noted that their revival would allow a new leadership to 
emerge in the rural areas of India who were best suited ‘to churn the soil of rural India 
and induce social change.’ (Government of India : 1978, p - 33, quoted in ibid.). The 
similarity with the views of Lord Rippon couldn’t be more, and yet almost a hundred 
years had passed without the dream being fully realised. 
 
The committee noted that the various state governments were reluctant to give away 
powers to the local governments out of fear of ‘local claimants’ (Franke and Isaac : 
2000, p - 6). The consequence was that in most states elections to local bodies had not 
happened for many years. In the state of Tamil Nadu, elections to local governments 
were postponed twenty-one times. Although, Franke and Isaac wrote in their book that 
the reason behind state governments’ reluctance to share power with the local govern-
ments was the central government’s reluctance to share power with the former, ‘the 
Ashok Mehta Committee considered it beyond their charge to inquire into centre-state 
relations.’ (ibid.) 
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The recommendations of the committee were welcomed by the state governments ruled 
by regional political parties which were in opposition to the Congress party. 
Amendments were made to the local government laws in the states of West Bengal, 
Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir (ibid.). However, in all the cases 
except West Bengal, the new system collapsed when new regimes took over the 
respective state governments. Only in West Bengal, the movement towards democratic 
decentralisation could deepen itself because the same left coalition led by the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) remained in power. In later chapters we would see 
how the very deepening of democratic decentralisation coupled with land reforms, was 
in turn, critical to the political triumph of the coalition. 
 
After the general failure of the Ashok Mehta Committee recommendations, it was 
steadily realised that critical matters such as ‘holding regular elections to the panchayat 
bodies of devolving functions and fiscal resources to them depended on the vagaries of 
political practices of different regimes in the states.’ (Mathew: 2004, p - 9). For an 
overall and permanent institutionalisation, it was necessary to grant Constitutional 
recognition to these bodies. Demands for such a recognition kept being raised until the 
matter was taken up by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi took the matter up and at 
his initiative the 64th and 65th Constitutional Amendment Bills were presented and 
passed in the Lok Sabha (lower house) of the Parliament in 1969.  
 
The whole situation was a bit ironic, as the initiative was being taken by Rajiv Gandhi, 
who belonged to the ruling Congress Party, known for its reluctance towards 
decentralisation. Moreover, the opposition to the bill came from various quarters 
including the leftists who had been the known champions of democratic decentralisation 
in the country. According to Franke and Isaac, the ‘initial versions of the 64th and 65th 
Constitutional Amendments’ were ‘the attempts of central government to bypass the 
state governments and link itself directly to the local bodies.’ (Franke and Isaac : 2000, 
p - 6). The bill failed to get the necessary majority in the Rajya Sabha (upper house) of 
the Parliament .  
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The bills were introduced again by the Congress Government under the leadership of 
Narasimha Rao. The bills were passed by both houses of the Parliament and, after 
ratification by the states, came to force between April and June 1993, known as the 73rd 
(Panchayat) and 74th (Municipalities) Amendment Acts. The local government 
institutions finally got the Constitutional recognition that they had been denied in the 
colonial and post-colonial times. 
6.5 Planning in India - In service of the Elite 
Before elaborating on the specific features of the amendments and the relevance they 
have for urban planning, it is better to have an overview of the essential problems that 
both economic and urban planning face in India. Neither of the two have been able to 
shake off completely the colonial legacy of the pre-independence times. In the above 
sections we have seen how the logic of ‘efficiency’ was used by the colonial 
administrators to undermine any serious attempt to democratise the local government 
institutions. During the years after independence, ‘this unfortunate tendency has been 
intensified, through an awesome centralisation of economic and political power.’ 
(Ghosh : 1992, p 21) 
 
The eminent planner Arun Ghosh described very beautifully the connection between 
centralisation, bureaucratisation and the reduction of the capacity of planning to change 
the status quo. 
 
‘Invariably, (with political and economic centralisation), the power of the bureaucracy 
has also grown. Every ‘elected’ government has had to rely heavily on the bureaucratic 
establishment to carry out its directives, and with increasing centralisation of authority, 
effective power has passed on, from the elected representatives of the people, to the 
permanent civil service. This has been a powerful instrument for the maintenance of the 
status quo. While a major objective of planning has been to change the status quo, the 
increasing power of the bureaucracy has proved to be a major obstacle to any 
fundamental restructuring of society. In fact, of late, the concept of planning has been 
subverted, and has come to be equated with the regulation and control of the economy 
by the bureaucracy.’ (ibid.) 
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 E.M.S. Namboodiripad seeks the cause of this subversion of the concept of planning by 
the bureaucracy in the connection between political power and class combinations in 
Indian society. He writes, that 
 
Answers (to planning problems facing the country) will remain purely academic, fail to 
be put into practice, unless the question of political power - which class or classes are in 
control of the state machinery ? - is satisfactorily solved. After all, no class in control of 
the state machinery will allow the political power which it wields to be used in 
furtherance of those policies which are detrimental to its class interests. (Namboodiripad 
: 1966, p - 274)   
 
Throughout the history of urban planning in India too, one sees this issue of class 
combinations playing its role. The typical colonial city was notorious for its segregation 
of the white/European town and the black/native town. In his analysis of urban planning 
in colonial cities Anthony King wrote that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century the urban planning ideology in England was dominated by the Garden City 
movement of Ebenezer Howard with the primacy of ‘health, light and air’ and its 
emphasis on ‘physicalist solutions to social, economic and political ills.’ (King : 1990, p 
- 54)  
 
The colonial administrators certainly imposed the same ideology on the Indian city 
living by the Garden City slogan, 
 
‘We want not only England but all parts of the Empire to be covered with Garden 
Cities.’ (Garden City, 2 (15) 1907, quoted in ibid.) 
 
But they modified the slogan to include the British upper classes of the colonial city and 
excluding the larger part of the native population. It was important to ensure ‘health, 
light and air’ to the guardians of British commercial interests in India and the provision 
of basic amenities of water supply, sanitation and extensive open spaces was largely for 
them.  
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 But such a situation was bound to continue after political independence from Britain for 
certain very basic historical reasons. Though, the masses of India had rallied for the 
political freedom, the classes that benefitted and consolidated most through political 
freedom were India’s own leading capitalists, its own bourgeoisies, and not the lower 
industrial and agricultural working classes. E.M.S. Namboodiripad provided a detailed 
account of the various classes of Indian society that joined together in the struggle for 
national independence. At the top of the ladder in the colonial society were the ruling 
classes themselves. Describing this main target of the national struggle, Namboodiripad 
wrote,  
 
Firstly, since the economy and the state structure were dominated and controlled by a 
foreign power in the interests of foreign power in the interests of foreign monopolists, 
the entire nation was objectively interested in the victorious struggle against foreign 
domination. (Namboodiripad : 1966, p - 275) 
 
The other classes included the feudal remnants of the society, such as rulers of the 
various princely states and the big landlords, who depended largely on the British rule 
for their very existence. In return they became enthusiastic allies of the British empire 
every time the master called on their services to quell the national struggle, such as 
during the great revolt of 1857. There was a section of the growing capitalist class also 
which depended strongly on the British empire ‘since they depended for their profits on 
foreign trade, or such lines of manufacturing industry as were organically linked with 
the British monopolists.’ (ibid.) The rising intellectual and professional classes were 
also depending on the empire for jobs, promotions and securing a higher standard of life 
for themselves. In the passage below Namboodiripad describes the different classes that 
ultimately participated in the struggle against the British empire and the reasons why 
they did so. 
 
In the ranks of those who fought for the victorious conclusion of the anti-imperialistic, 
anti-feudal and democratic revolution were not only the rapidly-growing working class 
and the mass of peasantry who together constituted more than 80 percent of the 
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population. Among them were also the mass of small proprietors and professionals in 
towns and villages: their salvation lay in the rapid modernisation of the economic and 
cultural life of the country which could not obviously be undertaken without the 
victorious anti-imperialistic, anti-feudal and democratic revolution. Furthermore, there 
were elements within the capitalist and landlord classes who were farsighted enough to 
subordinate their short-term narrow interests to their own and the nation’s long-term 
interests. They, therefore, took their position along with the mass of the working people. 
Thus was formed the multi-class united front of the Indian people fighting for the 
removal of those obstacles which prevented the development of the country as a free, 
democratic, modern and prosperous nation...Class relations were, in other words, 
modified to a certain extent by the relations of national struggle’ (ibid., p - 276)  
 
The freedom of India removed the cause of alliance between these naturally antagonistic 
classes and exposed their differences of interest. Describing the situation in free India, 
the author wrote that, ‘the exploiting classes as a whole have now become the ruling 
classes; it is in their interests that the economy and the state machinery of free India are 
being guided.’ (ibid.) Apart from the main stream bourgeoisies, there was a new class of 
people forming, which the author described using Lenin’s concept of labour aristocracy. 
This refers to the section of population comprising of ‘young men and women born and 
brought up in impoverished peasant, artisan and even agricultural labour families, 
including those belonging to the scheduled castes, are getting opportunities of securing 
higher general education or technical education and thus become skilled workers, 
technicians and white collared professionals; before them are dangled the prospects of 
rising up the social ladder.’ (ibid., p - 277). As early as in 1962, D.R. Gadgil had written 
that ‘the largest units in private industry and trade in India pay their highest employees 
salaries comparable to those paid in the most developed and richest countries of the 
world.’ (Gadgil : 1962, p - vii, quoted in ibid., p - 279) 
 
Namboodiripad goes on to write that compared to the total work force of India, the 
percentage of this new aristocracy may be small, ‘but, together with other middle class 
elements who have gone into trade, industry, contract, etc., they occupy a very 
important place in present-day Indian society.’ (ibid., 279)  
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Much of the urban planning and development that has happened in India has been 
dictated by the needs and preferences of this articulate, resourceful and well-connected 
affluent class. 
 
According to Prof. Dantwala, 
 
Conspicuous consumption is a fact which is too glaring to be ignored. A visitor to any 
metropolitan cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Delhi will not fail to notice several 
of the symptoms of an affluent society, crowded air-conditioned restaurants, traffic 
jams, parking headaches, ‘houseful’ theatres, high premium on club membership, long 
waiting lists with the Air Lines Corporation and ‘no booking’ advices from first class 
hotels. (Dantwala, quoted in Namboodiripad : 1966, p - 281) 
 
Such was the situation in the 1990s. Thirty nine years later, this is how the eminent 
journalist P. Sainath described the situation, 
 
The collective net worth of 311 Indian billionaires is now Rs.3.64 trillion. This is up 71 
per cent from last year, when it was a paltry Rs.2.13 trillion. The tribe has also grown. It 
now includes 133 new entrants who just months ago were merely millionaires. The 
daily newspaper that tracks this elite club (Business Standard, November 9, 2005) puts 
it simply: ‘India's billionaires have never had it so good. (Sainath: 2005, p - 1) 
 
At the same time the absolute number of poor in most large cities was reaching 
staggering proportions. The total slum population in the cities of Delhi, Kolkata and 
Greater Mumbai were 1.85 million, 1.48 million and 6.48 million respectively, 
according to the census of India (Census of India: 2001). In many large cities of India 
almost half the population comprises of slum dwellers. The part of the urban poor which 
is deprived of a job in the organised sector and doesn’t not have any security of tenure is 
even more vulnerable.  
 
This widening gulf between the classes in India coupled with a strong tendency to 
bureaucratic centralisation, is, according to many prominent thinkers and activists, the 
main cause for the inability of the development process to be more inclusive in both the 
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urban and rural areas. We have already seen how the failures of rural development 
programmes was directly connected to the absence of rural local governments in the 
report of the Balwantrai Mehta report. But rather than respecting the findings of the 
committee the tendency to centralise and boss over the wisdom of local leaders 
continued unabated. Over the years this was visible in the form of the proliferation of 
‘Centrally Sponsored Schemes’ for development. Arun Ghosh describes the rationale 
behind this strategy, 
 
It is a sobering thought that as of March 1990, there were as many as 237 centrally 
sponsored schemes...The proliferation of schemes to as many as 237 has a rationale. 
Different central ministries dream up the concept of new schemes from time to time; the 
bureaucracy at the centre and the bureaucracy at the state level both find it a useful 
device to extend their power and patronage; and schemes keep proliferating in the name 
of ‘national interest’, for which funds then get earmarked. (Ghosh : 1992, p - 39) 
 
This situation concentrated an extra-ordinary power and influence at the hands of the 
bureaucratic ministries and line-agencies. The situation in large urban centres was no 
different. In most large cities the functions of large scale planning, development and 
service delivery is undertaken not by the locally elected municipalities, but by 
specialised agencies called ‘Special Purpose Vehicles’ or ‘para-statals’.  
 
The special purpose agencies responsible for planning and development continued with 
the colonial ideology of physicalist intervention through the creation of Master Plans, 
without attacking the true causes of socio-economic inequality in the urban areas and 
without altering the institutional structure of the planning process. The rationale behind 
setting up special purpose vehicles was the same that led to the creation of line agencies 
and the fanatic pursuit of ‘efficiency’ during the colonial period and led to the 
marginalisation of local government institutions.  
 
Sivaramakrishnan writes, that ‘development authorities, special purpose agencies and 
para-statal organisations’ which ‘have been a major feature of the Indian urban scene’ 
were justified using two theories.  
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The first theory was that ‘technical efficiency and the scale of resources required for 
delivery of some services were such which the municipalities couldn’t mobilise’, and 
the second theory was that ‘city redevelopment or city extension involved large scale 
acquisition and assembly of land, which has to be organised and run on commercial 
lines’ (Sivaramakrishnan : 2004, p - 15). But the author concludes that none of these 
theories could actually justify the creation of these organisations, as ‘across the country 
these non-municipal or para-statal organisations are afflicted by the same problems of 
inefficiency, wastage, insensitivity, non-accountability and corruption, which were 
freely laid at the doorsteps of municipalities at the time when these parallel 
organisations were formed.’ (ibid.)  
6.6 Constitutional Amendments and their effects on Planning 
One of the most immediate and noticeable effects of the amendments was a tremendous 
widening of the democratic base of the country. George Mathew gives the exact figures 
to bring home the gigantic effect of the amendments, 
 
‘Today there are around 600 district panchayats, about 6000 panchayats at the 
intermediate level (block/taluka/ mandal) and over 232000 gram panchayats. In urban 
areas over 1500 city corporations/municipalities are in position, besides over two 
thousand nagar panchayats. Around three million elected representatives of people run 
these local government institutions of whom not less than one million are women and 
around 660 thousands belong to scheduled caste/scheduled tribe categories. At one 
stroke, the amendments have put in place over three million people’s representatives to 
take charge of public affairs in place of merely 5000 representatives constituting the 
parliament and the various state assemblies.’ (Mathew : 2004, p - 12) 
 
With the passing of the amendments the arbitrary supersession of the local governments 
by the state governments ended once and for all. All states were required to enact or 
modify existing legislations pertaining to local governments and ensure that in the event 
of a dissolution of the local government, fresh elections were held within six months of 
the dissolution. The normal term of these bodies would be five years. Talking about the 
amendment on urban local government the tenth five year plan states that ‘the 
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enthusiasm among urban residents for the urban local bodies has been amply 
demonstrated by the fact that voter turnout in elections has been in the range of 65 to 70 
percent, much higher than the participation in elections to Parliament and state 
legislature.’ (The Tenth Fiver Year Plan, 2002 - 07, p - 611)  
 
A three-tier structure of local government was prescribed with ‘district, taluk/block and 
village levels in the rural areas and town panchayats in smaller urban centres besides the 
existing municipalities and corporations in the larger urban centres.’ (Franke and Isaac : 
2000, p - 7)  
 
Provisions were made for fair representation of women and scheduled castes and tribes 
in the elected bodies. To increase direct citizen participation in matters of governance 
and development ‘gram sabhas’ (village council), comprising of all adult members of 
the village registered in the electoral list were to be recognised as a part of the local 
government. In the cities ‘ward committees’ were to be constituted in similar lines, 
though the eligibility for membership varied from state to state, depending on the legis-
lation. Each state would constitute an election commission for directing the electoral 
process of the local governments and every five years a finance commission would be 
constituted to ‘determine the principles on the basis of which adequate financial 
resources would be ensured for panchayats and municipalities.’ (Mathew : 2004, p - 11) 
 
However, one of the most important aspects of the amendments was pertaining to 
planning. It was categorically stated, that the panchayats in the villages and the 
municipalities in the cities would prepare ‘plans for economic and social justice.’ (The 
Constitution of India : 1996, p - 190). Therefore, in one stroke, the amendments wanted 
to do away with the problems of narrow physicalist-planning and the tyranny of 
bureaucratic expertise which operated largely outside local democratic control. 
 
Not only that, in the urban areas, the function of urban planning was devolved to the 
elected municipalities. The special purpose development authorities and the line 
agencies could no longer function independently of them. The role that these para-
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statals were ideally required to play in the new situation has been described in the tenth 
national plan drafted by the planning commission of India.  
 
Para-statal agencies and bodies such as development authorities, need to play a 
supportive role to the elected bodies rather than taking over the functions which 
properly belong to the urban local bodies. (Planning Commission of India, Tenth Five 
Year Plan, 2002 - 07, p - 614) 
 
As regarding large metropolitan centres, where most planning issues would cut across 
the boundaries of individual wards or even Municipal Corporations, Municipalities and 
Panchayats, the seventy-fourth amendment provided for the creation of a Metropolitan 
Planning Committee (just like the District Planning Committees for the districts), which 
had to prepare a ‘draft development plan for the metropolitan area as a whole.’ (The 
Constitution of India : 1996, p - 192) 
 
Such planning committees were a far cry from the para-statals in both their constitution 
and the unique bottom-up style of planning. The amendment specified that ‘not less 
than two-thirds of the members of such Committee shall be elected by, and from 
amongst, the elected members of the Municipalities and Chairpersons of the Panchayats 
in the Metropolitan area in proportion to the ratio between the population of the 
Municipalities and of the Panchayats in the area.’ (ibid.) 
 
Regarding the planning process the amendment stated that in preparing the draft 
development plan the Committee must ‘have regard to’ the plans prepared by the 
municipalities and panchayats in the metropolitan area and matters of common interest 
between the municipalities and panchayats. (ibid.) 
 
The task of existing bureaucratic and technocratic agencies was to provide technical 
support to this essentially democratic body in the task of preparing such an 
amalgamated plan. If one looks at the provisions for creating such planning committees, 
the requirement for preparing holistic socio-economic plans and the amalgamation 
principle based on the individual plans of separate municipalities and panchayats in a 
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region, then it seems to fit well with the three-fold strategy that the planner Arun Ghosh 
had suggested to revive the planning system of India, which combined the concepts of - 
(a) Democratic decentralisation; 
(b) Area planning; and 
(c) Convergence of social services, with the revised role of government. 
(Ghosh : 1992, p - 36) 
 
Thus it can be seen that in the early 1990s, through the amendments, the struggle for 
democratic decentralisation and the struggle for a more democratic planning process 
totally merged, as one was deemed absolutely necessary for the other and this 
recognition was given by no less an authority than the Constitution of India.  
 
However, despite the various advisory and constitutional measures undertaken, in the 
form of the recommendations of the Balwantrai Mehta Committee and the Ashok Mehta 
Committee and the 73rd and 74rth Constitutional Amendment Acts, any genuine effort 
made to change the centralised and bureaucratic system met with no lesser resistance 
than the democratic nationalists faced during the colonial times. These efforts were 
aimed at empowering the institutions of local government, granting them planning and 
regulatory functions and making the bureaucracy subordinate to them. As a rule they 
were welcomed by those states in India where left-of-centre political parties, which 
stood in opposition to the Congress Party had come to power. These included the 
democratic decentralisation experiments undertaken in the state of Karnataka, when the 
Janata Dal came to power and in the states of Kerala and West Bengal, when the Left 
Front coalition governments, led by the Communist Party of India (Marxist), were in 
power. Of these three states the experiments in Kerala and West Bengal went far 
beyond the agenda of merely providing political opposition to the Congress Party and 
actually initiating a development planning process that was more democratic and 
responsive to the needs of the poor. However, the control of the immensely powerful 
central government by the Congress Party ensured that all attempts at genuine 
democratic decentralisation met with stiff opposition. This was first demonstrated in the 
case of the state of Kerala. Before taking a deeper look at the West Bengal 
decentralisation experiment in the next chapter, it would be worthwhile to give a 
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description of how the first genuine experiment to democratise the planning process in 
post-independence India got sabotaged.   
6.7 Sabotaging the First Experiment - Attacks from Unexpected 
Quarters 
The first elections to the legislative assembly of the state of Kerala were held in 1957. 
This led to the historic event in which the first democratically elected communist 
government of the world was formed in the state. The eminent Marxist politician and 
freedom fighter E.M.S. Namboodiripad became the first Chief Minister of the state. 
Right after coming to power the government under the undivided Communist Party of 
India (CPI) started initiating its socialist policies, which it described as a democratic 
revolution. The government could stay in power only for 28 months before being 
dismissed, but it enacted no less than 88 bills which tried to make substantial 
improvements in the conditions of the urban and rural working classes.  
 
These bills included The Minimum Wages Act, aimed at improving the conditions of 
workers in 18 industries and of agricultural workers; the Maternity Benefit Act, aimed 
at improving the condition of women workers in agricultural plantations and other 
sectors; Agricultural Debt Relief Act to help debt ridden cultivators; the Agrarian 
Relations bill, which aimed at granting security of tenure to tenant farmers, imposing 
land ceilings, distributing land among tenant farmers by paying compensation to 
landlords and many others (Venugopal: 2007, p - 1). Another extremely important act 
was the Kerala Education Act, which sought to provide universal free education and put 
a control on the influence of private school managements. According to Venugopal, the 
Christian educational managements severely opposed this Act and they were joined by 
the Nair Service Society (NSS), which was an organisation of the dominant Nair caste 
in the state. (ibid., p - 2)  
 
These socialist measures were supported by moves to change the centralised and 
bureaucratic structure of the administration. Namboodiripad chaired the Administration 
Reforms Committee, which was formed in 1958, and argued for a two-tier set up of 
rural and urban local government - one at the settlement level and the other at the 
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district (regional) level. A District Council bill was introduced, which provided for the 
creation of elected District Councils to co-ordinate the functions of the rural panchayats 
and the urban municipalities and municipal corporations. According to Franke and 
Isaac, such elected committees were supposed to take over ‘the entire development 
administration in the districts.’ (Franke and Isaac: 2000, p - 13). This move was a 
serious challenge to the dominating position of the District Commissioner or Collector, 
who was the main bureaucrat in-charge of the administration of the districts, since the 
colonial times. 
 
Though the issue of land reforms was high on the agenda of the Congress Party and of 
the central government of India, the class alliances formed by the Congress Party 
ensured its opposition to any serious implementation of such policies. The Prime 
Minister of the country, Jawaharlal Nehru, was committed to socialist ideals himself 
and reluctant to move decisively against the government in Kerala. However, his 
daughter and the then President of the Congress Party, Indira Gandhi, mobilised the 
Congress machinery to support the local agitations that were developing in the state 
against the Namboodiripad government. According to Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, who 
was minister for home affairs in the Kerala government, the ‘communal forces, 
capitalists and landlords got united’ against the state government. (Information and 
Public  Relations Department, Government of Kerala: 2007) 
 
The clashes between the police and the agitators turned violent and this was presented 
as evidence of a serious break down of law and order in the state and an argument for 
the dismissal of the elected state government through the imposition of President’s rule 
by the central government. Article number 356 of the Indian Constitution was used to 
dismiss the communist government on 31st July 1959 and President’s rule was imposed. 
This led to the postponement of many of the moves towards progressive reforms in land 
relations and institutional/administrative structure of the state till a left-democratic alli-
ance was elected to power again eight years later. 
 
Evidence revealed many years later showed a much more serious aspect of the toppling 
of the communist government in 1959. The electoral success of the communists in 
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Kerala came in the years of the cold war and in the words of retired South Asia 
Specialist of the US state department, Dennis Kux, the event ‘rang alarm bells in 
Washington’ (Kux: 1993, p - 145, quoted in Schaffer: 2003, p - 67). The hand of the US 
government in overthrowing the Kerala government in 1959 was first brought to notice, 
when Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who was US ambassador to India in the early 1970s, 
wrote in a book published in 1979, that Indira Gandhi received clandestine Central 
Intelligence Authority (CIA) funding to help remove the elected government of Kerala 
(Moynihan, D.P. and Weaver, S.: 1979, p - 41).  
 
The biography of Ellsworth Bunker, who was the US ambassador to India at the time of 
the Kerala elections, was published in 2003 and documented at length the role played by 
the Eisenhower administration and the CIA in the dismissal of the state government. 
This is how the process was described by the biographer Howard Schaffer, 
 
The Eisenhower administration at first adopted a wait-and-see attitude towards the CPI state 
government, but soon became more hostile. Bunker’s embassy concurred with Washington’s 
approach and made recommendations for implementing it. Eventually, a clandestine CIA 
operation was mounted to help dislodge the communists from power. This apparently 
involved agency funding for political demonstrations organised by the Congress Party and 
other opposition groups, that were designed to create a law and order situation sufficiently 
chaotic to justify the central government’s dismissal of the Kerala administration. Citing 
such internal turmoil, New Delhi forced the communists out in 1959. (Schaffer: 2003, p - 
67) 
 
Following this event, the pace and intensity of decentralisation in the state of Kerala 
depended on when and for how long the coalition of leftist political parties led by the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist) were in power in the state.  
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7. Land Reforms and Democratic 
Decentralisation in West Bengal 
 
7.1 The State of West Bengal 
The state of West Bengal lies in the eastern part of India. It had a population of 82 
million people according to the 2001 census and, at 904 persons per square kilometre, 
has the highest population density among all the states in the country. While it accounts 
for only 2.7 per cent (88752 square kilometres) of the total land area of the country it 
contains 7.8 per cent of the country’s population within its borders (Ghosh: 2004, p – 
3).  
 
The city of Kolkata is the capital of the state. Before the partition of India in 1947, the 
province of Bengal in British India included the territories of the current state of West 
Bengal and the nation of Bangladesh. In the year 2000, 27 percent of the population of 
the state lived below the poverty line. The national average for people living below the 
poverty line in the same year was 26 percent. The concentration of the poor in West 
Bengal is mainly in the rural areas. 84 percent of the below poverty line population in 
the state lives in rural areas compared to the national average of 74 percent (Ghosh: 
2004, p - 9). 
 
From a political perspective the state is a unique one in India, as it has been ruled by a 
coalition of left-wing parties led by the Communist Party of India – Marxist (CPM), 
called the Left Front continuously since 1977. According to economist Jayati Ghosh, 
‘this government in turn has been motivated by a vision of political, economic and 
social change, which has been different from that observed among most other state 
governments or the central government.’(ibid.). This vision led to a focus on two inter-
related strategies for development - land reform and democratic decentralisation. Right 
from the start, it was the contention of the Left Front, that the reform of property 
relations in the state was crucial to tackling the problems of poverty and under-
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development. The twin strategies of land reform and decentralisation were never seen in 
isolation from each other. The devolution of power to and the revival of the panchayats 
(rural local government institutions) was seen as the best way to make the land reforms 
more effective in terms of scope, fairness and sustainability, and the land reform process 
was, in turn, seen as a way to strengthen the institutions of local democracy. 
 
Figure 1West Bengal and its districts 
 
(Source: Thörlind: 2000, p – 11) 
7.2 Land Relations in West Bengal 
The complex property relations  that existed in the state of West Bengal before the Left 
Front came to power were a consequence of the ‘Zamindari’ or ‘Permanent Settlement’ 
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system of revenue collection adopted by the British East India Company in the province 
of Bengal in the year 1793. The Company used two main systems for the collection of 
revenue from the territories, which were directly under its administration. One of them 
was called the ‘Ryotwari’ system and the other was called the ‘Zamindari’ system. 
According to the first system the revenue was collected directly from the ryot i.e. the 
individual cultivator who actually tilled the land. This system was in operation in the 
presidencies of Bombay and Madras and in Assam and Burma. 
 
According to the ‘Zamindari’ system, the revenue was collected indirectly through 
arrangements with the ‘Zamindars’ i.e. landlords, who in turn collected the revenue 
from the tillers of the land. The ‘Zamindars’ had been performing the same function 
during the Mughal period, when they collected the revenue on behalf of the ‘Diwan’ i.e. 
the regional representative of the Emperor. Following the battle of Plassey in 1757 and 
the battle of Buxar in 1764, in which the Mughal chief of Bengal was decisively 
defeated by the forces of the East India Company, the Emperor granted the latter the 
‘diwani’ or administrative rights to Bengal.  
 
The initial years of British administration in Bengal were a legacy of mismanagement 
and rampant exploitation of the local population through arbitrary taxation. The 
Governor General Warren Hastings tried to replace the indirect system of revenue 
collection by appointing revenue-farmers, who would collect the taxes for the 
Company, and be subject to a five yearly inspection system. This arrangement didn’t 
work well, as the revenue-farmers often squeezed out as much tax as possible from the 
cultivators and then absconded at time of inspection. The exploitation reached such high 
levels that it contributed to one of the most devastating famines in the history of Bengal 
in 1770. 
 
The next Governor General, Lord Cornwallis, set into motion a process to rectify this 
situation by getting into a permanent arrangement with the Zamindars by granting them 
security of tenure on a hereditary basis and permanently fixing the land tax. The first 
move was aimed at providing the necessary incentives to the landlords to invest in land 
improvement and development of infrastructure, and the second one was aimed at 
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curbing the tendency of the British administrators to amass large fortunes through the 
process of arbitrary taxation.   
 
The adoption of the permanent settlement had a range of consequences, which is beyond 
the scope of this research to document and analyse in detail. However, two of the most 
important consequences were the creation of a ‘class of parasitic, non-cultivating 
landlords who expropriated rent from the actual tillers who cultivated their lands’ and 
the ‘high prevalence of sub-infeudation, with many layers of intermediaries between the 
actual cultivators and the “landlord”, all of whom had some rights or claims upon the 
produce of the land.’ (Ghosh: 2004, p – 27). The land of the largely absentee landlords 
was cultivated by sharecroppers, or bargadars, who received a part of the farm produce 
as payment. Gradually, the jotedars, a class of farmers who became dominant in rural 
Bengal by taking over many of the functions of the largely absentee landlords, became 
the principal agents for rent collection. The jotedars became the most oppressive and 
feared class in the countryside rather than the zamindars. Despite the amount of the tax 
being fixed, the very high amount of rent which the Company extracted from the 
landlords forced the latter to pass on that burden to the already impoverished cultivator. 
The coercion of the tenants by the landlords, operating through the jotedars, was 
‘achieved with the threat of eviction and other extra-economic pressures.’ (ibid., p – 28) 
 
This arrangement continued even after the system of permanent settlement had 
effectively come to an end with the political freedom of India and the partition of the 
province of Bengal into the states of West Bengal (belonging to India) and East Pakistan 
(belonging to Pakistan and later becoming the independent nation of Bangladesh). By 
this time, there were five broad categories in the production system in rural West 
Bengal, which are listed below- 
1.  The landlords. 
2.  The large group of sub-infeudaries with varying claims to the land.  
3.  A small group of middle peasants who mainly used family labour and, 
sometimes, hired labour. 
4.  The large and growing class of poor landless labourers. 
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5.  The sharecroppers who did much of the cultivation on small plots of land and 
were generally impoverished and indebted. 
(ibid.) 
 
This state of affairs led to a vicious circle of poverty and under-development, as the 
sharecroppers, who had no security of tenure, had neither the incentive nor the money to 
invest in their lands and undertake various improvements to increase production. 
According to Ghosh, ‘both production and distribution were adversely affected by the 
existing state of land relations. The land tenure system served as an obstruction to 
agricultural production, affected incomes and access to productive employment for the 
landless, and created unequal access to social and political power as well.’ (ibid.) At the 
time of independence West Bengal was one of the poorest states in India, with a high 
incidence of rural poverty, and dependent on other states for its food supplies. The 
inequality was made even more glaring by the fact, that the city of Kolkata continued to 
be one of the most prominent economic centres of India.  
7.3 The Quest for Land Reforms after Independence 
An important peasant movement broke out in Bengal in the year 1946 in the aftermath 
of the Bengal famine of 1943 in which approximately 5 million people died. This 
movement was called the Tebhaga movement. The aim of the movement, was that the 
landlords should get one-third of the produce of the land instead of one-half, which they 
often expropriated using various kinds of economic and extra-economic threats. The 
remaining two-thirds should go to the actual cultivators - i.e. tenant farmers and 
agricultural labourers. The movement was led by the ‘Krishak Samiti’, the peasant wing 
of the Communist Party of India (CPI). The first eruption happened in a village under 
the Chirirbandar police station in Dinajpur district, which currently lies in Bangladesh. 
The local communist leader of the area, Rupnarayan Roy, was himself a small land 
owning farmer and the organiser of the Krishak Samiti in the area. The Samiti organised 
the Hindu and Muslim farmers in the area to resist the jotedars. 
 
On the day of rent collection, the peasants refused to part with more than 33 percent of 
the yield. The confrontation turned violent and led to a clash between the jotedars’ 
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goons and the peasants. When the police arrived, it took the side of the jotedars’ men 
and opened fire on the peasants. Although the police retreated that day, the violent 
repression of the movement by the combined forces of jotedars and the state police 
continued. In the words of Ajoy Roy, the ‘police force set a reign of terror in village 
after village in Chirirbandar police station - the leaders were hunted out, even common 
villagers including women folk were not spared from physical torture and repressive 
action.’ (Roy: 2002, p - 2)  
 
With the independence of India and the partition of Bengal in 1947 the Tebhaga 
movement came to an end but it played an extremely important role in raising the 
consciousness of the farmers and the state about the importance of such reforms. This 
was acknowledged by the government of independent India right from the start, but not 
much was achieved in terms of concrete results in any of the states. Moreover, as land 
was a subject under the list of functions devolved to the individual states according to 
the Indian Constitution, it was primarily up to them to undertake necessary reforms.  
 
The Congress Party, which emerged as the most influential political party in India 
through the years of the freedom struggle, didn’t have control of the state legislature in 
Bengal prior to independence. Due to the majority of the population in undivided 
Bengal being Muslim, it was the Muslim League that had formed the state government. 
After the independence, most of the territories where the Muslim population was 
concentrated became part of East Pakistan. As a result of this, there was a ‘serious 
power vacuum in the state of West Bengal’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 126) This vacuum was 
filled in by the most important and influential political party in India at the time of 
independence - the Congress Party. Following its strategy elsewhere, the Congress party 
consolidated its hold over the political environment in West Bengal by building an 
‘elaborate patronage network.’ (ibid.). This network of patronage had its centre in the 
city of Kolkata and penetrated into the countryside from there. 
 
In the aftermath of the Tebhaga movement, two laws were passed in the state of West 
Bengal related to land reforms. The first of these was the West Bengal Bargadari Act of 
1950, which provided for a share of 60 per cent of the total yield to the bargadars, or 
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sharecroppers, if they provided the farm inputs. The issue of the security of tenure was 
not addressed in this law. Five years later, a more comprehensive law called the West 
Bengal Land Reforms Act was passed. This law provided for the elimination of interme-
diaries between the landlord and the cultivator and the imposition of ceilings on land 
holdings. In subsequent years, amendments were made to this act which made the right 
of cultivation of the sharecropper hereditary, made the requirements of terminating 
bargadari contracts more stringent and made the share of the bargadar  75 per cent in 
case of input contribution (Ghosh: 2004, p - 29). 
 
However, the alliances that the Congress Party, which was the ruling party at the central 
level, had with the landlord class, contributed to a reluctance on the part of the former, 
to pursue any reforms that threatened the power of this class (Kohli: 1987, Ghosh: 
2004). A direct consequence of this was the failure to create a complete official record 
of the bargadars. In the absence of such a record the implementation of the provisions 
of the laws became well-nigh impossible. In fact, the situation became worse for the 
bargadars following the Acts, as the landlords tried to downgrade their status from the 
sharecropper to that of agricultural labourers to prevent them from claiming the rights 
that had been bestowed to them. 
 
The leadership of the Congress party passed on from Atulya Ghosh to Bidhan Chandra 
Roy and then on to P.C. Sen. According to Kohli, it was under the leadership of a 
‘dominant personality’ such as P.C. Sen, that ‘an already corrupt Congress became 
deeply factionalised’ and created an atmosphere of increasing political chaos in the state 
(Kohli: 1990, p - 126). Throughout this period of Congress leadership, the 
implementation of the land reform legislations remained negligible, and consequently, 
the opposition of various left of centre parties gained in strength. At the forefront of this 
opposition were the two parties that the earlier Communist Party of India had divided 
into in 1964 - the CPI and the CPM. Land reforms and the condition of urban labourers 
remained the most important political slogan of these opposition parties. 
 
The years 1964 and 1965, were years of drought, food shortages and rising food prices. 
According to Kohli, the successful utilisation of these situations and the rampant 
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corruption and rising factional disagreements within the Congress led to the defeat of 
the Congress Party in the state elections of 1967. 
 
After the defeat of the Congress party, a coalition of leftist parties formed the United 
Front government. The CPM was the most important political party within this 
coalition. It was in this period that the leftist parties began to understand the challenges 
of working as a regional state government within the political structure of India in 
which much power was concentrated in the central government. Regarding the con-
straints under which CPM, the dominant party of the left operates, Kohli remarks, that 
‘these not only involve the general constraints of India’s political-economic 
arrangements, but also the more specific constraints of the Constitution, and of the 
centrally controlled administration and finances, as well as those stemming from the 
prospect of presidential rule in case the government performance is deemed inadequate.’ 
(Kohli: 1987, p - 96).  
 
The United Front government had assumed that by controlling the state government it 
was in a strong position to unleash all its radical programmes involving class struggles 
both in the urban and rural areas. In the rural areas, this meant the appropriation and 
redistribution of land held above the prescribed ceiling and implementation of the 
legislations on land reforms already enacted. In urban areas it involved the 
intensification of trade union activity to demand better rights for the industrial workers. 
The militant nature of undertaking these processes led to a break down of law and order 
in the state. In this period of disorder, the central government in Delhi imposed 
Presidential rule and dismissed the United Front government in late 1967. However, by 
the time elections were held in 1969, the Congress party had grown even more 
unpopular and lost to the United Front. (Kohli: 1990, p - 127) 
 
Despite the bitter experience of the first phase of being in power, the political 
adventurism of the United Front government continued unabated. In the words of Kohli,  
 
‘Again, the UF formed a government similar to that in its first reign, and again chaos 
resulted. Gheraos (encirclement), forced redistribution of land, internecine fighting 
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among political parties, riots, and political murders once again became the order of the 
day.’ (ibid.)   
 
As a result of this situation, the central government imposed presidential rule again and 
dismissed the United Front government in 1970. The role that Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi played in the Bangladesh war of freedom in 1971 made her popularity soar as 
India achieved military victory over the Pakistani forces. Congress party used this wave 
of popularity to come to power in West Bengal in 1972. This resulted in the decline of 
the campaign for land reforms and the landlords, in many cases, even reclaimed the land 
that had been redistributed during the rule of the United Front governments. (Kohli: 
1989, p - 108). A massive repression of the leftist forces and of the bargadars was let 
loose by the Congress ruled state government and the landlords who were allied to it. 
Police assisted in the mass eviction of the bargadars. Kohli writes, that ‘according to 
Amnesty International, over 25000 cadres, mostly of the CPM and the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist-Lenisist) (CPIML), were in jail in the first half of the seventies.’ 
(ibid.) 
 
Between 1972 and 1977, certain important events happened in the political arena, which 
led to a situation, where the CPM, ‘which already had considerable power base within 
West Bengal, finally emerged as the single most important voice of the Bengali left.’ 
(Kohli: 1990, p - 127). The two main contenders of CPM within the leftist forces in 
West Bengal were the CPI and the extreme-left CPIML. The main contender outside the 
leftist forces was the Congress party. In 1972, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi used the 
opportunity created by the concentration of armed forces in West Bengal for the 
Bangladesh war to quell the militant extreme-left movement (ibid.). Following the 
declaration of national emergency by the central government ruled by the Congress 
party in 1975, the popularity of the party and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suffered 
immensely. The Communist Party of India, under the influence of Soviet Union decided 
to ally with the Congress party during the emergency and faced a similar decline in 
popularity. In the national elections in 1977 Congress party was decisively defeated and 
the political party called Janata Dal came to power. In the state of West Bengal, the 
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CPM benefitted indirectly from all these factors and had a resounding victory over the 
Congress party in the state elections of 1977. 
 
The elections of 1977 was a landmark event, as the CPM, which had always had land 
reforms high on its agenda, was never to lose political power in any state election after 
that. Its electoral success itself was substantially due to its contributions to these reforms 
in the following years. However, what was most important was the shift away from 
political adventurism and a serious rethinking of the strategies that could be pursued 
within the democratic-capitalist set up of the Indian state to undertake land reforms 
without being removed from power by the imposition of presidential rule. This 
rethinking of strategy was clearly expressed in the resolution adopted by the party in its 
tenth party congress which took place in the aftermath of the national emergency. No 
longer relying on the possibility of launching a revolutionary class struggle within a 
parliamentary democratic system, the focus of the party became ‘expanding democracy 
and introducing new clauses in the constitution putting the fundamental rights of the 
people beyond the mischief of any ruling party or government.’ (Political Resolution 
adopted at the tenth Congress of the CPM, quoted in Kohli: 1989, p - 99) 
 
Within this broad re-orientation of party strategy was the shift in the land reforms 
agenda from one of ‘class confrontation’, to ‘development and redistribution.’ (ibid.) 
Rather than militant forms of struggle, the new strategy of empowering the local 
governments by devolving power and functions to them and using these institutions of 
local democracy to pursue land reforms started gaining ground. To many supporters of 
the communist movement, this re-thinking of strategy appeared like a dilution of the 
revolutionary goals of the party and a compromise with the powerful classes. The noted 
theorist and communist leader from Kerala, EMS Namboodiripad clarified the position 
of the party in the following lines, 
 
Our experience of working of this system proves that since  the parliamentary  democratic  
system  as  prevails  today  provides  the exploited  majority  a  powerful  weapon  with  
which  to  fight  the exploiting minority, the latter does its utmost to reduce  democracy to a 
mere formality  to  subvert it whenever and wherever  the  exploited majority uses it to get 
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anywhere near the seats of power.  Defence of parliamentary  democracy  at the Central and 
State level (where  it exists but  is very often threatened by the authoritarian forces) and its 
extension  to  the district and lower levels as envisaged in  the four-pillar  democracy  is, 
therefore, of extreme importance  in  the advance of Indian society. My  faith  in democratic 
decentralisation in other  words, arises from  the  fact  that  it helps the working  people  in  
their day-to-day  struggles  against their oppressors and  exploiters. (Note on Report of the 
Committee on Panchayat Raj Institutions 1978, quoted in Isaac: 1998) 
 
It is from this point onward the processes of democratic decentralisation and land 
reforms got intrinsically bound in West Bengal. 
7.4 Land Reforms through Democratic Decentralisation 
According to government sources, the land reforms initiated by the Left Front 
government had the following objectives - 
 
1. To weaken the domination of landlords in rural Bengal, and therefore, contribute to 
the distribution of assets and wealth. 
2. To unleash the productive forces, which had been constrained by the prevailing 
pattern of land relations. 
3. To create a market in rural areas by increasing purchasing power among the 
peasantry, which was expected to lead to development of rural industries, trade, 
commerce and other services. 
4. It was believed, that such land reforms would provide the basic conditions for the 
expansion of literacy, education and public health. 
5. Finally, the aim was to empower the weaker sections of society, including Dalits and 
women, and shift the balance of class forces in the state in favour of working people 
generally. 
(Ghosh: 2004, p - 30) 
 
Although the decentralisation experiment undertaken by the Left Front Government was 
the most radical and innovative one in West Bengal, there had been various attempts at 
empowering the rural governments from a much earlier date. The first such attempt was 
in the year 1919, with the passing of the Bengal Village Self Government Act. This act 
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provided for a two tier structure of rural local government with District boards at the 
higher (district) level and Union boards at the lower (block) level. Though the 
community development blocks had been set up much later the union boards were co-
terminus with the blocks. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the local government 
institutions created in this period were victims of low resource capacity, excessive 
bureaucratic control and domination by local elites.  
 
The next attempt was in the form of the West Bengal Panchayat Act of 1957. This act 
provided for the creation of a Gram Panchayat in every village, that would function as 
the executive arm of the Gram Sabha (the village council comprising all the voters in 
the village). The number of elected members of the Gram Panchayat was to vary from 9 
to 15. There was also a provision for the nomination of eminent persons from the 
locality. There were two executive posts of the Adhyaksha (President) and the Upadhy-
aksha (Vice - President).  
 
The problem with this act was that it was prepared before the submission of the Balwant 
Rai Mehta report which had a major impact on the setting up of panchayat institutions 
all over the country. Due to this reason there was some problem in integrating the 
community development blocks into the panchayat structure of West Bengal. (Ghosh: 
2004, p - 46). This structure was further modified with the enactment of the West 
Bengal Zilla Parishad Act of 1963. This led to the replacement of the existing District 
Boards with Zilla Parishads and the creation of a four-tier structure of rural local 
government, which is shown below. 
 
Table 1Four-Tier Structure of Rural Local Government, as per the Act of 1963 
 
Tier Name Jurisdiction Total No. (at the time of 
creation) 
First Zilla Parishad The district 15 
Second Anchalik Parishad The community 
development bock 
325 
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Third Anchal Panchayat Cluster of 8 – 10 
villages 
2926 
Fourth Gram Panchayat The village 19602 
 
(Source: Ghosh: 2004, p – 46) 
 
However, this was the period when the severe economic crisis hit the state in 1964 and 
1965. Under those circumstances, no elections to the local government institutions 
could take place.  
 
The West Bengal Panchayat Act of 1973, replaced the four-tier structure with the three-
tier structure which was emerging all over India. The structure is shown below – 
 
Table 2Three -Tier Structure of Rural Local Government, as per the Act of 1973 
 
Tier Name Head Jurisdiction 
First Zilla Parishad Sabhadhipati Co-terminus with 
districts 
Second Panchayat Samiti Sabhapati Co-terminus with 
blocks 
Third Gram Panchayat Pradhan 8 – 10 villages 
 
(Source: Ghosh: 2004, p – 47) 
 
The Pradhan (chairperson) of the gram panchayat was ex-officio members of the 
panchayat samiti and the Sabhapati (chairperson) of the panchayat samiti was the ex-
officio member of the district level tier. However, due to the political turmoil in the 
state during this time and the spells of President’s rule and national emergency, 
elections to these bodies could not be held.   
 
From the experiences of the previous two United Front governments, the Left Front had 
realised that militant forms of struggle and forced appropriation and redistribution of 
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above the ceiling land would not be sustainable unless there was a pro-Left regime in 
place at the national level too. The alternate strategy adopted was to empower the ever 
neglected local government institutions and use them for undertaking the necessary 
reforms. Although, the local government institutions had been legally empowered 
earlier, the reluctance of the Congress Party and the political turmoil in the state made 
regular elections and a genuine transfer of powers and functions impossible. 
 
Elections were held simultaneously for all the three tiers of the rural local government, 
viz. The Zilla Parishad (at the district level), Panchayat Samiti (at the block level) and 
the Gram Panchayat (at the level of a cluster of 8 to 10 villages) in the year 1978. A 
bold departure from the Mehta Committee required the representatives at two tiers 
above comprising panchayat samitis and zilla parishads to also be elected directly by the 
voters. (Bardhan and Mookherjee: 2006). Ever since that year, elections have been held 
every five years without fail. This continuity of local elections was a unique 
achievement of the West Bengal government and was not to be happen at a national 
level till the ratification of the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments 14 years later.  
 
The main strategy of CPM was to encourage the participation of rural non-elites to 
participate in the local elections as party candidates and then use the ‘new politicised 
panchayats’ (Kohli: 1987, p - 108) to register sharecroppers and landless farmers, 
implement land reform and undertake poverty alleviation and agriculture support 
programmes. In one analysis of these local bodies, they were even termed as “red 
panchayats” (ibid.). Apart from playing the crucial role of being the most appropriate 
institutions for undertaking land reform these panchayats also helped CPM to ensure its 
political penetration of the countryside. 
 
Kohli writes, that one of the main tasks of the CPM after coming to power was to 
consolidate its political presence in the state. This could be done by expanding the party 
base, but that would bring its own problems. Inviting more and more members into the 
ranks of the party at a time of political victory would definitely bring in opportunists 
and compromise the two characteristics that were CPM’s strong points - discipline and 
loyalty. According to Kohli, the very organisation of the party is linked to its ability to 
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take a non-elitist path to politics and development. This is how he describes the 
characteristic of ‘party discipline’ in the CPM, 
 
The core membership of the party is a highly disciplined and select group. Each member 
actually gains that status after several years of party work. This work is typically in the trade 
union movement, or in the Kisan Sabha, or in the student movement. Those sympathetic and 
dedicated to the party’s mission are observed closely by those who are already 
members...The prospective members in turn absorb the party line as well as the belief that 
discipline and loyalty to the party line constitutes the highest virtues, enabling one to 
become a member. (ibid., p - 102)  
 
Given this state of affairs, there was no way CPM would have allowed the party to grow 
in a callous way. Moreover, as a political party it was attempting something, which 
most other political parties in India had failed to achieve - to consolidate power ‘by 
building its power base primarily on the lower and lower-middle classes.’ (ibid., p - 
109). As an alternative to expanding the party, opening up the panchayats for multi-
party elections at a time when the collective consciousness of the rural lower classes 
favoured the party and its slogan of land reform would have enabled the political 
penetration in the countryside without compromising party discipline. The assumption 
of CPM proved correct and the party candidates won a massive electoral victory in 1978 
at all the tiers of the local government. These elections were a marked departure from 
the earlier trend in India, when local governments were either superseded by higher tiers 
of government or got captured by local landed elites.  
 
As has been noted earlier, that one of the major problems with earlier attempts at 
implementing land reforms was the failure to register the sharecroppers. After 1978, the 
panchayats got active in the process of recording the bargadars or sharecroppers. 
Alongside the efforts of the panchayats was the ‘active participation’ of the bureaucracy 
and workers’ unions (Ghosh: 2004., p - 31). Group meetings with sharecroppers were 
used as a method to make the registration process more participatory and the paper-
work easier. Political workers of the Left Front played a very active role in campaigning 
for this process which became famously known as ‘Operation Barga’. Ghosh notes, that 
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the pace and effectiveness of land reforms in various districts varied with the strength of 
the political machinery (ibid.).  
 
The registration of sharecroppers and redistribution of above ceiling land became a 
remarkable achievement of the state. Despite having just 3.5 percent of the arable land 
in India, the amount of land distributed in West Bengal accounted for 20 percent (1.39 
million acres) of the total land distributed in the country. The state also accounts for 
nearly half (2.7 million persons) of the total beneficiaries of redistributive land reform 
across the whole of India. (ibid., p - 34). The land reform process was also weighted in 
favour of the low caste groups and  minority groups such as the Muslim households, 
who are among the poorest in West Bengal.  
7.5 Decentralised Planning in the Countryside 
From the early 1980s onwards there were also attempts at getting the panchayats 
seriously involved in a decentralised development planning process. The 
implementation of as many as 27 rural development programmes were handed over to 
the panchayats. The structure of decentralised planning system that was generated for 
the rural areas is shown in the following table - 
 
Table 3Structure of Decentralised Planning After 1985 
 
Level Government Planning Body Plan 
State State Government State Planning 
Board 
Annual and five 
year state plans 
District Zilla Parishad District Planning 
and Coordination 
Committee (DPCC) 
and District 
Planning 
Committee (DPC) 
Annual and five 
year district plans 
Block Panchayat Samiti Block Planning 
Committee 
Block plans 
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Village Gram Panchayat - Basic Needs 
Statements 
 
(Source: Ghosh: 2004, p – 53) 
 
Though the state planning board was responsible for preparing plans for the whole state, 
it played a crucial role in guiding the planning process of the lower levels. At the district 
level, the DPCC was more of a deliberative body, while the DPC was the executive arm 
and responsible for preparing the plan. DPCC for approval. The DPC was headed by the 
Chairperson of the Zilla Parishad and had a mixed membership of officials and non-
officials. The district collector was the member secretary of the DPC. The committee 
was empowered to integrate the various block level plans and approve schemes with a 
budget of up to Rs. 5 Lakhs. Schemes with higher value required the approval of the 
state planning committee.  
 
The Sabhapati of the Panchayat Samiti was the head of the BPC, which comprised of 
the chairpersons of all standing committees of the Samiti, chairpersons of the Gram 
Panchayats and officers of the various line departments at the block level. The block 
development officer was the member secretary of the BPC. The BPC was empowered to 
make block plans by integrating the needs statements of the various Panchayat Samitis 
and approve schemes with a budget of up to Rs. 50000. Larger schemes required the ap-
proval of the DPC.    
 
By making the district collector and the block development officer the member 
secretaries of the DPC and the BPC respectively, a serious attempt was made to make 
the bureaucracy subservient to the elected leaders in the planning and development 
machinery at the local level. This move, however, was not to the liking of the 
bureaucrats in general, as they considered it a threat to their power and prestige.  
 
This planning structure provided the blue-print to the decentralised planning system that 
was to be applied nation wide through the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendments of 
1992. The principle underlying this planning system was that rather than the plan being 
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dictated from the top, the overall plan of the district would be made by coordinating and 
integrating the plans prepared at the lower levels. Therefore, the basic needs statements 
of the Gram Panchayats were supposed to be integrated in the preparation of the Block 
Plans and these, in turn, were to be integrated to generate the annual and five year 
district plans.  
 
The state planning board had identified the development of agriculture and allied 
activities to be the overall goal of these plans as this would generate maximum 
employment and secure a high rate of growth. A lot of attention was paid to 
development of irrigation as this would enable the farmers to cultivate the high yield 
variety of rice called ‘Boro rice’. Agricultural development would generate the em-
ployment and overall economic growth which could tackle the problem of poverty in 
the state. Irrigation works and road construction would also generate employment 
opportunities in the villages. As it has been noted right at the start of this chapter, 
poverty in West Bengal, was concentrated mainly in the rural areas. According to the 
guidance provided by the state planning board, one-third of the available plan funds 
were earmarked for irrigation works; one-third for road construction and the remaining 
one-third for other projects.  
 
Much of the funding for the plans came from the centrally sponsored development 
schemes such as the  (IRDP), National Rural Employment Programme (NREP) and the 
Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme (RLEGP). One strong indicator of 
the willingness of the state government to empower these institutions for plan making 
was the amount of financial resources devolved to them. At a time when supersession of 
the local governments by the state governments was the norm, the state government of 
West Bengal not only guaranteed the political existence of the former but consistently 
increased their resources. Ghosh writes, that ‘in constant price terms, there was a five-
fold increase in the total funds received by panchayats, and a seven-fold increase in Plan 
funds between 1993-94 and 2000-01. 
 
Despite the increase in the amount of funds devolved it was also true that the state 
government never had enormous financial resources to devolve from in the first place. 
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Ghosh writes that ‘the actual financial devolution has been relatively constrained, 
especially in the period when the state government’s own severe fiscal problems 
reduced both the ability to make available untied funds and even the amount of planning 
and other departmental funds which could be utilised by the panchayats.’ (Ghosh: 2004, 
p - 59).  
 
However, the lack of finances, despite being a crucial factor, was just one of the many 
factors that affected this essentially bottom-up planning system. Jayati Ghosh writes that 
there are ‘three aspects to a success decentralised planning process.’ (Ghosh: 2004, p - 
57) 
 
1. Mobilisation of the common people - This aspect is crucial to the success of the 
planning process. A democratic and decentralised planning process cannot be conceived 
without sufficient mobilisation of the local people. 
2. Organisation or Institution building - Here, Ghosh focuses on the need to link up the 
three officially recognised levels of the local government to ad hoc institutions and 
community based organisations that exist in the locality. It is a process of continuing the 
decentralisation of the planning process even further down and closer to the people. 
3. Planning - Under this aspect, Ghosh stresses the need for sustainability. The planning 
process much be able to sustain itself in order to be able to make a difference in the long 
run. This becomes all the more difficult in the context of limited financial resources.  
(ibid.) 
 
Though the planning process started with enthusiasm, there was a substantially diversity 
in the quality of the district plans prepared. The paternalistic government and 
administrative machinery so taken for granted in the rural districts of India since 
colonial times had created such a culture and mind-set of dependence that it created 
enormous barriers in the path of such a progressive planning process. The conflicts 
between the bureaucracy and the panchayat leaders, the maturity and wisdom of the 
Zilla Parishad chair-persons, the involvement of the state planning board in the planning 
process of the districts, the disagreements between the state level ministers and the local 
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government leaders from the same localities all took their toll on the new experiment 
over and above the obvious problems of limited resources and technical capacity.  
 
Despite all these difficulties, most of the districts prepared their first development plans 
by 1985. The plan prepared by the Medinipur district was hailed as a model plan. Arun 
Ghosh, the eminent Indian planner, who was invited by the then Chief Minster of West 
Bengal to act as an advisor to the state planning board during the decentralised planning 
process, described the role that the Sabhadhipatis, or elected chair-persons of the Zilla 
Parishads, and people’s mobilisation played to make the planning process in Medinipur 
a success. 
 
‘The exercise on district planning in Midnapore was initiated by SKM, the Sabhadhipati 
there...The first task was to educate the local populace; SKM personally undertook trips 
of each of the 53 blocks, and to a number of Gram Panchayats especially in the more 
backward and problem areas. In largely attended meetings, he explained the purpose 
and the rationale behind the planning exercise. Each Gram Panchayat was required to 
prepare an inventory of resources, and a statement of the urgent needs of the local 
population. These were consolidated for each block at the block headquarters, and the 
Sabhapati of the Panchayat Samiti, The Block Development Officer, and all others 
connected with the Block Planning Committee were asked to prepare block plan 
proposals based on the statement of needs and resources for the entire block. These 
“plan documents” for each block were thus merely an aggregation or compilation of the 
inventory of resources and of the needs statements of all Gram Panchayats in the 
block...All the block plans were then pooled together, and a profile of the district plan 
emerged almost automatically. The existing situation, the currently available facilities, 
the needs and aspirations of people, the funds currently estimated as being deployed - 
and the schemes on which they were being deployed - by different authorities, were thus 
put in juxtaposition of each other for the first time. The programmes being promoted by 
different departments thus got highlighted in the background of needs and aspirations of 
the people.’ (Ghosh: 1989, p - 286)  
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On the other end of the spectrum were districts like Malda, where even the simplest 
steps of the planning process got complicated due to political rivalry and lack of 
coordination between the state planning board and the district planning committee. The 
state planning board had been dissatisfied with the district plan prepares in Malda. Arun 
Ghosh wrote, that ‘they (the local authorities) have not really taken note of the “needs” 
of the people, nor formulated any block plans.’ (ibid., p - 287). The state planning board 
had also requested that in the first year of decentralised planning (1985-1986), the 
district plans be discussed with them before finalisation and submission to the DPCC. 
As the DPCC had the final authority in the finalisation of district plans, the state 
planning board couldn’t intervene afterwards. Such an intervention would go totally 
against the very spirit of decentralisation. Moreover, one of the characteristics of the 
decentralised planning process was that private contractors should not be used in the 
undertaking of development works.   
 
In Malda, all these requirements had been violated. The plan was submitted to the 
DPCC without consultation with the state planning board and the local politicians 
resorted to arbitrary selection of projects and involving private contractors to please the 
electorate. One of the reasons for this state of affairs was attributed to the political 
situation in the district. In Malda, ‘the Congress...and the CPM are divided nearly 
50:50; and politics rather than the condition of the people is what concerns the elected 
representatives of the people.’ (ibid., p - 289). Apart from this there was a gap in the 
communication between the district authorities and the state planning board. A meeting 
was called in the district to correct these errors and modify some parts of the plan. The 
district chair-persons and panchayat leaders were in agreement with the state planning 
board. The MLAs (Member of Legislative Assembly), who are state level politicians 
elected from the district, were the ones who benefitted most from the patronage politics 
of arbitrary project selection, and were thus very reluctant to have a meeting once they 
have made their promises to the electorate. In the words of Ghosh, ‘stormy would be a 
mild word for the way the meeting of the DPCC started.’ (ibid.). This is how Ghosh 
describes the meeting that he witnessed first hand.  
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One MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) jumps to his feet. Please do not lecture us; we 
are the elected representatives of the people, we know the rural areas and represent them; we 
are answerable to them. We know the priorities. And why were we not told earlier of these 
diverse conditions? With what face can we confront the electorate - whom we have already 
advised as to the schemes we are going to implement - that these schemes are not to be 
allowed ? MLA after MLA jumps to his feet. For a while there is pandemonium. (ibid., p - 
291)  
 
Although the matter could be resolved later, mainly through the energetic intervention 
of the elected leaders of the panchayats, it shows the incredible challenges that arise 
when a planning process is both decentralised and democratised at the same time.  
 
Though he was always appreciative of the efforts of the Left Front government to 
initiate the process of democratic decentralisation, his observations in West Bengal also 
made him conclude that, ‘in the final analysis, it is the timber of the local politicians 
rather than party politics per se that would determine the quality of the local level plans. 
The only safeguard is to get the people enthused about this entire matter. There is 
nothing like the popular will to tame politicians.’ (ibid., p - 289)  
 
Despite this energetic beginning made by most districts in the state, the process of 
decentralised planning could not develop into a full fledged bottom-up process as had 
been hoped by seeing the achievements of districts like Medinipur. Jayati Ghosh wrote 
that, ‘most of the districts stopped systematic attempts at district planning and local 
resource mapping after the mid-1990s.’ (Ghosh: 2004, p - 55).  
7.6 The Next Strategic Re-Orientation 
On the whole, the path to development through the twin strategies of land reforms and 
democratic decentralisation has been quite a unique one in the country. Land reforms 
and democratisation were major achievements by themselves, but they had a strong 
impact on poverty reduction and empowerment in the countryside. 
 
The extremely small size of the parcels that got created as a result of the land reform 
process created doubts in the minds of some observers, who had doubts about the 
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economic viability of such an empowerment strategy. The average size of plots 
distributed turned out to be 0.39 acres and the ceiling on any parcel distributed was 1 
acre. However, such fears were proved false. Ghosh writes that ‘in the early 1980s, 
observers were talking of an “agricultural impasse” in the state, but in fact it was 
precisely from that period that agricultural output took off, making crop output in West 
Bengal the most rapidly expanding in India for the 1980s as a whole.’ (ibid., p - 74). 
She further writes, that ‘the moving force of this agricultural output expansion has been 
small cultivators, unlike the rest of India, and this was substantially due to the fact that 
productive forces were unleashed as a combination of the land reform and greater power 
to decentralised elected bodies.’ (ibid.). 
 
The state experienced one of the highest growth rates in the country in recent years and 
much of that happened in the agricultural sector. During the 1960s and 1970s the state 
domestic product growth in West Bengal was below the national average. By the 1990s, 
West Bengal had become one of the fastest growing states in India. Between 1991-92 
and 2000-01, the average annual growth in the net state domestic product was 6.75 per 
cent, which was higher than that of both Gujarat (6.34 per cent) and Tamil Nadu (6.25 
per cent), which are generally considered economically dynamic states.  
 
When the Left coalition government was formed in West Bengal in 1977, the incidence 
of poverty in the state was 60.52 percent. This was well above the ‘below poverty line’ 
(BPL) figure for India which stood at 51.32 percent. However, by 1999 - 2000, the 
below poverty line figure for West Bengal had come down to 27.02 percent, whereas 
that for India had come down to 26.10 percent. This shows a 55.35 percent decline for 
West Bengal compared to the 49.22 percent decline at the national level (Guruswamy: 
2005, p - 4). 
 
However, an important point to be noted about the West Bengal experiment is, that 
despite all the pro-poor orientation and achievements of the experiment, it is not true 
that the absolutely poor or powerless groups could become the dominant forces in the 
political spectrum of West Bengal. Kohli writes, that, despite the focus on structural 
change three points must be borne in mind while assessing the West Bengal situation - 
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 1. The change is in the organisation of regime power and in the underlying class 
alliances rather than in the class structure. 
2. The structural political change is not from the upper to the lower classes, but rather 
from the former to an in-between group. 
3. The majority of the new office-holders are party supporters rather than party activists. 
(Kohli: 1987, p - 113) 
 
Therefore, one cannot focus just on the tangible, material aspects of the West Bengal 
experiment. Apart from these tangible material achievements of the decentralisation 
experiment in West Bengal, there was a very important social-psychological 
achievement too. Robert Thörlind, agreeing with Biplap Dasgupta’s argument, explains 
the social-psychological achievement in the following lines. 
 
It is not that these land reforms have made the West Bengal peasant economically 
independent, or that he does not have to sell his labour power anymore. Instead Biplab 
Dasgupta argues that the main achievement of these land reforms is more of a social-
psychological nature - to curb the former monopoly of the rich and to make the poor peasant 
feel that the state is behind him and supports his rights. The land he now holds, or more 
securely rents, provides the peasants with ‘a certain amount of income and social status, and 
thus the ability to break through the mental barrier that makes him accept poverty and a low 
social ranking’. (Dasgupta: 1995, p - 2696, in Thörlind: 2000, p 75) 
 
Thörlind further writes that ‘this clearly fits with the radical NGOs’ views on 
conscientisation and empowerment.’ (ibid.).  
 
By the early 1990s however, major changes were happening in the macro-economic 
processes in the country, which had a strong impact on the situation in West Bengal. 
This was a period of economic liberalisation in India, which, according to Jayati Ghosh, 
‘bore a strong resemblance to the standard Washington Consensus.’ (Ghosh: 2004, p - 
6). Some of the main characteristics of this liberalisation process are given below - 
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1. A substantial reduction in state control in terms of administered prices and regulation 
of economic activity. 
2. Privatisation of state assets. 
3. Reduction of direct and indirect taxes, leading to declining tax-GDP ratios. 
4. Cut backs in social expenditure, increase in user charges for public services and 
reduction in subsidies to farmers. 
5. Sharp reduction in rate of tariff production. 
6. Removing interest rate ceilings, leading to increased cost of borrowing. 
7. Easing of rules for foreign direct investment. 
(ibid.) 
 
Among these, the reduction in state subsidies to farmers and the high costs of borrowing 
have hit the Indian farmers the hardest. Despite the extreme reluctance of the corporate 
media, news of a growing agrarian crisis was trickling in. One of the most unfortunate 
aspects of this crisis was the growing number of suicides by indebted farmers in India. 
The growing input prices, withdrawal of state support, the falling international price of 
cotton and the high subsidies provided to their farmers by most first world states, 
created a vicious cycle of poverty and indebtedness for the Indian farmers. Sainath 
wrote that, ‘close to 150000 Indian farmers committed suicide in nine years from 1997 
to 2005.’ (Sainath: 2007, p - 1).  
 
Though, West Bengal did not face the extreme issue of farmer suicides, the farmers in 
the state did feel the impact of the neo-liberal policies. Ghosh writes that,  
 
Cultivators in West Bengal over the 1990s were hit by higher input costs, especially for 
seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, water and electricity; highly volatile, stagnant and even falling 
farm gate prices of food grains and some cash crops; sharp declines in access to formal 
credit and crop loans; inadequate investment in physical infrastructure such as roads as well 
as irrigation and water management; and declining access to agricultural extension services 
run by the public sector. (Ghosh: 2004, p - 75) . 
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Alongside the challenges faced by the farmers in this new macro-economic 
environment, was the problem of industrial decline that had haunted the state ever since 
the Left Front assumed power. Between 1984 and 2001, the investment of industrial 
capital increased only four times in West Bengal, while it increased seven times in the 
rest of India. In the same period, ‘the numbers employed in the organised sector in West 
Bengal almost halved, from 917000 to about 456000.’ (ibid., p - 2). Though West 
Bengal’s record in reducing poverty and increasing agricultural production was 
impressive, it was also clear that the ‘flight of capital and the prolonged industrial 
unrest’ had also ‘taken their toll.’ (ibid.). The Left Front had started realising that, under 
the new circumstances, a continued emphasis on the agricultural sector, without 
developing the industrial base of the state would be politically unstable.   
 
From the late 1990s onwards, the Left Front started initiating the next major re-
orientation of its development strategy - this time focussing on promoting the state as an 
ideal destination for industrial investment. This shift of focus automatically signalled a 
shift from a rural focus to an urban focus for the first time in the history of Left Front 
rule in West Bengal. In the absence of any major urban centre apart from the capital city 
of Kolkata, a focus on urban areas automatically meant a focus on the city of Kolkata 
and a concerted effort towards turning the city as investor friendly as possible. 
Environmental improvement of slums, city beautification and infrastructure creation and 
up gradation became the new mantras of planning and development in such a situation. 
This re-reorientation geared towards urban development for investment attraction 
created new challenges for the process of decentralised and democratic planning in 
Kolkata. The situation was all the more ironical, because this was also the period, when 
the city of Kolkata took the lead in implementing the provisions for further 
democratisation of its planning structure by creating the Kolkata Metropolitan Planning 
Committee. Although, all major cities of the country had to take these steps towards 
democratising their planning structures according to the provisions of the 74th 
Amendment to the Constitution, it was again the state of West Bengal that took the lead.  
 
In the next chapter, the urban dimension of the decentralisation experiment of west 
Bengal; the consequences of focussing on rural areas at the expense of the urban centre; 
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and the conflicts emerging from the re-orientation of the overall development strategy 
of the Left Front from a focus on agriculture and rural development towards a focus on 
industry and urban development shall be discussed. 
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8. Democratising of the Planning 
Structure in Kolkata 
 
8.1 The City of Kolkata 
Kolkata, the capital of the state of West Bengal, has had a very unique position among 
India’s cities in the past. From the time the agents of the British East India Company 
first set up their trading posts on the banks of the river Hugli in the seventeenth century, 
till the year 1912, Kolkata was the capital of British India. Although the capital 
subsequently shifted to Delhi, the economic importance of this second city of the British 
Empire remained strong. The following description by historian Rajat Ray gives a good 
idea of the position of Kolkata in the national and international context post 1912. 
 
Kolkata remained the nerve centre of the economic connection between Britain and 
India. From this city the tentacles of British economic imperialism had spread over the 
vast north Indian hinterland during the nineteenth century. The overall subordination of 
the Indian economy to British capitalism was reflected in the dominating importance of 
Kolkata as a centre of commerce. Situated in the gateway of the river systems of 
northern and eastern India, Kolkata’s port provided easy access to ocean going vessels. 
It was the natural outlet for tea, jute, coal, indigo and other raw materials which fed 
Britain’s industrial economy, as well as the major point of entry for cloth, sugar, salt 
and other British manufactures which had captured the vast market represented by 
India’s teeming millions. A terminus of important rail and steamer systems which 
linked it with the tea-gardens of Assam, the jute fields of East Bengal and the coal-
mines of West Bengal and Bihar, Kolkata held sway over the biggest industrial complex 
in India. It enjoyed with Mumbai one of the most organised financial markets and active 
stock exchanges in India. Out of 44 crores invested in various industries by joint stock 
rupee companies in India, no less than 23 crores were invested by companies with 
headquarters in Kolkata. (Ray: 1979, p - 3)  
 
The economic position of the city remained strong even after the independence of India. 
Banerji and Chakravorti write, that ‘according to 1964 figures, the Kolkata port handled 
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92 per cent (by tonnage) of India’s export and 25 per cent of its import. The 
metropolitan district at the time contained 15 per cent of India’s manufacturing capacity 
and handled 30 per cent of the total value of bank clearances nationally.’ (Banerji and 
Chakravorti: 1994, p -2). This dominant economic position of the city led to a steady 
growth in the city population and in the last decade of the twentieth century the Kolkata 
Municipal Corporation had ‘three times the population density of New York City.’ 
(Kohli: 1990, p - 123).  
 
According to the 2001 census the Kolkata Metropolitan Area had a population of 13.2 
million persons and a total area of 1854 sq.km. The Kolkata Metropolitan Area consists 
of 3 municipal corporations, 38 municipalities and 527 towns and villages. Kolkata city, 
which is administered by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC), had a population 
of 4,572,876 according to the 2001 census and an area of 187 sq. km. Almost 32 per 
cent of the population (1,485,309 persons) lives in slums and it is estimated that as 
many as ‘500,000 to 600,000 live on the streets.’ (Ibid.). The Kolkata Municipal 
Corporation is territorially divided into 15 boroughs, which are further sub-divided into 
141 municipal wards.  
 
In his splendid account of local politics in the city of Kolkata, Atul Kohli draws 
attention to four demographic facts, which are important for a more nuanced 
understanding of the historical processes underlying the sheer size of the population of 
this city. The first one is, that despite the high density of population, the growth rate of 
the population has actually declined in the last few decades of the twentieth century. 
From the late 1970s onwards West Bengal started losing its pre-eminent position in the 
Indian economy. Between 1980 and 1998, i.e., precisely during the period when the left 
Front consolidated its hold over the state and initiated successful agrarian reforms, the 
share of West Bengal in the total value of industrial output in India declined from 9.8 
per cent to 5.0 per cent  (Ghosh: 2004, p -6). The decline in economic importance also 
caused a decline in the population growth rate of the city. According to Kohli, the city 
‘just doesn’t attract migrants as it once did’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 123).  
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 Figure 2Kolkata Metropolitan Area 
 
 
 
(Source: National Atlas and Thematic Mapping Organisation, Kolkata) 
 
The second fact is the high rate of literacy in the city. This is true for the overall 
population in the city and also among the slum dwellers. This high level of literacy 
exists side by side with a high level of unemployment in the city. Kohli correctly points 
 148
out, that such a co-existence of ‘poverty and unemployment among a literate population 
can be politically explosive.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 124) 
 
The third point that Kohli mentions is, that contrary to popular assumption Kolkata is 
not an ‘exclusively Bengali city.’ (Ibid.). Its economic and political importance drew 
migrants into the city from various parts of India. The city has considerable diversity 
both in terms of mother tongue and religion. The fourth demographic fact was that at the 
time of partition of India, there was not a substantial migration of Muslims out of 
Kolkata to East Pakistan, as had happened in the case of Muslims living in Punjab. This 
was another cause of the extremely high population density in the city. 
 
Based on the above facts Kohli writes that it was much easier to expect a perennial state 
of chaos to prevail in the city rather than peace and good governance. 
 
Because of severe overcrowding, extremes of poverty, high rates of unemployment 
among the educated youth, great ethnic diversity and the presence of a large homeless 
population, one wonders how political order in such a setting can ever be achieved. It is 
much easier to expect breakdown and chaos here than to expect a functioning and 
effective local government. (Ibid.). 
 
The Left Front government had started making attempts to democratise the planning 
process in the city of Kolkata long before the 74th Amendment to the Constitution was 
enacted. Like in the rural areas, the democratisation strategy in Kolkata too focussed on 
a twin strategy of empowering the urban local government institutions and fighting for 
security of tenure for the urban poor. However, the first major planning intervention in 
Kolkata in the post-independence period happened before the Left Front came to power, 
and was triggered by a public health disaster. 
8.2 The Basic Development Plan - The Politics of Apolitical 
Planning 
In the year 1958 an outbreak of cholera in the city claimed 250 lives. In 1959 a team 
from the World Health Organisation visited Kolkata and ‘recommended immediate 
planning for potable water supply, drainage and sewerage, along with a general 
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planning effort to address the abominable condition of the city’s transportation system, 
housing, slums and land-use.’ (Banerjee and Chakravorti: 1994, p 1). The state 
government, which was under the rule of the Congress Party, decided to invite the Ford 
Foundation as consultants to prepare a plan for Kolkata. In the absence of any formal 
agency for planning in the early 1960s, The Kolkata Metropolitan Planning 
Organisation was created in 1961 to be a base for the planners of the Ford Foundation 
and the main planning agency for the whole city. 
 
According to Banerji and Chakravorti, ‘the effect of American planning style was 
apparent from the very beginning.’ (Ibid, p - 2). The Basic Development Plan (BDP) 
prepared by the Ford Foundation marked a significant departure from the British 
influenced master plan approach, which was prevalent in India during that time. Instead 
of a detailed focus on land use, the approach of the BDP was strategic and aimed at 
overall economic development. Rather than listing out specific projects the plan was to 
‘simply outline the desired direction of growth.’ (Ibid.). Some of the major 
characteristics of the BDP are listed below - 
 
1.Strategic - It had a strategic approach, rather than one based on primarily physical 
solutions to urban problems. 
2. Regional - The plan suggested the development of four economic growth poles, viz. 
the Kolkata Metropolitan District (which encompassed a far larger area than the 
municipal limits of the city of Kolkata), the Haldia port area, the Durgapur-Asansol 
industrial complex, and the Siliguri market area. 
3. Comprehensive - The plan attempted to encompass all aspects of urban life and 
proposed the preparation of separate plans for water, sanitation and transportation. It 
also sought to incorporate the existing urban institutions and their roles within its scope. 
 
Such an approach truly rectified many of the technical problems associated with the 
master plan approach. The Ford Foundation was instrumental in transferring the 
innovations of American planning to an Indian city. Banerji and Chakravorti wrote, that 
‘the three basic tenets of Ford Foundation expertise - regional planning, a strategic 
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policy orientation, and a strong reliance on data analysis and modelling - were accepted 
locally with no resistance.’ (Ibid, p - 5) 
 
However, despite all the improvements over the rigid master plan approach, the BDP 
failed to live up to its own ideals. The failure of BDP is very interesting, as it showed 
very clearly that merely altering the technique of plan making and the strategic 
approach of the plan, does not ensure a better planning process in reality. Just like the 
master plan approach, the strategic plan also assumed a massive availability of data, the 
capacity to process it and the necessary institutions and political eagerness to carry 
forward the grand ideas.  
 
Right from the very start the implementation of the BDP regressed from the strategic 
approach to the physicalist approach. Banerji and Chakravorti write, that ‘although the 
BDP was never intended to be project specific, it now included a list of projects in an 
addendum obviously forced by political exigencies.’ (Ibid, p - 2). The irony was, that 
despite being a serious deviation from the essential philosophy of the BDP, these 
projects were considered inevitable for the development of the city. Over time, this list 
of projects ‘turned out to be the very essence of the BDP.’ (Ibid, p - 2). However, there 
were other processes taking shape in the city, which not only derailed the 
implementation of the BDP substantially but also exposed very clearly the flaws 
inherent in such strategies at reviving urban environments.  
 
It was in this period, as we have seen in the previous chapter, that the popular 
movements for land reforms were getting stronger. These movements had an urban 
dimension too which focussed on the plight of the scores of bustee dwellers in the city. 
As the economic importance of Kolkata grew during the nineteenth century, scores of 
migrants came into the city in search of the myriad economic opportunities that the city 
offered. In response to the need for shelter of this growing work force a unique and 
complex three-tier tenure structure got developed in the city. At the top of this structure 
was the landlord, who would rent out large plots of land to ‘members of his retinue’ 
(popularly known as the thika tenants) (Chakravarti and Ramaswami: 1997, p - 64). The 
thika tenants would build small huts on the land and rent them out to the labourers. The 
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landlords didn’t show any incentives to provide basic services on these plots of land. 
Whenever the city authorities provided civic facilities, the landlords simply evicted the 
labourers and rented the land to more prosperous tenants to earn high profits.  
 
During the 1950s the communist parties spear-headed a movement focussed on the land 
rights of the bustee dwellers. This coincided with the passing of legislations both at the 
national and the state level. At the state level the rights of the landlords were curtailed 
and tenancy rights granted to the intermediary thika tenants. Throughout the post-
independence period, when the Congress Party dominated both the State Government 
and the KMC, the communists provided consistent political opposition. However, the 
Congress rule was not threatened until the late 1960s, due to the lack of unity among the 
various parties leftist parties.    
 
A well planned city had a very specific political purpose to serve. Banerji and 
Chakravorti wrote that the ‘underlying assumption of the interests promoting and 
funding the BDP was that “better” infrastructure would lead to a “better” and less 
Marxist city.’ (Banerji and Chakravorti: 1994, p - 3). These overt and covert arguments 
in favour of the BDP reflected at the micro-level the general rationale for what Hickey 
and Mohan have described as ‘imminent development’. (Hickey and Mohan: 2004, p - 
10). In the years of the cold war, apparently apolitical and physicalist solutions to 
developmental problems were promoted not so much out of a genuine concern for the 
plight of people and the environment in developing countries, as for preventing the rise 
of communist movements, which invariably focussed on ‘immanent development’.   
 
We have already discussed in an earlier chapter, the role played by the CIA and the 
United States embassy in India in the dismissal of the democratically elected leftist 
government of Kerala. Similarly, in just the period when the Ford Foundation 
specialists were busy advising the Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Organisation, the 
foreign aid received by India from the United States was increasing steadily for quite a 
unique reason. In her analysis of the Indo-Chinese border conflict of 1962, the eminent 
journalist Anna Louise Strong wrote that, 
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Aid granted India by the U.S.A. and U.S. - controlled funds in the past ten years 
averaged only $ 105.2 million a year for the first six years when India was neutral; then 
from mid-1956 to 1959 when she moved to the right, India got $ 645.5 million yearly; 
now for the three years 1959-62 in which she fights China, she averages $ 1,290.8 mil-
lion a year. Is Nehru any longer a fully “free agent” ? Or is he bound to his creditors? 
(Strong: 1962, p - 3)  
 
The involvement of the Ford Foundation in the planning process of this communist 
hotbed of India is also a very interesting fact, and further underlines the political motive 
behind seemingly apolitical instrumental interventions for planning and development. In 
his essay on the interactions between the CIA and philanthropic foundations in the 
United States, James Petras wrote, that ‘the Ford Foundation-CIA connection was a 
deliberate, conscious joint effort to strengthen U.S. imperial cultural hegemony and to 
undermine left-wing political and cultural influence.’ (Petras: 2001, p - 1). Petras further 
wrote that this ‘collaboration of respectable and prestigious foundations, according to 
one former CIA operative, allowed the Agency to fund “a seemingly limitless range of 
covert action programs affecting youth groups, labour unions, universities, publishing 
houses and other private institutions”.’ (Saunders: 1999, p - 135, quoted in ibid.) 
 
In the case of Ford Foundation’s entry to India, again a strong role was played by the 
US embassy. Ambassador Chester Bowles was involved in the process which 
culminated in the Ford Foundation setting up its office in India in 1952. An article 
published by the Research Unit for Political Economy (RUPE), Chester Bowles wrote 
the following lines to Paul Hoffman, who was president of the Foundation from 1950 to 
1953 and had opened its international office in Delhi.  
 
The conditions may improve in China while the Indian situation remains stagnant...If 
such a contrast developed during the next four or five years, and if the Chinese 
continued their moderate and plausible approach without threatening the northern Indian 
boundary...the growth of communism in India might be very great. The death or 
retirement of Nehru might then be followed by a chaotic situation out of which another 
potentially strong communist nation may be born. (R.U.P.E: 2003, online source) 
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Paul Hoffman, agreeing with Bowles’ analysis wrote that, 
 
A strong central government must be established...The hardcore of communists must be 
kept under control...The Prime Minister Nehru greatly needs understanding, sympathy 
and help from the people and governments of other free nations. (ibid.) 
 
The growing leftist movements voicing the demand of the landless poor in the country 
for agrarian land reform prompted the Ford Foundation to get involved in the agrarian 
sector too. The Foundation was closely involved with the Community Development 
Programme (CDP) initiated by Prime Minister Nehru in the 1950s. The CDP was 
described by the Prime Minister as ‘a model for meeting the revolutionary threats from 
left-wing and communist peasant movements demanding basic social reforms in 
agriculture.’ (R.U.P.E: 2003, p - 3) 
 
According to R.U.P.E, the Foundation ‘helped train 35000 village workers for the CDP’ 
and ‘by 1960 the Ford and Rockfeller Foundations had between them extended over $ 
50 million on the CDP alone.’ (R.U.P.E: 2003, p - 3). The problems of de-linking such a 
large development program from the local government institutions has already been 
discussed in an earlier chapter.  
 
The suggestions of the Foundation to the agrarian problems of India where completely 
the reverse of what was attempted later in West Bengal. While the West Bengal 
experiment focussed on the twin strategies of land distribution and empowerment of 
local government and increasing agricultural productivity through mobilisation of 
scores of small and middle farmers, the strategy of the Foundation focussed on purely 
technical interventions to assist the Green Revolution. According to R.U.P.E, the 
Foundation ‘even funded the Intensive Agricultural Development Program (IADP) as a 
test case...providing rich farmers in irrigated areas with subsidised inputs, generous 
credit, price incentives’ and ‘the World Bank too puts its weight behind this strategy.’ 
(ibid., p - 4) 
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Initially, urban and regional planning was not one of the focus areas for the Ford 
Foundation’s mission in India. It wanted to stay focussed on rural development issues. 
However, in the 1950s it found itself involved in a major planning initiative to prepare 
the Delhi Master Plan of 1962. Following this planning exercise, the Foundation was 
approached by the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy, for 
assistance regarding the preparation of a plan for Kolkata too. Initially, the head of the 
Foundation’s office in Delhi, Douglas Ensminger, was reluctant to get involved in yet 
another urban planning exercise. However, the Chief Minister stressed on the political 
situation in the region as a strong reason for the Foundation to get involved. This is how 
he described the situation in Kolkata to Ensminger, 
 
You have seen the condition of Kolkata with your own eyes. India is in real trouble with 
respect to Kolkata. It was no longer a foregone conclusion in the next and succeeding 
elections the Congress could win and unless the Congress Party gave leadership to 
changing and improving the living conditions in Kolkata, the communists would be 
voted into power and if the communists were voted into power in Kolkata and West 
Bengal then there would be a real threat of communism in Eastern India. Kolkata had to 
be looked upon as India’s problem as well as the world’s problem if, particularly the 
Western world, was interested in the success of democracy in India. (Ensminger: 1972, 
p - 7, quoted in Banerjee: 2005, p - 155) 
 
The plan document was finally published in December 1966, just a few months before 
its main patron, the Congress Party was defeated in the assembly elections of 1967. As 
the coalition of fourteen leftist parties, called the United Front, assumed office, the BDP 
was sidelined. The political instability and chaos that followed the election and the 
imposition of president’s rule in late 1967 and the re-election of the United Front in 
1969 meant that the BDP would remain shelved till 1970. In those years before the 10th 
Party Congress of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the approach of the Left 
Front was tilted towards open class confrontation. Such an approach was totally 
different from that articulated through the BDP. 
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Kohli gives an interesting example of the application of such strategies in urban areas. 
One of the stands of the United Front, when it came to power, was to order the police 
‘not to interfere’ in labour-management conflicts (Kohli: 1990, p - 126). The United 
Front labour minister Subodh Bannerjee said,  
 
“I have allowed a duel between the employees and employers in West Bengal, and the 
police have been taken out of the picture so that the strength of each other may be 
known.” (ibid., p - 130)    
 
Kohli writes, that through such strategies, ‘the United Front...may have improved its 
political standing with labour, but industrial production plummeted, and capital flew to 
other parts of India.’ (ibid.). The flight of capital was preceded by utter chaos in the 
industrial scene of Kolkata and within the first few months of the United Front 
government as many as 1000 gheraos were recorded in and around Kolkata. (ibid.) 
 
This flight of capital was further aided by the absence of a well developed regional 
bourgeoisie in West Bengal. Ghosh writes, that ‘the traditional (mainly Marwari) 
business houses of Bengal have shown a tendency to move new investment to other 
states, unlike the regional bourgeoisie of other states such as Tamil Nadu and Andhra 
Pradesh.’ (Ghosh: 2004, p - 77) 
 
Another characteristic of the period, was the rise of the ultra-leftist Naxalite movement, 
which refused to participate in electoral politics and decided to wage war against ‘class 
enemies’ using violent means. The class enemies included ‘members of other political 
parties (especially the CPM), university professors, informers, and, of course, members 
of the police.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 130). Kohli writes, that ‘one measure of the chaos that 
existed in Kolkata in 1970 and 1971 is that even under presidential rule, there could be 
as many as sixty political murders committed in a day.’ (ibid.). Side by side with the 
ultra-leftist Naxalites, the Congress party too turned increasingly violent by including 
hoodlums and toughs into its ranks. When elections were held in 1969, after the first 
spell of presidential rule, the United Front was again voted to power. As the political 
chaos remained unabated, this government too was dissolved and presidential rule 
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imposed again in 1970. It was in this phase of complete undermining of all democratic 
institutions and processes in the whole state of West Bengal, that the BDP found new 
life. 
8.3 The Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority - 
Increasing Centralisation 
The resources required for the program package prepared by the BDP creators for 
immediate implementation, was far beyond the financial capacity of the Government of 
West Bengal in 1966. However, the political volatility of the state in the last three years 
of the 1960s increased the eagerness of the central government of India to do something 
about the proper development of the city of Kolkata.  In such a political atmosphere the 
general assertion of the Congress ruling elite both in Kolkata and in Delhi was that 
‘what was needed at once in Kolkata...was a massive infusion of funds for physical 
improvement projects that would improve the physical city, create jobs, and ultimately 
counteract the rising twin forces - revolutionary Marxism and electoral Marxism.’ 
(Banerji and Chakravorti: 1997, p - 3).  
 
The requirement of Rs. 100 crores for the projects that required immediate 
implementation in the city in 1966, had increased to Rs. 150 crores, by the time the 
Government of India agreed to release funding for their implementation in 1971. Out of 
the total amount, Rs. 43 crores was to be provided from the plan funds and the rest was 
to be raised from other sources including market borrowing. In the same year, the 
KMDA was authorised to go in for market borrowings (Banerjee: 1991, p - 34).  
 
Between 1971 and 1974, the KMDA received capital funds to the tune of Rs. 130 
crores. From 1974 onwards the World Bank also got involved in the Kolkata planning 
project. Though, the funds from the World Bank were not transferred directly to the 
Authority, but flowed through the Government of India and the Government of West 
Bengal in the form of plan funds, a certain regularity and certainty of funding was 
ensured through the Bank’s involvement. However, the Bank also showed a particular 
bias towards the implementation of those projects of the BDP which were concerned 
with the physical aspects of the city, rather than those which focussed on the socio-
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economic conditions prevailing in the city. Of the 160 projects listed by the BDP, the 
Bank funded 44, and these included projects dealing with water supply, sewerage and 
transportation. Interestingly, the Bustee (slum) Improvement Programme, which was 
considered one of the major achievements of the BDP was not funded by the World 
Bank. 
 
The idea behind setting up the KMDA was not to let it encroach upon the functions of 
all the existing urban planning and development institutions such as the Kolkata 
Improvement Trust (KIT), the Howrah Improvement Trust (HIT), Kolkata Municipal 
Corporation and the Kolkata Metropolitan Water and Sanitation Authority (KMSWA) 
for the sake of implementing the BDP, but to coordinate them. However, the power of 
raising finances and the urgency of addressing the myriad of challenges facing the city 
increasingly led to the centralisation of all planning and development authority at the 
hands of the KMDA. Shortly after its formation, the KMDA took over the management 
of the HIT and KMSWA.  
 
According to Tapan Banerjee,  
 
The advent of the KMDA marked the beginning of centralisation of local functions in 
this Authority in respect of the development of the KMA. All urban local bodies in the 
KMA, including the Kolkata Corporation, the KIT, HIT and KMSWA, were now to 
receive capital fund from a single source, i.e. the KMDA, which mobilised capital fund 
through market borrowing and Central and state assistance....The KMDA itself grew 
into a massive organisation quite rapidly. The size of the staff increased from 800 in 
1972 to around 5000 by 1980, excluding that of the KMSWA, KIT and  HIT. (ibid., pp 
34-35) 
 
This centralisation of power at the hands of a special purpose agency like the KMDA 
led to a steady marginalisation of local government of Kolkata. According to Banerjee, 
‘the Kolkata Corporation was soon to find itself in the role of an ‘agent’ implementing 
the projects of the KMDA.’ (ibid., p - 35). Therefore, despite all the creativity of the 
strategic approach of the BDP over the physicalist master plan, we again end up 
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encountering the same issue that had been plaguing Indian planning for ages - the 
victimisation and marginalisation of the institutions of local democracy in the name of 
efficiency and a narrow conception of instrumental rationality. And just as has been 
discussed in an earlier chapter on the conflict between efficiency and democracy in 
Indian planning, the functional agency, despite all the centralisation of functional and 
financial authority at the cost of local democracy, failed to make a substantial difference 
to the overall fabric of the city of Kolkata.  
 
However, it is wrong to assume that the mere presence of a functional agency 
automatically undermines the capacity and importance of local government. In a city of 
the size of Kolkata, with all the challenges that it faces, a local government may very 
well be in need of a body of trained experts purely devoted to the task of planning for 
the city. It is the unhealthy encroachment of each (whether local government or 
functional agency) into the other’s realm of activities and responsibilities, which causes 
problems for the city at large.  
 
By 1983, the KMDA had invested Rs. 450 crores in the development process that it 
initiated, but still it was felt that ‘its impact on services was perhaps little more than 
marginal.’ (Banerji: 1991, p - 35). Similarly, Arun Ghosh wrote the following lines in 
his memoirs in the winter of 1983.  
 
Kolkata is an impossible place. Not because of the dust, the crowds, the traffic. Nor 
because of the occasional power shedding which is quite disconcerting...not even 
because of the appalling road conditions and the suffocating atmospheric pollution. 
Occasionally, it is difficult to breathe freely even while one is being driven (in relative 
comfort), so nauseating are the diesel exhaust fumes of buses and trucks. These are all 
disquieting features of Kolkata, as is the sight of roads dug up and not repaired, of the 
overcrowded trams and buses, people holding on to a knuckle-hold or toe hold space on 
the foot-board while the buses careen along at great speed...look at the revolting squalor 
on the pavements, of whole families living like animals, eating, bathing, defecating, 
sleeping, copulating and giving birth to new life on the pavements...Nothing seems to 
move here. It is difficult to fathom the reason for this inaction...A large section of the 
bureaucracy in West Bengal is not dead, it is simply perverse...Few people seem to be 
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bothered about the State’s development program. The usual pastime is to stymie others 
effectively...This, then, is the Kolkata of today. (Ghosh: 1989, pp  34-37) 
 
These lines are important as they come from one of the most brilliant and conscientious 
development planners of India, who was a great admirer of the democratic 
decentralisation experiment in West Bengal, was invited as an advisor to the State 
Planning Board by the Left Front government and shared none of the elitist prejudices 
of authors like Rudyard Kipling, despite the outward similarity in the nature of the 
reflection. 
 
Such reflections hardly speak of a city where the BDP has been implemented 
successfully for over a decade. Arun Ghosh travelled widely throughout West Bengal as 
an advisor to the state planning board and in his writings one finds a stark difference 
between the conditions existing in the metropolis and the processes initiated in the rural 
areas of the state after the Left Front government came to power in 1977. Comparing 
the situation in the city and in the countryside, he wrote the following lines, 
 
What a difference between the spirit, the vitality one sees in the rural areas and the stale 
breath of decay of Kolkata? How is this possible, in this city of culture, of 
tradition?...May be Kolkata is sickening, but the rest of West Bengal is not. While the 
loudspeakers are blaring in Kolkata, all through the State, in the villages, people are 
ploughing, harrowing, sowing, weeding, watering, harvesting, in sunshine and in rain, 
painstakingly going about their business...the signs of new life sprouting, a robust new 
community emerging...That is life. That is the story of human civilisation for upwards 
of 5000 years. (ibid., pp 36-37)  
 
This difference between the energy and vigour of development effort in the country-side 
and the exact opposite of that in the main urban centre of the same state is one of the 
main contradictions in the whole democratic decentralisation experiment of West 
Bengal. This is not to say that the endeavours of KMDA had no effect at all. Indeed, the 
transport projects like the Barrackpore-Kalyani expressway, the eastern metropolitan 
bypass, pro-poor environmental projects such as the sanitization of registered slums and 
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socio-economic projects such as the small scale enterprise program have been important 
successes. But the combined challenges of political unrest, environmental degradation, 
the extent and intensity of urban poverty, the flight of industrial capital and an acute 
public apathy concerning issues of the local environment in the midst of a keen political 
consciousness have been rather overwhelming on the whole. 
 
In the next section I shall discuss how the approach towards meeting these challenges 
changed after the Left Front Government came to power. When the United Front 
government came to power during the 1960s, the leftists couldn’t capture the local 
government institutions in Kolkata, which remained under the control of the rival 
Congress Party. The competition between the Leftists and the Congressites to win the 
urban votes led to the adoption of unsustainable ploys by both groups. Interestingly, as 
Kohli points out, the Leftists couldn’t score a substantial victory over the Congress 
party even in the State Assembly elections when it came to the Kolkata seats. The ethnic 
mix of the poorer sections of the city population had a role to play in this state of affairs.  
 
Much of the migrant worker population of Kolkata are Hindi speaking people coming 
from outside the state. Since the days of the freedom struggle and particularly after it, 
the Hindi speaking belts of north India had been a particular strong-hold of the Congress 
party. On the other hand, the substantial presence of educated middle-class Bengalis in 
the Leftist parties and their championing of the cause of the refugees who poured into 
the city during the Bangladesh war created the impression that the CPM and the other 
Leftist Parties are primarily representative of Bengali interests. This cultural factor 
enabled Congress, and later, its break away factions like the All India Trinamool 
Congress, to maintain a substantial political presence in the city.  
 
Though, from the early 1980s, the Left Front was in control of both the State 
Government and the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, and seriously tried to revive the 
institutions of local government and provide security of tenure to the bustee dwellers, 
the success of this twin strategy was nothing as remarkable as seen in the villages. One 
of the main reason for this was, that while the approach of the Congress Party was to 
solve the developmental problems of the state of West Bengal by investing in the 
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development of Kolkata, the approach of the Left Front was the reverse - to solve the 
problems of the metropolis by first concretely addressing the developmental problems 
of the countryside, where the bulk of the poor of the state lived. 
 
The Leftist parties were aware, that the regional influence of Kolkata stretched far 
beyond the state and encompassed the whole eastern region of the country, and even the 
substantial reforms undertaken in the West Bengal countryside might not be enough to 
relieve the pressure on Kolkata. Tapan Banerjee, in his article, referred to a speech 
delivered by Jyoti Basu, the Chief Minister of West Bengal from 1977 to 2000, in which 
the leader ‘sincerely hoped for fast economic development of all states in the eastern 
and north-eastern regions as that would largely solve the urban problem and the poverty 
in the KMA’ (Banerjee: 1991, p - 24). Banerjee further wrote about Jyoti Basu, that ‘as 
a visionary he could well perceive a durable solution to Kolkata’s urban problem in a 
well conceived regional planning or macro-planning approach.’ (ibid.) 
 
This is interesting and ironic, as the macro-planning and regional approach aimed for in 
the BDP was attempted in a much more comprehensive and politically mature manner 
by the Leftists who were staunch opponents of the political patrons of the BDP. But 
taking such an approach while being forced to geographically restrict the scope of 
application within the boundaries of the state of West Bengal resulted in an unfortunate, 
but perhaps inevitable, shift towards rural development at the cost of urban de-
velopment. 
8.4 Planning and Governance Under the Left Front - 
Decentralising the Centralised 
When the Leftists first came to power in 1967, the city of Kolkata had an elected local 
government which functioned for five years before being superseded by the state 
government in 1972. However, this period was so full of political changes with the 
creation two United Front Governments and the imposition of presidential rule, that the 
local government hardly found the time and opportunity to organise itself to meet the 
urban challenges. From 1972 to 1975, the local government remained superseded by the 
state government ruled by the Congress party. In the last two years before the election 
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of the Left Front, the nation was under Emergency, ruling out the possibility of having 
any kind of democratic government at any level.  
 
Immediately after coming to power 1977, the Left Front initiated a strategy towards 
urban development which had three main characteristics - 
 
1. Reviving and strengthening the institutions of urban local government. 
2. Addressing the needs of the bustee dwellers regarding civic services and security of 
tenure. 
3. Doing the above two without risking the hard earned political victories over the rival 
political parties, especially the Congress Party. 
 
After coming to power, the Left Front government responded to the problem of the 
three-tier tenure system in the slums by taking over most of the bustee lands. However, 
this step wasn’t enough for the purposes of comprehensive environmental improvement 
of the slums. According to existing laws, it was the intermdediary thika tenant who had 
the authority to undertake such improvements. To rectify this problem, the Kolkata 
Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act was passed, which substantially cur-
tailed the power of the thika tenants while protecting the rights of the slum dwellers. 
 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a series of steps were taken, which showed that the 
Left Front was eager to empower the urban local governments and make them the prime 
institutions for planning and development in Kolkata, rather than any super centralised 
functional agency such as the KMDA. In 1979, the West Bengal Municipal Finance 
Commission was set up to review and improve the fiscal performance of the 
municipalities and also develop the mechanisms for revenue transfer between the state 
government and the individual local government institutions based on the fiscal 
performance of the latter.  
 
The Bengal Municipal Act of 1932 and the Kolkata Corporation Act of 1951 were both 
amended in 1980, to strengthen the managerial and financial capacity of the local 
government institutions. In the same year some institutions were created to act as 
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support structures for the local government. The Central Valuation Board was set up to 
ensure a ‘fair and uniform valuation’ of properties across the state for more efficient 
property tax collection. The Directorate of Local Bodies was set up to oversee the ‘gov-
ernance of the Bengal Municipal Act, to perform inspectorial functions and provide 
help, assistance and guidance to the municipalities.’ The Municipal Engineering 
Directorate was set up to provide technical support. Apart from all these an Institute for 
Local Government and Urban studies was set up for knowledge dissemination, research 
and for creating as urban data bank (Banerjee: 1991, p - 37). 
 
Another very important process initiated from the early 1980s was intended to curtail 
the tremendous centralisation of functions at the hands of  KMDA. As has been noted 
earlier, that despite all the concentration of resources, the KMDA had not very 
successful in reducing the urban problems of Kolkata. The very concentration of power 
and functions was coming in the Authority’s way to function effectively. As Tapan 
Banerjee correctly points out, that ‘being over centralised, the investment decisions of 
the KMDA were far removed from area specific-needs and aspirations at the local level; 
and thus quite understandably suffered from lack of popular participation, which 
eventually proved to involve higher social costs when the KMDA failed to carry out the 
responsibility of operation and maintenance of the civic assets it had created due to both 
want of financial resources and lack of compatible organizational competence.’ 
(Banerjee: 1991, p - 36) 
 
Alongside all the interventions being made to enhance the capacity of local government 
institutions, a high powered committee was set up in 1980, called theWest Bengal 
Urban Development Strategy Committee. The committee made the following 
observation. 
 
A decentralised organisational pattern is likely to step up the work of municipalities. 
Under the new Municipal Act, the municipalities will be given more power and 
strengthened by technical persons like engineers and financial experts. Even then a 
district level coordination committee may be necessary. At the other end, ward or 
 164
mahalla committees may be very useful to involve local people in development work. 
(Banerjee: 1991, p - 38)   
 
The state planning board, which was already active in promoting the decentralised 
planning structure in the villages also started taking steps in Kolkata so that the KMDA 
devolves the planning and implementation of local and area-specific projects and 
services to the local government institutions. After such a process of devolution, the 
main functions of the KMDA would be the following - 
1. To continue acting as a mobiliser of capital fund. 
2. Allocating capital assistance to municipal bodies. 
3. Implementing trans-municipal and area-wide projects. 
4. Inter-agency coordination. 
5. Monitoring of project implementation at all levels. 
(ibid.) 
 
Thus, the role of the KMDA was perceived as an umbrella funding, coordinating and 
monitoring agency. It is not difficult to see, that this structure was not only more in line 
with the strategic planning approach that was embodied in the BDP but also provided it 
with a democratic aspect, which was lacking earlier. The local government was to be 
more robustly involved in the planning process than ever before. It was this process 
which was to culminate in the creation of the Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Committee 
(KMPC) in 1994, following the passing of the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. A 
more detailed account of the KMPC shall be provided in the next section. 
 
Following the recommendations of the West Bengal Urban Development Strategy 
Committee, were backed up by, what Banerjee describes as a, ‘quantum jump in the 
capital assistance’ to municipal bodies, ‘from almost nothing to Rs. 1 to 3 crores.’ 
(ibid.). This money was to be spent by the local government for local and area specific 
interventions, over a period of five years, and to be ‘handled all by themselves.’ (ibid.). 
These major changes went into effect from 1983 onwards. 
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In 1981, municipal elections were held all over West Bengal apart from Kolkata and 
Haora. According to Kohli, the reluctance of the Left Front to hold elections to the 
municipal corporations of Kolkata and Haora ‘must be attributed to fear of losing the 
city to Congress or to a combination of Congress and other non-leftist parties.’ (Kohli: 
1990, p - 151). Even in the state assembly election of 1977, which brought the Left 
Front to power, the combined vote of Congress and the Janata party was more than 50 
per cent. (ibid.) 
 
The CPM and its allies in the Left Front estimated, that to hold elections in Kolkata 
under such circumstances, especially since they had no strong program for urban 
development, would mean certain defeat. At  the same time, they, more than any other 
cluster of political parties in India were committed to reviving the local government. 
The CPM therefore devised a strategy to both preserve political power in Kolkata and 
revive the local government.  
 
The total number of wards in the KMC, when the Left Front came to power was 100. 
Between 1977 and 1985, the Left Front undertook a process of adding 41 more wards. 
Most of these wards were located on the periphery of the Kolkata city and included the 
Jadavpur area, whose residents, being former refugees from East Pakistan/Bangladesh 
were strong supporters of the leftist parties. Moreover, these outlying areas, being semi-
rural in character, had received the benefits of the rural development strategies so 
ardently promoted by the Left Front government.  
 
In 1984, elections were held for the Haora Municipal Corporation after a gap of twenty 
years. One year later, elections were held in the 141 wards of the Kolkata Municipal 
Corporation, after a gap of twelve years. The calculations of the leftists proved to be 
correct. The CPM and its Left Front allies ‘eked out a thin majority, just enough to form 
a city government.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 151). Kohli writes, that ‘it is clear that without 
expanding the city, the CPM would not have won the KMC election.’ (ibid.). However, 
it is also true that the legalisation and environmental improvement of slums also had a 
role to play in the victory. The support of the Left Front in the slums of Kolkata had 
also become strong by 1985. The decision to legalize the slums, which had never been 
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done by the previous Congress governments, reduced the perennial fear of being 
evicted. Following the legalisation, the government ‘initiated new programs to introduce 
sewerage, running water, and electricity into those areas.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 141). Kohli 
referred to an analysis of the elections to KMC, which concluded, that ‘the majority’ of 
the dwellers of legalised slums voted ‘in favour of the Left Front.’ (ibid.).  
 
However, it soon became clear, that the political strategies of the CPM had a wider 
vision behind them and the long preparations for ensuring victory had been made 
mainly to get the chance to initiate a process of empowering urban local government, 
which had so often been thwarted and shunned in the India. As per the requirements of 
the amended Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act of 1980, a Mayor-in-Council system 
for a local government was set up in India for the first time. In this system, the elected 
Mayor appoints a council, which is the city level equivalent of a cabinet. The cabinet 
becomes the city’s ‘ruling body.’ (ibid.). 
 
The 141 wards were grouped under 15 boroughs. Each borough had a committee 
consisting of councillors elected from the respective wards within it. These borough 
committees were made responsible for numerous civic services such as maintenance of 
government aided schools, hospitals, street lighting, road maintenance, municipal 
markets etc. Banerjee writes, that in both Haora and Kolkata the decentralisation of 
civic management had been ‘perceived in the form of borough committees.’ (Banerjee: 
1991, p - 37) 
 
With democratic decentralisation procedures strongly in place in both rural and urban 
areas, West Bengal could take the lead even in the implementation of the provisions of 
the 73rd and 74th Constitutional amendments. One of the major provisions of the 74th 
amendment, which focussed on urban local bodies, was the setting up of Metropolitan 
Planning Committees for all metropolitan areas. In a metropolitan region of the size of 
KMA, most of the planning issues would spread over and across the boundaries of the 
individual municipalities and panchayats. Devolution of planning functions to these 
local government institutions would invariably call for a coordinating system which 
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much be able to meet the needs of spatial planning without compromising the 
democratic character of the planning structure.  
 
The West Bengal Metropolitan Planning Committee Act (WBMPC) was passed in 
1994, and the Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Committee (KMPC) set up in 2001. The 
KMPC was designed to be a democratic body for planning for the Kolkata region. Two-
thirds of its members were elected by, and from among the locally elected 
representatives of the 41 municipalities and the approximately 100 gram panchayats in 
the KMA and the remaining one-third were comprised of nominated members such as 
the technocrats of the various line departments, academicians, members of the 
legislative assembly and professionals of other agencies like the Kolkata Improvement 
Trust.  
 
The arrangement was similar to the decentralised planning system already in place in 
the villages. Just like the DPCC, the KMPC was supposed to prepare a 25-year Draft 
Development Plan (DDP) for the KMA by amalgamating the individual plans of the 
various municipalities and gram panchayats. The earlier recommendations by the West 
Bengal Urban Development Strategy Committee had suggested such a coordinating role 
for the KMDA, but the WBMPC Act gave a democratic angle to the whole task of 
regional planning by making the KMPC in charge of regional planning and 
coordination. According to the act, the KMDA would function as the technical 
secretariat of the KMPC. After being made the technical secretariat of the KMPC the 
KMDA prepared a 25-year plan called Vision 2025: Perspective Plan of KMA. The 
KMPC is also preparing five sectoral plans for the KMA.  
 
The various urban local bodies were required to prepare 5-year DDPs. The West Bengal 
Municipal Act of 1993, was amended to incorporate this requirement of DDP 
preparation. The annual needs statements of the various municipal wards would have to 
be taken into consideration for the preparation of the 5-year DDPs. Thus, for the first 
time in India, a planning system was set up in an urban area which, at least in terms of 
the institutional arrangement, ended the subordination of local government institutions 
by technocratic functional agencies. However, in practice, the process, though 
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democratic in form, is yet to become democratic in spirit and content. In this structure 
too, the top is functioning better than the bottom. The 25-Year perspective plan has been 
prepared, but the amalgamation of municipal DDPs is incomplete and the mobilisation 
of ward committees for planning nearly absent. In fact, the process cannot start 
functioning properly until the people at the level of neighbourhoods and wards start 
taking ownership of the process and use the Ward committees to actively articulate the 
needs of the area and demand the necessary responsiveness from the higher tiers, where 
the lower plans are being amalgamated.  
8.5 Left out under the Left Front 
The support of the Left Front in the slums of Kolkata had also become strong by 1985. 
The decision to legalize the slums, which had never been done by the previous Congress 
governments, reduced the perennial fear of being evicted. Following the legalisation, the 
government ‘initiated new programs to introduce sewerage, running water, and 
electricity into those areas.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 141). Kohli referred to an analysis of the 
elections to KMC, which concluded, that ‘the majority’ of the dwellers of legalised 
slums voted ‘in favour of the Left Front.’ (ibid.). However, while the Left Front 
achieved success in its development strategies in the countryside, consolidated its 
support among the slum dwellers through tenancy reforms, and strengthened the 
foundations of its political power and influence in the state, it also lost its support 
among some important groups in the city due to a combination of the very reasons that 
had given it its successes. 
 
After coming to power, the Left Front started losing support among the Bengali middle-
class population in Kolkata. Even in the 1985 municipal elections it was noted that the 
middle-class population and the Bengali intelligentsia, were moving away from the Left 
Front. Kohli attributes three reasons to this state of affairs. First, the whole strategy of 
the Left Front was focussed on developing the rural areas at the expense of urban areas. 
Such a focus led to the ‘neglect of those city services that affect many middle-class 
urban residents.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 143). Even after two decades of being in power, it 
was noted in an Asian Development Bank report, that only 17 percent of the population 
were connected to the sewerage system, and less than 50 percent of the KMC area was 
 169
covered by a drainage system.’ (ADB: 2000, p  - ii). Decline in Industrial development 
and the consequent shrinking of employment opportunities forced many well educated 
young women and men to seek jobs in other parts of India. The transport situation in the 
city was clear to anyone who had the experience of getting stuck in the notorious traffic 
jams of Kolkata, where the only choice for the commuter was to wait for hours in his 
car, breathe the air of one of the most polluted cities in the world and have his ears split 
by the constant honking of horns and the human rudeness which comes as a natural 
consequence of all these. 
 
The second reason given by Kohli, was a ‘more diffuse, cultural reason’, which reflects 
an attitude that many middle class Bengalis have of themselves as being essentially 
‘anti-establishment.’ (ibid.). This was also brought out in an interview that Kohli had 
with a member and District President of the opposition Congress Party, in which the 
President said, “When communists were not in power, the Bengali intelligentsia 
supported them; now, not so.” (ibid.). The very political maturity of the Left Front, that 
made it move away from revolutionary class struggle towards a process of land reform 
and democratisation ‘may have disillusioned the more romantic among Kolkata’s lively 
political strata.’ (ibid.) 
 
The second group of people to start feeling alienated from the Left Front, were none 
other than the industrial workers, who were staunch supporters of CPM during the most 
difficult years that the party had to face in the 1960s and 1970s. As has been discussed 
earlier, the labour militancy encouraged and abetted by the United Front government 
created a political and industrial chaos in Kolkata, which finally forced the leftists to 
take a much more reformist stance in subsequent years.  
 
Though such a stance reflects the political wisdom of the Left Front to survive and do 
what it can within the overall democratic-capitalist structure of the Indian state, it was 
no respite for the workers who sacrifised much in bringing the CPM and its allies to 
power. This is well documented in Nandini Gooptu’s paper on the condition of jute mill 
workers in the city of Haora, in the Kolkata Metropolitan Area. The jute industry had 
been one of the most prominent industrial sectors in Bengal from the colonial period 
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onwards. During the 1960s, there was a considerable increase in the strength of 
worker’s unions and their ability to bargain collectively with the industrialists. Gooptu 
writes, that ‘by the early 1970s, the norm of job security and the notion of worker’s 
rights and entitlements in the jute industry had come to be recognised by the state, often 
in response to worker’s mobilisation, in particular, after a strike wave in 1966, and 
general strikes in 1969 and 1970.’ (Gooptu: 2007, p - 1924). These important 
entitlements included progressive labour legislation, increase and standardisation of 
wage rates, improvement in working conditions, social security and other welfare 
measures and the abolition of ‘sardari’ (labour recruitment through intermediaries) 
(ibid.). 
 
However, Gooptu writes, that the employers used their superior resources and power to 
thwart such processes whenever they could. The militant labour movements, which 
reached their peak during the United Front government, showed, according to Gooptu, 
‘that workers...had come to internalise the legitimacy of their newly gained and hard-
earned rights, and were prepared to fight in their defence.’ (ibid.). The response of the 
employers was to use the mechanism of state coercion, when the Congress Party was in 
power. When the state apparatus was denied to them during the United Front rule, by 
asking the police to stay out of labour disputes, the employers resorted to rampant lock-
outs. The national emergency came as a boon to industrialists. During these two years, 
‘labour movements were brutally repressed nationwide...and jute employers resorted to 
large scale retrenchment in their mills.’ (ibid.). Such an analysis raises serious questions 
about the reality that gets described through terms such as ‘chaos’ and ‘normalcy’. To 
have a more complete picture of the reality, it is, perhaps, better to say, that the move 
towards normalcy from the point of view of the employers created a crisis for the 
workers, and any move towards normal and human living and working conditions for 
the workers created chaos for the employers. 
 
All through this period, the CPM, its allies and its trade union wing - Centre of Indian 
Trade Unions (CITU) - had provided leadership and support to many workers’ 
movements in the city. However, the more the Left Front aligned itself with the 
struggles of the workers, the more they created the conditions which would have 
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‘disastrous implications for governability.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 145). Kohli writes, that al-
though such actions consolidated CPM’s position as an authentic revolutionary party in 
the eyes of the of the workers, at that time, it simply was ‘not capable of understanding 
the detrimental effects of such a strategy on the overall political and economic situation, 
and thus the long-term prospect for building broad political support.’ (ibid., p - 146). 
 
With the change in the overall strategy of the Left Front, its support for radical workers’ 
movements reduced drastically. What was important now was to lure back the 
industrialists and create a congenial atmosphere for investment, while at the same time 
trying to safeguard the rights of the workers as much as possible. Unfortunately, the 
eagerness to do the former often pushed the latter aspect to the background. This trend 
became even stronger with the emergence of neo-liberal economic policies from the 
1990s onwards, which strengthened the position of the employers vis-à-vis the 
employed. Gooptu writes, that according to various estimates, ‘the number of permanent 
workers had been reduced by as much as about 100000 by the early 1990s out of a total 
work force of about 250000 and only about 30 per cent of workers enjoyed “permanent” 
status by 2000.’ (Gooptu: 2007, p - 1925). Even the rights of the permanent workers 
were being steadily encroached upon. This is how a worker, interviewed by Gooptu, de-
scribes the situation. 
 
‘Our employer...pays his workers the weekly wage...You work, you get money 
[implying bare wages only, no other entitlements]. Don’t ask for your rights [a reference 
to the lack of dearness allowance, bonus, pensions, gratuity, guaranteed employment, 
etc.]. What you work for, ask only to be paid for that, but no more.’ (ibid.) 
 
As the Left Front government in general and the trade unions in particular adopted an 
attitude of collaboration with the industrialists, the workers felt more and more 
vulnerable and isolated. Gooptu writes, that ‘the most influential and militant labour 
union of the 1970s CITU, dramatically attenuated its militancy in the 1980s, towing the 
government line to avoid alienating employers in search of investment.’ (ibid.).  
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 Table 4 Decline in Labour Strife in West Bengal under the Left Front 
 
Year Number of strikes 
per year 
Number of men in 
strikes per year 
Number of man-
days lost per year 
1969 - 76 306 321122 5550000 
1980 78 68411 1485399 
1981 43 16592 620110 
1982 29 8114 309292 
1983 39 12014 563946 
1984 49 286460 21596573 
1985 39 13527 197215 
1986 30 23130 273864 
 
(Source: Kohli: 1990, p – 148 
 
Note: The increase observed for the year 1984 was due to a three-month long strike in 
the jute mills of Kolkata) 
The disillusionment that set into the workers as a result of all this is vividly captured in 
their own words, as recorded in Gooptu’s interviews. This is how some workers living 
in the slums around the jute factories described the situation. 
 
‘Here there is nothing. They [mill authorities] have cut off the electric supply [while the 
mill is closed]. Next they will cut off the water supply. Don’t drink supplied water, 
drink dirty water. Somehow the workers have to be broken in every way...If we have 
nothing to live on for a week or two, one is bound to run away. Leave the struggle and 
run away... 
See this [battered] pole of bamboo. We are like this - left to rot away; we are standing 
upright today with difficulty, but we will collapse soon as we rot away.’ (ibid., p - 126) 
 
 173
Another group of workers said that ‘earlier there used to be agitation on behalf of the 
workers; now there is agitation on behalf of the employer.’ (ibid.). Some others drew 
incredible parallels with events in international politics to describe their condition, 
 
‘[Osama bin] Laden made a cremation ground of America and no one could catch him. 
Our bastard employer is not getting into the hands of any union or the government.  So 
you can say he is Laden no. 2...He [bin Laden] is not going to come into anyone’s hands 
[meaning he cannot be captured or brought to justice]. He [bin Laden] is no. 1, and our 
employer is no. 2. He is not going to come into anyone’s hands either. The government 
here [West Bengal] and the government in Delhi are in his pocket - he says so openly. 
He says he has power. He says a third of the High Court is under him’ (ibid.) 
  
One of the best evidence of the changed circumstances in the political landscape of 
Kolkata comes from an editorial comment made by none other than the New York 
Times, two years after the municipal elections in Kolkata, 
 
West Bengal’s Left Front Government is currently playing a constructive role as gadfly 
to the country’s inertia-bound Congress party...Local industrialists have made their 
peace with Mr. Basu. They argue that the communists out of power are trouble. In 
power, they have become realists, adept at persuading fractionalised unions to honour 
their agreements...West Bengal’s communists clobber their me-too opponents at the 
polls because they are smarter, better organised and less corrupt. (New York Times, 
April 16, 1987, quoted in Kohli: 1990, p - 150) 
 
However, there is an interesting aspect to the marginalisation of workers’ movements in 
Kolkata, which can be considered as a positive achievement of the Left Front 
government. The undermining of workers’ movements and solidarity, is accompanied, 
in many cases, with a rise in narrow sectarian identities and communal tensions and 
conflicts. Gooptu refers to Jan Breman’s and Chitra Joshi’s analyses of industrial 
decline in the cities of Ahmadabad and Kanpur respectively to show how ‘the erstwhile 
political tradition of working class collective action gave way to narrow sectarian 
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identities and religious mobilisation, within a wider context of the rise of 
fundamentalism, caste conflict and communal tensions.’ (Gooptu: 2007, p - 1923).  
 
However, even those journals and newspapers who were severely critical of the Left 
Front government in West Bengal, either for being too leftist (e.g. major local 
newspapers like ‘The Telegraph’ and ‘Ananda Bazaar) or for not being leftist enough 
(e.g. journals such as the ‘Economic and Political Weekly’), had to agree in 1987 that, 
‘in fact, there has been no report of any communal riot or caste conflict in West Bengal 
during the last ten years. [The] Left Front can really take pride in...the political stability 
it has ensured.’ (Kohli: 1990, p - 150). Kohli also observed, that ‘CPM is one of the few 
national parties that has scrupulously avoided entering into collusive electoral 
arrangements with the Hindu-chauvinist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).’ (ibid., p - 142). 
 
Thus, it cannot be concluded that the softening of radical worker’s movements was a 
betrayal of the workers’ cause by the Left Front. If the Left Front had been completely 
sold out to the interests of capital, it would probably have succumbed to the rising 
influence of sectarian forces that were gripping many major Indian cities during the last 
two decades. In Kolkata an attempt was made to create a sustainable arrangement to 
prevent capital  flight and yet try to accommodate the interests of the workers, just like 
the one attempted in the countryside between landlords and sharecroppers. However, it 
can be argued, that due to the overall focus of this resource constrained state 
government being on rural areas, the urban versions of the experiment failed to show 
similar results. 
 
The third important group consists of the hundreds of thousands of people, who belong 
to the poorest of the poor in the city of Kolkata - the residents of informal settlements. 
Just like the slums, the settlements of these people can be found all over the city. 
Despite the legalisation of slums by the Left Front government, the sheer number of the 
informal settlements and the extreme location of most of them meant that granting 
formal recognition and undertaking environmental improvement in such settlements 
would be well-nigh impossible. Many of these settlements are located on the banks of 
the many inland waterways passing through the city, on the roadside footpaths or on 
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buffer land along railway lines. Many of these settlements were created in the aftermath 
of man-made disasters such as the great famine of 1943 (which is often referred to as 
the greatest man-made famine of all time) and the refugee crises caused by the partition 
of India in 1947 and the Bangladesh war of independence in 1971. Partha Chatterjee 
writes, that as a result of such crises the suburbs of Kolkata came to ‘accommodate a 
refugee immigration of more than three times the original population of the city.’ 
(Chatterjee: 2004, p - 54). These settlements almost always grew up illegally on private 
or public property, but with the ‘tacit acquiescence of the authorities.’ (ibid.). 
 
The cause of the East Pakistan/Bangladesh refugees was championed by the leftist 
parties when they were in the opposition. The settlements which were located on illegal 
properties, such as garden houses, could benefit from the slum legalisation procedures 
initiated by the Left Front. However, those that lived on canal banks, roadsides and 
along railway lines, continued to live under the constant threat of eviction and excluded 
from all environmental up gradation schemes. The support that this group extended to 
the Left Front still remains, but it has a very different spirit and purpose - to extend 
support to the ruling coalition at least to mitigate the possibility of involuntary eviction.  
8.6 Wooing the Investors 
The failure to make a noticeable difference in the socio-economic and environmental 
condition of the city of Kolkata and the alienation of the three major groups of people 
described above had a negative effect on the political supremacy of the Left Front in the 
city. A new and energetic rival of the Left Front started appearing in the political arena 
in the late 1990s in the form of the National Trinamool Congress party. The Trinamool 
Congress was largely made up of defectors from the Congress party and was led by the 
dynamic and vocal leader Mamata Bannerjee. Although the Trinamool Congress was far 
from removing the Left Front from power from West Bengal, it stunned all by wresting 
the KMC from the Leftists. It was for the first time that a non-Left political party took 
control of the local government in Kolkata. The rising influence of the Trinamool 
Congress and the alliance it formed with a coalition of religious right-wing parties led 
by the BJP, which was in control of the central government, caused alarm to the Left 
Front. 
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 It has already been noted in the previous chapter, that despite all the measures taken by 
the Left Front government to control labour unrest and ensure political stability, the 
industrial stagnation of the state continued. The political challenge posed by the new 
rivals and the problems of sustaining the rural development experiment in a neo-liberal 
economic environment compelled the Left Front to re-orient its political and 
development strategy from rural and agricultural issues to urban and industrial issues. 
Partha Chatterjee wrote that ‘after tripping over numerous ideological hurdles, the 
political leadership has been finally cornered into acknowledging that the economic 
revival of Kolkata depends on high technology industry.’ (Chatterjee: 2004, p - 146). 
 
From the late 1990s, the Left Front got into action to tackle the economic challenges 
facing the state and the political challenges posed by the new rivals simultaneously. In 
the year 2000, the Chief Minister of West Bengal, who had set a record of being the 
longest serving Chief Minister of any state in India (1977 - 2000), stepped down and 
Budhhadeb Bhattacharya, who had been in charge of the Ministry of Information and 
Culture, stepped in. Ever since stepping in as the Chief Minister, Budhhadeb 
Bhattacharya championed the cause of West Bengal’s industrialisation actively and 
initiated discussions with many big industrial houses, such as the Tata Motors, for the 
setting up of its first small-car manufacturing plant in West Bengal; the Salim Group in 
Indonesia, for setting up of agro-based industries, a special economic zone (SEZ) and 
the construction of an expressway and a bridge; and various information-technology 
(IT) companies. He also showed willingness towards the restructuring of ailing public 
sector companies in the state. 
 
It was not that a change of Chief Ministers, was all that was required to change the 
approach of the Left Front towards industrialisation. The Left Front had been trying to 
make West Bengal attractive to investors for a long time, but the special combination of 
political-economic factors that were becoming strong during the 1990s got the process 
going. The fielding of a new leader of the state, who was considered honest and 
completely incorruptible, leading a spartan life-style with his family in his small 
apartment, possessing a deep understanding to art and culture and, yet, proving to be 
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willing to make the necessary concessions to big business, was a very important signal 
given by the Left Front both to the middle-classes in Kolkata and the investors. 
 
The political intelligence of the Left Front was once again proved, when it took back all 
the political space that the Trinamool Congress had taken possession of. In the 
municipal elections that happened in West Bengal in May 2005, the Left Front won 49 
out of the 79 municipalities (excluding the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and the 
Bidhan Nagar Municipality). In the KMC elections that happened later that year, the 
Left Front won 75 out of the total 141 wards and reclaimed the most important local 
government body from its political rivals. The Left Front actually won in 14 more wards 
than in 2000. This was a significant victory as the city of Kolkata had ‘traditionally 
voted against the party in power.’ (Chattopadhyay: 2005, p - 4). The KMC election 
results showed, that the Left Front had been ‘able to attract a sizeable number of voters 
from the upper and upper-middle classes, and the non-Bengali business community.’ 
(ibid.). Equally revealing was its victory in the posh suburban township of Bidhannagar, 
lying to the north-east of the KMC. In the Bidhannagar Municipality, the Left Front 
won 18 out of the 23 wards. 
 
According to Chattopadhyay, ‘the Left Front’s policies of inviting investment to West 
Bengal and promoting industrialisation, and the clean image of Budhhadeb 
Bhattacharya have contributed to bolster the confidence of the urban middle class.’ 
(ibid.). In the state assembly elections that happened in 2006, the Left Front completely 
trounced its opponents by winning for the seventh consecutive time and with a massive 
three-fourths majority. The industrial orientation was working extremely well for the 
Left Front politically and a survey conducted by the Indian Chamber of Commerce 
ranked West Bengal ‘as the third most preferred destination for investment’ after 
industrial heavy-weights such as Gujarat and Maharashtra (Chattopadhyay: 2006, p - 1). 
 
Chattopadhyay observed that the Left Front had always tried to maintain a balance 
between the ‘need for industrialisation and the interests of the working class’ (ibid., p - 
2). Bikas Ranjan Bhattacharya, the new mayor of Kolkata, who grew up in a slum 
himself, started giving priority to the improvement of slums in the city immediately 
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after being elected. Chattopadhyay wrote that this ‘was a welcome change from the 
emphasis on new flyovers and garden layouts, which appeared to have preoccupied the 
outgoing KMC leadership.’ (Chattopadhyay: 2005, p - 4). Similarly, Chief Minister 
Budhhadeb Bhattacharya said the following lines in an interview. 
 
Not everything about liberalisation in right. We are against the policy of hire and fire of 
labour and arbitrary privatisation. I believe socialism is a better system, but we live in a 
time where we have to work according to market conditions. (Chattopadhyay: 2006, p - 
2). 
 
However, even if the Left Front succeeds in the daunting task of balancing the need for 
investment attraction and the interests of the working class, the beneficiaries are going 
to be the organised sections within the labour force (in terms of livelihood) and the 
residents of the legalised slums (in terms of residence). Both the populace involved with 
the substantial informal economy of the city and the hundreds of thousands of residents 
of the informal settlements, are undoubtedly going to suffer more than ever before.  
 
It is not that there would be a severe stepping up of governmental action against them. 
Indeed, the implementation of neo-liberalism increases the number of people in the 
informal sector rather than acting directly against it. However, the city of the informals, 
will be more and more in the way of the city that the rising upper- and middle-classes 
would demand. The shelters of the informal residents will increasingly come in the way 
of faster expressways, canal-side walkways, clean parks, shopping malls, cineplexes, 
high-tech office complexes etc.  
 
Thus, during the 1990s three important processes were happening simultaneously, 
which affected the nature of the overall development strategy of the Left Front. 
 
1. The rise of neo-liberal economic policies in India. 
2. The strengthening of local democratic institutions nation-wide through the 73rd and 
74th Amendments to the Constitution of India. 
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3. A re-orientation of the development strategy of the West Bengal government from a 
rural and agricultural focus to an urban and industrial focus due to political and 
economic reasons. 
 
In the next chapter I shall, through the use of an area-level case study, show how such 
changes are affecting one of the poorest sections of the city of Kolkata - the residents of 
informal settlements along an important canal system of Kolkata. Such an account 
would give a clear picture of how all the macro-level changes, as well as the institutions 
created for democratic decentralised planning are being seen from the point of view of 
this section of the population. Such a local level investigation is also a litmus test for the 
overall democratic planning structure set up in Kolkata, and a way of testing the 
potential that such a structure has in resisting or mitigating the effects of neo-liberal 
urbanisation on the poorest groups in the city.    
 180
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part V 
The Case 
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9. Environmental Improvement of the 
Baghbazar Canal System - Under-
standing actually existing Democratic 
Planning 
 
This chapter turns the analytical frame used to understand the democratic planning and 
development process in West Bengal up-side down. It may be better to say that it 
substantially zooms into the local area and see the effects of macro-level planning 
interventions and strategies, as they unveil at the micro-level. After having elaborated in 
detail the context and history of democratic planning in West Bengal, this chapter 
attempts to study and analyse the implementation of a cluster of environmental 
improvement projects to understand the nature of actually existing democratic 
decentralised planning in Kolkata. 
 
The case selected for this purpose, was a cluster of small and big environmental 
improvement projects being undertaken to revive a major canal system of the city. 
These canal systems of Kolkata are a part of the inland waterways constructed by 
British engineers and planners during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to connect 
the resource producing areas of East Bengal with the markets of Kolkata. Over time, 
these canals became non-functional in terms of inland navigation, and their banks 
became home to tens of thousands of informal settlers. In the recent years, as the 
economic importance of the city of Kolkata started growing and it started being 
championed as a potential investment destination, the demands for undertaking 
widespread environmental improvement and beautification of this severely dense and 
polluted city became stronger. The canals of Kolkata became a focus of such 
improvement projects, as their revival could contribute to sustainable city transport 
options, creation of much needed recreational spaces and opening up the land on the 
canal banks for commercial use.  
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However, undertaking such improvement would also mean coming up against severe 
humanitarian and political issues of removing the informal settlers from the banks. How 
does such an improvement process originate and navigate its way towards 
implementation ? What role do the institutions of local government and the newly set-
up democratic planning structure play in such a situation ? How do the informal settlers 
view the turbulent evictions that they are faced with ? How do the different wards and 
local government bodies coordinate with each other in executing such a complicated 
project, especially since the canal system flows through the territories of four major 
municipal bodies in the KMA (the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, Bidhannagar 
Municipality, South Dum Dum Municipality and the Rajarhat-Gopalpur Municipality) 
and across numerous wards. Answering such questions can provide us with a clearer 
understanding of how neo-liberal urbanisation and democratic planning actually work at 
the local level.  
 
In the following section a short history of the inland waterways of Bengal is provided 
before moving on to a detailed account of the Baghbazar canal system, its informal 
residents and the improvement projects being undertaken on and along it. 
9.1 The Inland waterways of Kolkata 
The man-made canal systems that traverse the surface of the city of Kolkata are more 
than just an ingenious system of waterways developed for the twin purposes of inland 
navigation and storm-water drainage. Within their now stagnant waters, they contain the 
environmental and economic history of the city ever since it was established as the seat 
of the British East India company in the late 17th century. Though, I used the word 
man-made, the actual proportion of artificial canals in the whole system is very less. Out 
of the total network of waterways, the combined length of which is more than 1803 
kilometers, only 120 kilometres is man-made. The original design idea was to link long 
stretches of naturally existing waterways with artificial canals at specific points and 
stretches.  
 
Adam Smith had made a mention of the role played by inland navigation in the 
economic prosperity of the Bengal region in his classic work ‘The Wealth of Nations’. 
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The improvements of agriculture and manufacture seem, likewise, to have been of very 
great antiquity in the provinces of Bengal, in the East Indies, and in some of the eastern 
provinces of China...In Bengal, the Ganges and several other great rivers form a great 
number of navigable canals in the same manner as the Nile does in Egypt...It is 
remarkable that neither the ancient Egyptians, nor the Indians, nor the Chinese, 
encouraged foreign commerce, but seem to have derived their great opulence from this 
inland navigation. (Smith: 1776, Book 1, Chapter 3, p - 3)  
 
Figure 3Inland waterways of Bengal 
 
 
(Source: National Atlas and Thematic Mapping Organisation, Kolkata) 
 
According to the imperial gazetteer of India, published in 1908, in the late nineteenth 
century this was ‘one of the most important systems of river canals in the world, judged 
by the volume of the traffic’, which averaged ‘1000000 tons per annum, valued at 
nearly four millions sterling.’ (The Imperial Gazetteer of India: 1908, p - 287). The area 
between Kolkata, and East Bengal was criss-crossed with numerous tidal creeks and 
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channels. Most of these were flowing in the north south direction, but sometimes they 
had a horizontal connection. For many years, these tidal creeks and channels had been 
used to bring rice from Barisal, which was the head-quarters of the major rice growing 
district of Backergunge, tea from Assam and Cachar and wood from the jungles of 
Sundarbans into Kolkata. In the other direction, salt, finished products and kerosene oil 
were transported from Kolkata to these very eastern districts. (The Imperial Gazetteer of 
India: 1908, p - 287) 
 
Before the man-made canals were built to connect the naturally existing ones, the boats 
had to follow a long and treacherous route to reach Kolkata. Starting from the eastern 
districts they had to turn south and travel along the sea face and reach Hooghly through 
the Baratala creek, which lay 112 kilometers to the south of Kolkata. After completing 
this long circuit the boats would again travel northwards to reach Kolkata. This water 
route was known as the ‘Outer Boat Route’ or ‘Lower Sundarbans Passage’ (Mitra: 
1980, p - 154, The Imperial Gazetteer of India: 1908, p - 287) . Travelling along the sea-
face was particularly dangerous and virtually impossible for the small country-made 
boats during the rainy season.  
 
The pioneering intervention was made by one Major Tolly, who devised a plan to create 
an inland waterway which would directly connect Kolkata with the east without having 
to take the detour along the sea face. Major William Tolly conceived the idea of joining 
naturally existing channels and riverines with man-made canals to create a straighter 
west-east water-way to avoid the longer and more dangerous ‘outer boat route’. The 
construction began in 1775 and the canal became functional in 1777. (ibid. - 1953). This 
was the beginning of an ingenious process of creating a network of waterways by 
connecting naturally existing creeks and riverines with man-made constructions. After 
the creation of Tolly’s nulla, many such canals were constructed by improving and 
extending existing waterbodies. These included important urban waterways, such as the 
Beleghata canal (completed in 1810), the Circular canal (completed in 1831), the New 
Cut canal (completed in 1859) and the Keshtopur canal (completed in 1910). The steady 
increase in the volume of traffic and the continuous process of siltation was the reason 
behind the construction of so many canals. 
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 Tolly’s Canal in 1835 
 
 
(Source: Lotsy: 1990, p – 104) 
 
Before the independence of India, this above network of canals was under the 
administration and supervision of an independent department of the Government of 
Bengal, known as the Circular and Eastern Canals Division. After independence, in 
1947, all the eastern canals outside of Bangladesh (East Bengal became East Pakistan in 
1947 and then the independent nation of Bangladesh in 1972), were under the 
administration of Irrigation and Waterways Department of the Government of West 
Bengal. 
 
From the middle of the 20th century onwards, the condition of these vibrant waterways 
became increasingly poor. The maintenance of the canals declined steadily in the years 
following the independence of India. East Bengal became a part of Pakistan and West 
Bengal remained in India. This partition affected the economic inter-dependence 
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between the east and the west, which was the main rationale behind the construction of 
the canal system. The political turmoil in the city of Kolkata, lack of resources to main-
tain the canals, decline in traffic, the prioritisation of rural development over urban 
development by the ruling left-front government, the massive migration of refugees 
from Bangladesh during independence (1947) and the Bangladesh war of independence 
(1971) were some of the important factors that led to the transformation of these vibrant 
waterways to the near stagnant drains that one finds in the city in the present times. 
 
Informal Settlement along the Circular Canal, 2005 
 
(Photograph taken by author) 
 
Apart from the economic function, the canals of Kolkata performed a very important 
environmental function too. Right from the establishment of the first urban settlements, 
the history of planning in Kolkata has been the history of finding the harmony between 
land and water in this region dotted with innumerable wetlands and criss-crossed by 
riverines, creeks and canals. Despite all the economic advantages and temptations that 
the location of the city provided, it was hardly a comfortable place for the English 
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traders to live in. The marshy land, dense jungles, intolerable heat and humidity in the 
summer months and the vigorous cyclonic storms from the Bay of Bengal all took their 
toll on the inhabitants. According to Davies, ‘until 1800 the European inhabitants met 
on the 15th November each year to congratulate each other on having survived.’ 
(Davies: 1985, p - 48). Hamilton, a private trader who operated in Kolkata 
independently of the East India Company, gave the following description of the state of 
health in the initial years of the city’s development -  
 
One year, I was there, and there was reckoned in August about 1200 English, and before 
the beginning of January there were 460 burials registered in the clerk’s books of 
mortality. (Hamilton: 1727, in Davies: 1985, p 48) 
 
Hamilton was further disgusted by the situation that got created with the flooding of the 
wetlands, lying to the east of the city, during the monsoon season. After the rains the 
waters would withdraw leaving behind a large amount dead and rotting fish and an 
unbearable stench. Being essentially a low-lying marshy land, storm water drainage and 
sewage disposal have always been a problem in Kolkata. It is interesting to note, that for 
about a hundred years after the establishment of the settlement, the administrators and 
planners continued to generate solutions to this problem based on the understanding that 
the city sloped toward the river Hooghly to the west rather than toward the wetlands to 
the east. In the early 1800s the Lottery Committee, which had been created to finance 
urban development in the city noted that the land actually sloped towards the east.  
 
Kolkata’s combined drainage and sewerage system was sanctioned in 1859 and laid out 
between 1860 and 1865 (CEMSAP: 1997, p -62). The underground trunk line is 
connected to 17 pumping stations in the eastern parts of the city. The pumping stations 
are necessary as the design capacity of the system is much lower than the amount of 
sewage it has to discharge in present times. It was only the central core of the city that 
had a proper coverage under this combined system. Most of the outlying areas of the 
city were not covered at all. According to an Asian Development Bank (ADB) report 
prepared in 2000, ‘only 17 percent of the population in Kolkata municipal area are 
connected to the sewerage system and less than 50 percent of the area is covered by a 
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drainage system.’ (ADB: 2000, p - ii). The industrial waste flows largely untreated and 
the months of the monsoon flood substantial parts of the city practically every year.  
 
The canals of Kolkata, which had been developed for inland navigation started 
performing an additional function of draining storm water and sewage out of the city. 
Even in their present dilapidated condition, the Bagjola and Baghbazar Canal systems in 
North Kolkata drain 15 percent  and the Tolly’s Nullah drains 10 percent of the total 
waste water of the city. The remaining 75 percent flows through two channels 
constructed later, called the Dry Weather Flow (DWF) and Storm Weather Flow (SWF) 
channels. Thus at their fully functional stage the canal network performed the twin 
functions of solving the drainage problem of the low-lying city and also enabling the 
city to maximise its economic potential.  
 
Apart from these functions, there was the obvious aesthetic appeal of having a network 
of waterways with a stretch of open space along both banks. This was especially 
important for a polluted city like Kolkata, which over time, lost much of its limited open 
space to the twin challenges of increasing density and poverty. 
9.2 The Decline of the City Canals and the Calls for Revival 
There were many reasons for the decline of the canal system of Kolkata from the mid-
20th century onwards. The challenges of siltation and frequent shifting of course by the 
natural waterways were always there. Old canals had to be abandoned and new ones 
constructed in many cases, as has been documented above. What made the system 
necessary was the volume and vibrance of the inland trade, the overall economic and 
political significance of Kolkata as the second city of the British empire and the conse-
quent ability to allocate necessary resources for the maintenance and upkeep of the 
canals. After the independence of India in 1947, all these necessary elements crumbled 
all at once. 
 
The political and administrative importance of Kolkata had already started declining 
since 1911, when the capital of British India was shifted to Delhi. However, it still 
continued as an economic powerhouse. This economic prominence of Kolkata also 
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started declining due to various reasons after the political independence of India. The 
eve of independence was also the eve of the tragic partition of the country into the states 
of India and Pakistan. East Bengal, which always had a majority of Muslim population 
became a part of Pakistan and was called East Pakistan. Pitting one religion against 
another and one community against another in order to thwart any conscious efforts 
towards nation building on the part of the colonised people was a typical strategy of 
British imperialists in India.. This divide et impera strategy had some severe economic 
separate resource producing areas of the country from the resource processing and 
marketing areas. The separation of jute producing East Bengal from the jute processing 
and exporting West Bengal by a national boundary, thus, broke the back of the powerful 
jute based industry of Bengal. As, one of the prime purposes of the canal network was 
to connect the resource producing zones of the east to the markets and ports of the west, 
such a separation affected the prime economic rationale for having the canals in the first 
place. The maintenance of the canals suffered and the already existing problems of 
siltation compounded.  
 
Added to all this was the human dimension of the problem, which presented itself in the 
form of massive inflows of refugees from East Pakistan during the partition of India in 
1947 and the Bangladesh war of independence in 1972. Millions of refugees came to the 
city during this time and were forced to occupy any land that was available. Thousands 
crowded onto the platforms of the Sealdah railway station and made it their home for 
months together, others occupied the vacant garden houses of the elites and campaigned 
together with the leftist political parties for getting ownership rights for the land and 
equally large numbers filled up other public lands such as pavements and green buffer 
strips along railway tracks and urban canals.  
 
From the late 1970s onwards the canals became practically unrecognizable as inland 
waterways. Crowded with informal housing on both sides, they resembled, at best, 
stagnant waste water drains with nothing better to contribute to the city than an 
increased number of malaria victims. At many stretches, where the water hyacinths 
covered the water surface, even the semblance to a drain disappeared. The plight of the 
people living on the banks of these canals was no better than the canals themselves. 
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They were engaged in the most menial jobs the city had to offer ranging from collection 
and sorting of uncollected solid waste, household help, running road-side food and tea 
stalls, informal wage labour in small and medium factory units, construction work, idol 
making for religious events, rickshaw pulling etc. Within the urban poor, the condition 
of this strata is the worst as both their livelihoods and place of living are outside any 
kind of security net. Their jobs are all within the informal sector, which is totally devoid 
of any kind of social security for the work-force and their housing, being located on the 
shoulder and the green belt along the canals, has no security of tenure. And yet, the 
services of these people are indispensible to the city. 
 
Condition of Keshtopur Canal in 2004 
 
(Photograph taken by author) 
 
Another important reason for the decline of the canals was the reclamation of land for 
residential development in the eastern fringes of Kolkata. One of the biggest 
urbanisation projects undertaken in the city after independence, was the creation of the 
suburban township known as Salt Lake. The suburb was so named, because it was 
created after filling up the extensive salt water lakes in the region with silt dredged from 
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the river Hugly. Soon after the construction of the township began, the section of the 
New Cut canal that joined the Circular canal with the Beleghata canal was filled up to 
construct the Eastern Metropolitan Bye-pass road. Although, the bye-pass played a very 
significant role in easing the severe traffic congestion in the city core, environmentalists 
warned of the effects these projects could have on the natural drainage patterns of the 
city. Private developers started buying land along this traffic corridor and constructing 
numerous housing estates. The effect of these developments started getting felt from the 
1980s, when Salt Lake and the neighbourhoods bordering it started getting flooded 
almost every year during the monsoons. 
 
The state of West Bengal was hit by massive floods in the year 1978. A government 
report prepared in the aftermath of the floods recommended the de-silting of the canals 
to protect the city of Kolkata from such paralysing floods. The department of 
environment of the Government of West Bengal also prepared a report recommending 
the improvement of Kolkata’s canals and wetland systems. The Central Inland Water 
Transportation Corporation put forward similar proposals to the state transport 
department in order to address the chaotic traffic conditions that existed in the city and 
to explore the possibility of strengthening the canal based cargo movement from and to 
Bangladesh. Alongside these formal, departmental demands to revive the canals, there 
were also demands from concerned citizens, environmental NGOs and civil society 
organisations like residents’ welfare associations of middle and upper income 
neighbourhoods located along the canal. Public health experts also supported this cause, 
as the stagnant canals were breeding grounds for malaria and various kinds of skin and 
stomach ailments. 
 
In the year 1996, an independent report on the traffic and environmental situation of the 
city of Kolkata was prepared by Prof. John Whitelegg of the School of Built 
Environment, Liverpool, at the request of various NGOs in the city. The purpose of the 
report was to generate sustainable transport solutions for the city. Sustainable transport 
solutions were described as those, which met the needs of the all residents regardless of 
income; protect and preserve and enhance the health of the residents; and are not 
damaging to the present and future conditions of the city (Whitelegg: 1996). 
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 The report took note of the severe traffic and environmental conditions that prevailed in 
the city. The traffic levels had doubled between 1985 and 1996. Particulate matter 
pollution, which should not exceed 90 µg/cu.m according to the regulations of the 
World Health Organisation (WHO), were in the range of 1300 - 3000 µg/cu.m during 
the winter months. Benzene levels are exceptionally high at 30 - 100 mg/ cu.m. Noise 
pollution is another major problem due to the high traffic volumes. Noise levels in the 
city often cross 90 decibels, whereas the WHO recommended limit is 55 decibels during 
daytime and 45 decibels during the night. The incidence of traffic accidents is high, 
causing injury and death mainly to the pedestrians and cyclists (Whitelegg: 1996). 
 
The report went on to list the potential transport resources of the city, which could be 
reclaimed and improved in order to generate sustainable transport solutions for the city. 
One such under-utilized resource identified by the report was the canal system of 
Kolkata. The report stated, that ‘in a city where the most often quoted complaints are 
about congestion and lack of road space, the use of river and waterways in combination 
has tremendous potential to improve the quality of life and transport choices for the 
citizens of Kolkata.’ (Whitelegg: 1996, p - 6) The report came up with ideas to create 
river-buses and integrating them with the existing bus, tram, train and metro networks in 
the city. Such a development of the waterways could also generate a better micro-
climate and possibilities for water based recreation.  
 
Despite, all these voices for reviving the canal network of the city, the improvements 
could not be undertaken for many years. This was due to the fact, that there were also 
scores of people on the other end of the spectrum who would lose much if any dredging 
project got implemented. These were the thousands of squatter families who had made 
the canal banks their home for many years. In many cases, the families had lived on the 
canal banks for more than one generation.  
 
In my research, I focused on the process of improving and re-claiming various stretches 
of a canal system known as the Bagh Bazaar Canal System. In the following sections I 
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shall elaborate the various conflicts and dilemmas that arose in the process and the ways 
in which they challenged the democratic planning apparatus of Kolkata. 
9.3 The Baghbazar Canal system 
The Baghbazar canal system originates at the Chitpur lock at Baghbazar in north 
Kolkata. The system is made up of separate canals, which were constructed at different 
points of time, viz., the New Cut canal, the Circular canal, the Beleghata canal, the 
Eastern drainage channel and the Keshtopur canal. However, all these individual canals 
are ‘parts of the same hydrographic system.’ (CEMSAP: 1997, p - 132) 
 
Figure 4The Bagh Bazar Canal System 
 
 
(Map drafted by author) 
 
In 1997, a limited survey of the informal settlements along the banks of the canal 
system, was conducted as part of the ‘Calcutta Environment Management Strategy and 
Action Plan’ (CEMSAP), prepared by the Department of Environment of the 
Government of West Bengal. According to the CEMSAP survey, the total number 
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households residing along the various stretches of the Baghbazar Canal System is about 
3300. Assuming an average family size of 5 persons, the survey estimated a total 
population of 16500. Based on its observations, the CEMSAP study categorized the 
various stretches of the system as high encroachment, medium encroachment and low 
encroachment stretches.  
 
Table 5Approximate Population of Informal Settlers on Baghbazar Canal System 
 
Canal Stretch Households Population 
Baghbazar Canal Chitpur lock to Ulta 
danga Gridge 
1250 6250 
Circular Canal Ulta Danga Bridge 
to Chawlpatty 
1300 6500 
Beleghata Canal Chawlpatty to 
Eastern 
Metropolitan By-
pass (EMB) and 
Dhapa lock 
50 250 
Eastern Drainage 
Channel 
EMB to 
Korunamoyee, in 
Salt Lake Township 
60 300 
New Cut Canal At Ulta Danga 
along the VIP Road 
300 1500 
Keshtopur Canal VIP Road to 
Korunamoyee 
25 125 
Keshtopur-Bhangar 
Canal 
Beyond 
Korunamoyee, till 
Ghusighata 
300 1500 
Total  3285 16425 
(Source: CEMSAP: 1977, p - 134) 
 
The strategy to revive the canal system consisted of two main parts. The first one was to 
dredge and de-silt the whole system. The second part consisted of various post-dredging 
services and development projects, such as operating cargo and leisure transport on the 
canals, improving and widening the roads along the canals, developing recreational and 
commercial uses along the canal banks and around the proposed terminals etc. Although 
the strategy consisted of these two parts by necessity (no development could be possibly 
undertaken on or along the canals unless they were dredged), they didn’t follow any 
strict chronological order in terms of the overall planning process. Discussions 
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regarding development alternatives for a particular stretch of the canal often started 
years before the dredging of that very stretch could be initiated and the dredging of the 
various stretches itself followed a highly staggered time schedule depending on a 
number of factors.  
 
Figure 5Density of Informal settlements along Bagh Bazaar Canal system 
 
 
 
(Source: CEMSAP: 1977, p – 134; re-drafted by author)  
 
The various improvement projects can be broadly categorised according to the two main 
stretches of the system on which they took place, viz. The New Cut-Keshtopur canal 
stretch and the Circular-Beleghata canal stretch. The first of these two stretches is also 
known as the North Kolkata canal system and the improvement projects undertaken on 
it were cumulatively called ‘The North Canal Reclamation project’. The other stretch 
starts at the Ulta Danga Bridge and extends southwards and then eastwards including 
the Circular canal and the Beleghata canal, all the way up to the EM by-pass road. 
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9.4 Planning and Resistance Along the Canal System 
In the year 1995, in line with the renewed thrust of the Left Front government towards 
industrialisation and urban infrastructure upgradation, the Government of West Bengal 
and the ICICI bank (the second largest bank of India) formed a joint-venture company 
called the ICICI-West Bengal Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited (ICICI-
Winfra or IWIN ). The primarily objective of such a joint venture was to accelerate the 
development of infrastructure in the state. In 1998, the State Transport Department, 
through the West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation 
(WBTIDC), had appointed IWIN to prepare a feasibility report for the canal reclamation 
project. In the month of September IWIN approached British Waterways for assistance 
regarding the preparation of the feasibility report. (West Bengal Industrial Development 
Corporation, www.icici-winfra.com) 
 
In September, 1999, while IWIN and British waterways were, presumably, preparing 
the feasibility report for canal improvement, the city of Kolkata and the planned suburb 
of Salt Lake got flooded due to monsoon showers. The drainage system was so 
incapacitated, that the water didn’t recede for up to ten days in many parts of the city 
(Asia Times: 30th November 1999). The flooding, though severe, had become an 
annual feature in the city. The floods added fresh fuel to the demands for restoring the 
canals of the city, which were already coming from various quarters. 
 
The report prepared by IWIN and British Waterways was submitted to the Chief 
Minister of West Bengal, Mr. Budhhadeb Bhattacharya, in 2000. It covered all the 
technical, market and financial feasibility aspects and expressed the view that the canal 
project was both technically feasible and financially viable. (Business Line: Oct 16th 
2002). The report estimated a project cost of Rs. 60 crores, of which Rs. 31 crores was 
for canal work and Rs. 29 crores was for the creation of terminals for the operation of 
passenger and cargo ferries. However, it is important to note that the feasibility study 
excluded the cost of land and the cost of removing and resettling the squatter population 
from the canal banks.  
 
 
 197
 
Figure 6Proposed Ferry Route along Bagh Bazar Canal System 
 
 
(Map drafted by author) 
 
The project was planned to be implemented in two main phases. The first phase 
involved the dredging of the canals and the second phase involved the environmental 
improvement of the green belts on the canal banks, improving and widening the roads 
along the canals,  undertaking commercially viable development on the canal banks, 
building navigational infrastructure and operating passenger, cargo and leisure vessels. 
The eviction of informal settlers on the canal banks and the dredging of the canal was to 
be undertaken by the Irrigation and waterways Department of the Government of West 
Bengal with the cooperation of the various local governments through whose territory 
the canal system was passing. Following the clearing of the canal banks and the 
dredging a private developer would implement the second phase of the project on a 30 
years Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis. The developer would be responsible for 
creating the necessary infrastructure and recover the costs by operating directly or 
leasing out the operation of vessels (www.icici-winfra.com). 
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 The passenger transportation was proposed both for urban commuters (e.g. between the 
upcoming New Town at Rajarhat and Salt Lake/North Kolkata) and for longer routes 
stretching up to Kulti in the east. Just as Prof. Whitelegg’s assessment had also hoped, 
the project aimed at integrating the canal route into a multi-modal transport system. The 
proposed Chitpur terminal of the North canal passenger route would be within a 
distance of 100 meters from the Shovabazar station of the metro rail and the Baghbazar 
station of the circular rail system. Leisure vessels were proposed to be operated to the 
east of the busy corridor between Chitpur and Rajarhat. 
 
The cargo movement would begin by bringing fresh vegetables and other farm products 
into Kolkata from the countryside and taking building materials, finished products out 
from the city. The cargo movement was proposed during the night time and the 
passenger movement during the day. In the same year, the IWD took up a Rs. 200 crore 
loan from the Housing and Urban development Corporation of India (Hudco) to dredge 
some of the major canals of the city. The deadline for the project’s completion was set 
at May 2003. (The Times of India, Kolkata: 19th Oct, 2002). The dredging of the 
remaining stretches of the Baghbazar canal system were to be undertaken as part of this 
project.  
 
Despite, all these endeavours, practically nothing happened on the ground for the next 
two years. The political and human costs of evicting the informal settlers continued to 
haunt the implementation process. In 2002, many parts of Kolkata got flooded again 
after the first showers of monsoon. This initiated a fresh round of blame-game between 
the KMC and the IWD over the issue of drainage and canal dredging. The KMC 
officials claimed that they had done their part by upgrading all the pumping stations. 
However, they warned, if the IWD failed to dredge the canals , then the filtered water 
supply of the KMC could get contaminated. Rajib Deb, Mayor-in-Council for Sewerage 
and Drainage, KMC, said, 
 
“We have repaired all the six faulty booster pumping stations in the city. Even if the 
water collects, it should be drained soon after. But now we are facing a strange 
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problem. Even after the water is drained out, the choked canals are forcing it back on 
the streets.” (The Times of India, Kolkata: 17th June 2002)  
 
Ganesh Chandra Mandol, the Minister of State for Irrigation and Waterways replied by 
saying, that the clearing of the silt would require a high powered dredging machine, 
which the department couldn’t afford at that moment. The Minister expressed the wish 
to have an urgent meeting with KMC mayor Subhash Mukherjee to work out a solution. 
On September, 2002, a high level meeting was organised to address the issue of canal 
improvement. The meeting was attended by Irrigation Minister Amarendralal Roy; 
Minister of State for Irrigation, Ganesh Mandol; Transport Minister Subhash 
Chakrabarty; and Mayor-in-Council of KMC for Sewerage and Drainage, Rajib Deb. 
 
The participants of the meeting reached a decision, that the informal settlers living along 
the 8 kilometer stretch of the Keshtopur and Beleghata canals and numbering upto about 
16000 persons, would be evicted by the month of November. The concluding remark by 
the participants was as follows, 
 
“A Rs 150 crore project taken up in 2000 to clear the city’s waterways has been 
delayed because of encroachments. Costs have now escalated to Rs 200 crore. de-
silting, dredging and excavation work along the canals have not been possible. Now we 
are determined to remove the squatters.” (The Telegraph, Kolkata: 20th Sep2002) 
 
The eviction and the dredging, was going to be a joint effort of the IWD, which is a 
department of the left front controlled State Government and the KMC, which was 
controlled by the rival Trinamool Congress Party (TMC). This collaboration, for the 
purpose of eviction and environmental improvement created conflicts within the ranks 
of both the left front and the TMC. The latter had always used anti-eviction campaigns, 
primarily organised by its associated activist organisations such as the Hawker Sangram 
Committee (Hawkers’ Resistance Committee) and Uchhed Birodhi Mancha (Anti-
Eviction Forum), as a political strategy against the ruling left front. 
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However, in this case, the Mayor of KMC, who was himself a prominent leader of the 
TMC, was at the very front of an alliance with the State Government to undertake a 
massive eviction drive. Similarly, the Kolkata unit of the left front started applying 
pressure on the Government to offer some sort of trans-shipment package for the 16000 
odd informal settlers living along the canal. The Uchhed Birodhi Mancha, on the other 
hand, was totally against any eviction at all. 
 
Though, the canal bank settlers live on the very fringes of the municipal wards, most of 
them are active during state assembly and municipal elections, both by voting and 
campaigning. Considering the active political participation by the informal settlers and 
the fact that almost all the wards along the stretches of the canal, where these 
settlements are concentrated, are controlled by the left front, the TMC certainly stood to 
gain if it could successfully mobilise the people against eviction.  
 
Initially, the date for the eviction was decided to be October 22, 2002. The local 
councilors of the wards along Canal East Road and the urban units of the Left-Front 
insisted, that the eviction drive be deferred till after the Durga puja and the month of the 
Ramzan, which are the two major religious events of the Hindus and Muslims 
respectively. The postponement was also for the sake of 81 tenth-standard students in 
the informal settlements, who had to take a very important examination during that 
period and the community of idol-makers who would lose out on their main season of 
work if evicted at that time. The eviction re-scheduled to the 10th of December i.e. after 
the Ramzan, as a result of these discussions. The date was decided at a meeting attended 
by representatives of KMC, KMDA, IWD and the Urban Development department. 
Regarding the trans-shipment package the Urban Development Minister Ashok 
Bhattacharya said, 
 
“On humanitarian grounds, we may pay Rs 2000 to 2500 to the 4500 odd families 
living in the hutments.” (The Times of India, Kolkata: 22nd Oct, 2002) 
 
 201
The irrigation Minister Amarendralal Roy emphasised that the delays had increased the 
cost of the project by 25 %. He also stressed that the loan from Hudco did not have a 
resettlement component. 
  
“Restoration of the canal was to have begun long time ago. Now the dates for the 
eviction have been fixed. We realise the human problems but we have to do this in the 
larger interest.” (The Times of India, Kolkata: 8th Nov. 2002) 
 
Subrata Mukherjee, the Mayor of KMC was utterly disappointed due to the delays in the 
improvement. He expressed his exasperation to the media through the following 
statement, 
 
“This is a complete betrayal of the people of Kolkata. Just for the sake of a few, they 
are playing with the lives of millions of residents of the city. I have said repeatedly, that 
the canal clean up process should be now or never. If the eviction process is not taken 
up immediately, no one should blame us if streets remain waterlogged or people die due 
to malaria.” (The Times of India, Kolkata: 19th Oct, 2002) 
 
The moment the date of eviction was finalised, the Uchhed Birodhi Mancha tried to 
organise the informal settlers to resist the eviction drive. Shaktiman Ghosh, a prominent 
activist in the organisation told the journalists present, that “the settlers are ready to be 
smashed by bull-dozers, but are not ready to leave their homes before the authorities 
provide them with proper rehabilitation.” (The Telegraph: 9th Dec, 2002) 
 
The authorities showed no signs of changing their plans. The joint action by the various 
agencies was aimed at cleaning the 4.5 km stretch from Beleghata to the R.G. Kar 
medical college in the north. Four contingents of the Rapid Action Force (RAF) riot 
police and lots of normal police were present to assist in the eviction process. Sanjoy 
Mukherjee, Deputy Commissioner, Eastern Suburban Division, told the journalists 
present that the police was not expecting any major resistance against the drive. (The 
Telegraph, Kolkata: 10th Dec, 2002) 
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The payloaders went into action in the morning of 10th December. After the hutments 
along a 2.5 km stretch were demolished, some of the hutments were set afire by the 
people. The eviction drive went on for six hours. Shaktiman Ghosh was present during 
the eviction. Only two human rights groups were present during the drive. One was the 
Uchhed Birodhi Mancha and the other was the Association for protection of Democratic 
Rights. Despite all the threats of strong resistance to the drive, it was the prediction of 
the deputy commissioner that turned out to be true. This is how one journalist covering 
the drive described the interaction between the activist groups and the police, 
 
‘A quiet word from Deputy Commissioners Piyush Pandey (Detective Dept., Special) 
and Sanjoy Mukherjee, that there was enough force at hand and they being 
“gentlemen” should see reason, had the desired effect. After voting to resist demolition 
“at any cost”, both groups chickened out, with only 19 people courting arrest.’ (The 
Telegraph, Kolkata: 11th Dec, 2002)  
 
It was by pure co-incidence, that during my field work in Kolkata in 2005, I could meet 
and interview a person who was not connected to the canal project in any way, but had 
been an eye-witness of the eviction drive on 10th December 2002. The name of the 
young man was Bubai and he was the driver of the private taxi that I hired for a couple 
of days to go around the whole canal network and photograph its various stretches. 
While driving on the Canal east road, along the Circular Canal, he told me that on the 
day of the eviction drive he had driven by the same area on his way to meet a friend in 
Manicktala. This is how Bubai described what he saw, 
 
“What a terrible situation it was ! There was police everywhere...over the Manicktala 
bridge and on the Canal east Road. At around 8 am, large bulldozers started 
demolishing the hutments. At first, the settlers tried to stop the police...a verbal 
confrontation gave way to a physical one. But the demolition just continued. Household 
items were scattered all over the place. The children were scared and crying loudly. I 
felt so bad....so bad. But there was nothing to do. Later I learnt that the drive went on 
all the way till evening.” (Interview with Bubai: 2005) 
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The eviction drive was resumed on the next day. Starting at 9 am, it went on without 
any incidents for one and a half hours. After that lots of women and some children lay 
down in the path of the payloaders to stop them. The settlers started pelting the 
payloaders with stones. The RAF was brought in to control the situation. After the drive 
was completed, Piyush Pandey said that, “The job, undoubtedly, was tough, and we 
have completed the operation successfully. We demolished 1000 structures on 
Wednesday on the 1.3 km stretch from Manicktala thana to R.G. Kar hospital bridge. 
Now the 4.8 km stretch on both sides of the canal is clean.” (The Telegraph, Kolkata: 
12th Dec, 2002) 
 
The Uchhed Birodhi Mancha, through its council Bijon Ghosh, had sought an ex parte 
injunction with the Supreme Court of India, restraining the state government and its 
agents from proceeding with the eviction. The Supreme Court directed the organisation 
to move the Kolkata High Court against the eviction of an estimated 5000 families on 
Canal east and Canal west roads. (ibid.) 
 
As had become a routine affair in the city, Kolkata got flooded yet again in 2003 
causing great inconvenience to the citizens. This time the flooding happened before the 
monsoons arrived, causing worries that the suburb of Salt Lake would face serious 
problems if the Keshtopur canal was not dredged soon. According to Amerandralal Roy, 
“The encroachment problem along the banks of the Keshtopur canal has to be resolved 
first. Once the ongoing dredging of Beleghata canal is completed, the programme will 
be taken up for Keshtopur canal.” (The Telegraph, Kolkata: 16th June 2003). 
 
The Salt Lake Municipality, which is the second most important local government after 
the KMC in the Kolkata Metropolitan Area had been under the control of the left front 
in 2003, but the number of wards under the left front and the opposition was almost 
equal. the left front and allies controlled 12 wards, while the opposition controlled 11. 
The opposition had always blamed the left front for having used unfair tactics to win the 
one extra ward, though, that allegation could not be confirmed. In this tense and 
precariously power balance of the Salt Lake Municipality, the continuous delay in the 
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implementation of the canal dredging gave the opposition a very good opportunity to 
criticise the left front leadership in the local government.  
 
Apart from the massive problems of poor drainage and flooding the stagnant canal also 
created a huge mosquito menace for the residential blocks in Salt Lake which lay 
adjacent to it. This also led to waste of resources. In 2003 Rs 12 lakhs were allotted by 
the Municipality to Malaria control medicine and to spray Pyrethrum. In the winter 
months it became almost impossible to walk along the canal due to the stench and the 
mosquitoes. 
 
In July 2003, the Salt Lake authorities decided to undertake the largest eviction drive in 
the history of the township. The aim of this drive was to check the mushrooming of 
informal settlements in and around the planned suburb. Apart from the direct connection 
to the canal dredging project, this drive was also demanded by the various residents’ 
welfare associations of the suburb, who alleged that the growth of informal settlements 
was increasing the crime wave in the area. Six teams were to undertake the drive, 
accompanied by a magistrate and a senior police officer. A total of 1000 hutments were 
to be demolished.  (The Telegraph, Kolkata: 29th July 2003) 
 
It was in the same year, that the residents’ welfare associations of three residential 
blocks of Salt Lake filed complaints to the West Bengal Pollution Control Board 
regarding the failure to dredge the Keshtopur canal. They were assisted by Justice 
Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee of the Kolkata High Court, who is also a resident of Salt 
Lake. (Interviews with Justice Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee: 28th June 2005; and Sudhir 
Dey, Editor of Salt Lake News: 1st July 2005) 
 
Despite this massive eviction drive and the demands by the citizens of Salt Lake, the 
plans to dredge the North Canal couldn’t be activated until January 2004. The plan 
could be activated, when the West Bengal Housing and Infrastructure Development 
Corporation (Hidco) stepped in with financial contributions for the project. Hidco was 
set up as a government company in 1999 with the immediate purpose of developing a 
residential and industrial hub called the ‘New Town’ to the east of the existing suburb 
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of Salt lake. In the long run, the dredging of the Keshtopur canal would benefit the New 
Town both as a water transport route and a source of fresh water for its residents. 
However, the immediate interest of Hidco was the fact, that the silt dredged from the 
Keshtopur canal could be used for the extensive land-filling that was required for the 
development of the New Town. (Interview with Sudhir Dey, Editor of Salt Lake News: 
1st July 2005) 
 
It was planned that the IWD will undertake the dredging and improvement of a 10 km 
stretch of the canal from Baghbazar to Keshtopur and Hidco would undertake the same 
tasks for a 20.5 km stretch of the canal from Keshtopur to Bhojerhat. It was estimated 
that approximately 1000 informal settlers would have to be evicted for the dredging. 
(The Telegraph, Kolkata, 16th Jan 2004) in the first phase of the eviction the settlers on 
the stretch between Nayapatti in Salt Lake ward number 14 and Baisakhi in Salt Lake 
ward number 9 were evicted. In the second phase, another 400 hutments were 
demolished in Ward 14. (Laban Hrad Sambad: 24th March 2004) 
 
The dredging of the North Canal got into trouble right from the start. In the month of 
April, the dredging was called off as a result of the collapse of the guard wall at Chitpur 
and damaging of the embankment at Salt Lake. Ganesh Mandol, Minister of State for 
Irrigation, told the media that the severe north-westerly winds that had hit the city were 
responsible for these damages.  According to the IWD, there was hardly any possibility 
of resuming the work before the monsoon were over (The Times of India, Kolkata: 20th 
March, 2004)  
 
In August 2004, the issue of the dredging of the North Canal was taken up by a high 
level meeting attended by the Chief Minister, the Urban Development Minister, the 
Public Health Engineering Minister, the Minister of State for Irrigation and the 
Transport Minister. This meeting gave another thrust to the North Canal  reclamation 
project. However, the dredging didn’t resume until December 2004. The Left-Front 
councilors of the Salt Lake municipality kept stressing that the dredging process will 
continue very soon, but the opposition councilors of the TMC alleged that it had 
become a trend to start the dredging early on every year to silence the critics, and then 
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abandon it at the onset of the monsoons (Interviews with Anita Mandol, councilor 
(TMC), Salt Lake Ward no. 11 and Tulsi Sinha Roy, councilor (TMC), Salt Lake ward 
no. 12: 16th November, 2004).  
 
The dredging of the Beleghata and Circular canal got completed by the beginning of 
2005. Following the dredging the improvement of the canal banks and the widening of 
the canal east and West roads was initiated in the summer of the same year. The 
widening of the roads was to be undertaken by the Kolkata Metropolitan Development 
Authority (KMDA) at a total cost of Rs 545 Lakhs. Out of this total amount Rs 200 
lakhs was to be contributed by the Kolkata Municipal Corporation (KMC) and the 
remaining was to be provided by an agency called Hooghly River Bridge 
Commissioners, through funds borrowed from the Japan Bank of International 
Cooperation (JBIC). The project technicalities were worked out jointly by the KMC and 
the KMDA. It was decided, that after the improvement of the roads they will be main-
tained by the KMC. The street lights would be arranged by the KMC and the 
advertisement rights would also go to them. The project got completed in the beginning 
of 2006. 
 
On August 15th of 2005, a project was launched to beautify the banks on either side of 
the Beleghata canal. The project was to cover an 18 km stretch on either side of the 
canal, including the Canal East and West roads and the Chawalpatti road. The tasks 
included planting of trees and development of children’s parks. The total cost of the 
project was Rs 73 lakhs and the funding was provided by the Department of 
Environment, through the West Bengal Pollution Control Board. The duration of the 
project was to be three months. 
 
The dredging was completed in early 2006. The 8th of August 2006, was an extremely 
important day in the history of the Bagh Bazar canal system, as it was the day on which 
a trial run of two launches was to be conducted after many years. The larger launch 
called ‘MV Durga’ carried the important officials and political leaders involved with the 
reclamation project and the smaller one called ‘MV Niharika’ carried the journalists. 
The passengers of neither launch expected the unpleasant surprises that awaited them on 
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the trial run. Both the launches got stuck on the way from Chitpur to Salt Lake. The first 
launch got stuck close to the Ulta Danga railway station and it was impossible to turn it 
around. The second launch turned back, but also got stuck close to the R.G. Kar medical 
college. After waiting 40 minutes the passengers of the first launch tried to reach the 
canal bank using a wooden plank. According to one journalist, ‘the VIPs made quite a 
picture, clutching on to their dhotis and hopping on to the ground from the wooden 
plank with great relief. Hundreds of spectators from the shanties, including many 
children, cheered and clapped.’ (The Telegraph, Kolkata: 9th August 2006)  
 
The unfortunate incident created a furore, as everyone started blaming the IWD, which 
was responsible for dredging that stretch of the canal system and had confirmed that the 
process had been completed. In the words of one Hidco official, 
“The launches got stuck due to low depth. The excavation work was not carried out 
properly. The irrigation department was reponsible for de-silting the canal and 
repairing the lock gates.” (ibid.) 
 
The average depth of the canal, after the dredging, should have been 8 feet, but it was 
alleged that the average depth was no more than 5 feet and at some points it became as 
less as 2 feet. (ibid.) 
 
After this incident, the plan to start the launch service on North Canal remained 
suspended for almost one year. The irrigation department tried to rectify the errors left 
from the dredging project. Finally, on 5th August 2007, the service could be resumed 
again. This time, the launches used were much smaller. 
 
According to Sadhan Das, former irrigation secretary and technical advisor to Hidco, 
“The launch used in the trial run was too big and heavy for Keshtopur canal. The 63 
feet long vessel was of the type that plies in the Sundarbans. This time we are deploying 
42 feet long launches which can carry 50 passengers each.” (The Telegraph, Kolkata: 
25th July, 2007). 
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The West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation, a state government undertaken 
corporation , was given the contract for operating the service.   
9.5 From Simplistic Conclusions to Deepening Questions 
This chronological account of the projects provides us with extremely interesting 
insights into the overall process of planning and implementation and also raises many 
questions. The first glaring observation is the complete absence of any mechanism for 
participation of either the informal settlers living on the canal banks, or the middle and 
upper income residents in the formal neighbourhoods along the canal system. Most of 
the decisions were taken at high level meetings, where there was a strong representation 
of project authorities, line departments and the local government, but which precluded 
any kind of active citizen participation or control. 
 
There were no public meetings, hearings, citizen consultations or grievance redressals 
of any kind. Even when it concerned serious human rights issues such as the eviction of 
thousands of poor families from the only land they could occupy close to their sources 
of livelihood, these were overwhelmed by quick decisions and stern official rhetoric. 
The absence of mechanisms for participation and the extent and nature of the eviction 
drives in 2002 and 2003 hint at the complete exclusion of the poor from the planning 
and implementation of such large development projects and their utter powerlessness in 
the face of such events. 
 
Yet, this conclusion, which is both easy and tempting to reach in the context of such 
projects in cities of developing countries, hides a serious anomaly. Throughout the 
history of the projects, and even before they started, it was acknowledged by the 
concerned government departments and ministers that the major obstruction in the path 
of improving and reclaiming the canals were the informal settlers. For many years, these 
abjectly poor, excluded and powerless people successfully frustrated all the efforts of 
the various bureaucratic departments of the state government to evict them and dredge 
the canals. Some ‘powerlessness’ that must have been ! 
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Let us consider another observation. The ruthless eviction drive along the Circular and 
Beleghata canals was undertaken in December 2002. Subsequent to that, the largest 
eviction drive in the history of Salt Lake township was undertaken in July 2003. Yet, 
during my field work in Kolkata in 2004, I saw large concentrations of informal settlers 
both along the Circular canal and the Keshtopur canal. I was even more surprised, when 
I returned to Kolkata for the second phase of my field work in 2005, and still found 
more or less the same clusters standing along the canal banks. I am writing ‘more or 
less’, because it was clear that sporadic eviction drives had happened between 2004 and 
2005. But still, the major clusters were present. 
 
How had this happened ? How did the dredging get completed and yet, so many 
informal settlers continue to inhabit the canal banks? What were the methods they used 
to deal with the eviction drives ? How did they perceive this massive development 
project and how did they prepare for it ? These were some of the questions that 
automatically arise from the above observations. Answering these questions would also 
throw light on the way in which the local institutions empowered by democratic 
decentralisation processes try to be responsive to the poor in the face of such large 
development projects. This is what I shall attempt to do in the following sections. 
9.6 The Improvement Process - In the Informal Resident’s 
Words 
One of the first things I did was to take long walks along the whole Baghbazar canal 
system, starting with that particular area, which was the site of the most intense 
confrontation between the informal settlers and the project authorities. Before 
proceeding with the details of the field observations I would like to present an 
unplanned but very revealing encounter that I had on one of my reconnaissance walks 
on the canal east road. Though this encounter happened in the second phase of my field 
work i.e. in 2005, it is worthwhile to present this right at the start, as it summarises in 
the words of an informal settler herself the complexities and dilemmas involved in the 
canal improvement project.  
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It was late afternoon, when I set out for the site of confrontation - the stretch of the 
Canal East Road between Manicktala Bridge and Altadena Bridge.  
 
As I walked to the center of the Manitoba bridge I was stunned by the view of the canal 
and its banks. Instead of a view of thousands of shanties crowding along the canal bank 
and encroaching almost half of the two roads that run adjacent to it, I saw a wide, 
spacious road and an equally impressive footpath lit brightly by powerful sodium lamps. 
A magician of urban development seemed to have waved his wand and the ever-
predictable sight of abject poverty along the roads and canals of the city had completely 
disappeared from this stretch of the Circular Canal.  
 
As I walked down that bridge and started walking along the Canal East Road, I started 
seeing the other details of the landscape, which had not been revealed in the ‘zoomed-
out’ view from on top of the bridge. I saw families and groups of people huddled 
together around cooking-stoves along the canal bank. As I walked on towards 
Narkeldanga bridge, the number of huddled groups kept increasing. It was around eight 
in the evening and the cooking had started. The intoxicating smell of boiling rice 
seemed to create a festive atmosphere among the huddled people. Children clung on the 
back of their mothers looking with anticipation at the rice pots and hearing the 
appetizing gurgling sound of food getting ready. The old chatted and smoked. Many 
young men slept deeply on top of their cycle-rickshaw vans3 in such positions of 
exhaustion and heat related undress, that they seemed to become a veritable supply of 
free male models for a nude sculptor. At some places the children huddled around the 
old listening to stories. It seemed from the way they crouched even when they sat that 
their bodies had not yet got accustomed to the sudden exposure of becoming roof-less 
and wall-less. But the fact that they were not rice-less as yet was very evident from the 
number of stoves and smiling faces. 
 
                                                 
3  A modified version of the cycle-rickshaw used to transport machine parts, furniture etc. The van 
drivers are hired on a daily wage basis by the many motor vehicle units on the Canal East Road. 
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I felt that the magician’s wand had not had a perfect effect. The landscape had not been 
wiped as clean as it looked from the bridge. Like a dusty floor being cleaned with a 
broom on a breezy afternoon, the dust left the ground, floated around for a while and 
then seemed to settle again on the very same spot. This world of huddled, homeless 
people seemed like a parallel and different world, though it existed in such spatial 
proximity to the bulldozers and the cement mixers that all this could be shown together 
in any GIS program only through overlays.  
 
I walked over the footpath and went totally to the edge of the canal and looked at its 
dark waters. The sodium lamps didn’t light up its waters and the canal looked like a 
mute witness to the drama unfolding on its banks, though all of that was formally done 
in its name.  
 
It is when I was contemplating the rather quick revelation of these three worlds of 
sleeping bulldozers, rice-awaiting huddled people and a very slow moving, complacent 
canal, when the perfect question came from behind me. 
 
‘Ki dekhchhen Babu ?” (“What are you looking at Babu ?”) 
 
I was a bit startled by the question suddenly emerging from behind me as I was staring 
into the darkness of the murky waters of the Circular Canal as it barely flowed by under 
the Maniktala bridge. I felt no alarm, as there was more warmth and calmness in that 
feminine voice than a paranoid challenge to a possibly antagonistic intruder from the 
upper classes. Evidently a footpath dweller on the Canal East Road, she was dressed in 
an old sari which also partially covered the body of the naked baby she was breast-
feeding. The baby suckled on in eternal safety, completely oblivious to the magic of 
urban development that was unfolding all along the Baghbazar canal system. The accent 
in which the woman spoke Bengali and the bright, golden ear-rings that she wore even 
in the midst of obvious poverty, suggested to me that she was Muslim. 
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“Well…just looking around”, I replied. “I had been reading and hearing about the 
improvement projects going on along the canal bank, so I just came by to see how it is 
going on.” 
 
“What is there to see Babu ?…Just look at our condition. Our homes were pulled down 
and burnt so long ago. Ever since then we have been living under the open sky like 
this.” 
 
“Have you lived on the canal bank all your life?” 
 
“Yes, I have lived here all my life…I was born here. I have no home at all anywhere 
else. Many of the families living on the canal bank have some land of their own 
somewhere or the other…we have nothing at all. It’s the same situation for the twelve 
families that you see living close to us here.” 
 
As I saw no sign of a shelter of any kind at all, I asked her how long these families have 
been living like this. 
 
“It has been three years now…they came and told us that we must move away from here 
as the whole road will get repaired. We got a lot of time to plan what to do…almost one 
and a half to two months. After that our homes were torn down…but we had nowhere to 
go…we just lingered on here. The police tried various methods to remove us. Once they 
came and snatched away the only pot I have for making rice. Our temporary shelter was 
burnt down…the police came and harassed us every now and then. One day they came 
and sawed off the wheel of the cycle-rickshaw van that my husband drives and beat him 
up…the children got scared and then they took him to the police lock-up.” 
 
She pointed to the man who seemed to be sleeping so deeply on his rickshaw van, that 
the sight alone could make the word ‘insomnia’ extinct.  
 
“Have you been living like this for the last three years ?” 
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“Yes….just look at the condition of my children. I have three daughters and one son. 
Don’t we wish to feed and clothe our children well too…to give them a good education, 
let them grow up like human beings ?…I get tears in my eyes when I think of them.” 
 
Her eyes had indeed moistened at these words and her voice choked, but her ever-
present calm smile remained. Her two daughters who had been standing close to us for a 
while were, however, in a rather different mood. They looked at me with wide open 
eyes and a very amusing expression on their faces. They smiled brightly. The elder was 
about ten years old and the younger was four.  
 
“What is your name?”, I asked the elder one.  
 “Gulab Jaan Khatoun”, said she. 
“Oh my! What a grand name ! Like a Mughal princess !” 
 
The girls almost dissolved in their own blushing and giggling, and the mother smiled 
brighter than ever. And I was feeling genuinely warm and relaxed in their company too. 
I found out that the younger daughter had an equally pretty name – Yasmeen. And the 
mother was called Shaheeda (the feminine form of the  arabic word – martyr). 
 
When I saw the children my curiosity about how they tackled the monsoon in their 
present condition increased. Also, it would be worthwhile to mention here that my first 
attempted visit to the area two days earlier got foiled at Maniktala crossing itself due to 
a massive thunderstorm. Strokes of lightening streaked all over the sky and booming 
bolts of thunder seemed to strike just a few meters above my head. Rather than visiting 
the field, my prime mission on that day turned into reaching home before getting struck 
down by one of the lightening-bombs or turning deaf from the noise or simply 
becoming a nervous wreck with a PhD largely incomplete. 
 
Shaheeda’s reply, on the other hand, had none of the panic that is reflected from my 
own description above.  
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“It is a big problem during rain and storm. Sometime ago there was a wonderful 
watchman in one of the factory units across the road…he was like a God. One night 
when the rains started, he came and told us, that though he wouldn’t be able to give all 
of us shelter, he couldn’t bear the thought of the children being left in the open. He let 
the children stay with him in his little room. He took their wet clothes off and wrapped 
them in his own blanket. The children survived because of him. But he doesn’t work 
here anymore…may God watch over him wherever he is. At other times we just have to 
create some cover using our vans and polythene sheets or just use any shelter that’s 
available.” 
 
“Did you get any kind of compensation at all? Has there been any talk of resettling you 
somewhere else?” 
 
“We had heard some talk”, she replied. “When we were being removed from this place, 
we heard that the Government is going to give 2000 rupees to every family. The 
families that had registered their names on the list got the money…but we were so 
confused…we didn’t know where to register and when. But it is true that many families 
got the money before they left to their homes in the village. We had also heard that we 
would be given land in Salt Lake. But we don’t know what happened to those plans 
afterwards. We don’t hear anything anymore.” 
 
“What did the local ward councilor do regarding all this ?” 
 
“The local councilor here is Dr. Subodh …‘chhee pee en’4. To tell you the truth, it is 
because of him that we are still able to live here on the canal bank. He speaks for us and 
prevents us from being totally removed. But he can’t do more than that. And yet….we 
have been voting all the years that we have lived here. Even during the last three years 
after being homeless. We still have our voter’s cards.”  
 
                                                 
4Most of the canal bank squatters I interviewed had their own ways of pronouncing CPM (Communist 
Party of India-Marxist). This was Shaheeda’s version.  
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“Did any other organization come forward to offer help ?” 
 
“One kind man…he lives on the other side of the canal…his name is Krishna Babu…he 
helped us a lot, sat down and listened to our problems. He said very clearly that he does 
not belong to any political party. Lot of people came on 15th August, the Independence 
Day, to listen to us about our problems and to speak for us. Krishna da5 gave me a 
phone number also!” 
 
Just when my curiosity was rising, hearing about the committed Krishna da, Shaheeda 
said, 
 
“But I think I have lost that phone number now…I have no contact with him any more. 
It would have been nice to meet him again.” 
 
I wondered what was so difficult in meeting a person who lived just on the other bank 
of the canal, but there was a clear tone of resignation in Shaheeda’s voice and I didn’t 
feel like disbelieving her. After all, it had already been proved to me many times over in 
the course of the conversation, that what was totally obvious in my world in the suburbs 
of Kolkata, was not at all obvious in the world of Shaheeda. Considering that, I was 
thankful enough that we could continue speaking like old friends. 
 
During the conversation I had become a bit curious about the role played by the scores 
of ‘motor-parts’ and ‘motor-servicing’ units and sheds that lined the Canal East Road, 
which employed most of the men of the canal bank families as contract-labourers. I 
asked Shaheeda about this. 
 
“No ! No !…they didn’t help us in any way at all ! On top of that, they have fired most 
of our men. They told us ‘You folks have been evicted now. You don’t have a home. 
What if we hire your men to transport the machine parts by your vans and then you just 
                                                 
5 da is a short form of dada which means elder brother in Bengali.  
 
 216
run away and disappear with them !’…Just imagine ! This is what they said ! Where on 
earth can we run ? That’s precisely what our problem is! We have no place to run !” 
 
“How long have you studied ?”, I asked Shaheeda. 
 
“Till class three.”, she replied and then added quickly, “But my children go to school 
regularly…they are studying in the Government school nearby.” 
 
I looked around at their demolished, marginal world on an environmentally upgraded 
foot-path and somehow tried to grasp the fact that had just been given to me by a proud 
mother. In the midst of this two girls were regularly setting out to school every morning. 
I couldn’t help remembering a discussion I had with a friend and researcher in the 
Faculty of Anthropology in my University in Norway, who told me in one of our chats 
that there was some discussion going on in Norwegian schools about banning ‘home-
work’, because it was felt to be a violation of the human rights of the children. Did the 
bull-dozer just wink at me ? 
 
Once again the wise Shaheeda brought my erratic thoughts back in focus. 
 
“Yasmeen, my dear, why don’t you recite the rhymes that you learnt in school ?” 
 
And then it started. The little Yasmeen stood on top of a cycle-van, with her mother, 
sister and the proud members of the twelve homeless families looking on, and started 
reciting one rhyme after another…as if digging and pulling them out of my own 
childhood memory. ‘Noton-noton Payraguli’ , ‘Baburam Shapure…kotha jaash 
bapure…’ and some other poems of Sukumar Ray6. 
 
                                                 
6 The noted poet, author and humorist, and father of film maker Satyajit Ray, who founded the ‘Nonsense 
Club’ in Kolkata and founded the style of nonsense rhymes in Bengali. In addition to that he wrote a 
fantastic Bengali version of ‘Alice in Wonderland’. 
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Not once did her memory slip. Not once did the smile disappear from her face. Within a 
few minutes the gathering had turned into a veritable poetry recitation session with 
requests coming in from the other families and me, and the little talented girl just going 
on and on. At the end we clapped and cheered at this performer, while she dissolved 
from her cycle-van stage into the arms of her mother.  
 
Now with two children in her arms, Shaheeda asked me if I could do something to help 
these families. There was not a streak of begging, complaining or sympathy-dragging in 
her voice. Just a very basic and humane request. 
 
“I am not involved with the project…I can only write about this now. I am studying 
about the project.” 
 
“So much has been written already Babu…what good is writing anymore.” 
 
I thought rapidly and tried to find out if after having studied urban planning for six 
years, and undertaking a PhD in a northern University, there was anything convincing 
and worthwhile I could do for this family at that moment. Apparently, it seemed to be 
my lucky day. 
 
“Would you like me to photograph you !” 
 
It seemed, that I could finally say something that excited the twelve families on the 
footpath. There was a sudden stir and people got up, got in order and started lining up 
for a joint-family photo shoot. On my part, I replied with as much seriousness and 
professionalism as I could. A fourteen year old labourer boy, obviously stoned and 
dressed only in torn shorts and a sooty scarf round his neck, decided to turn the scarf 
into a turban. The sisters held hands and Shaheeda reorganized her sari to cover up the 
patches. The lady who had been crushing spices and listening to our interviews 
critically, suddenly jumped in joy and frantically looked for water to clean her hands, 
which is no easy task despite living along an almost thirty meters wide canal. Yet, 
despite all the enthusiasm this ‘joint’ family seemed to be hesitant about something. 
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 The stoned boy staggered close to me and asked, 
 
“Dada…takata ki ekhuni dite hobe ?” 
(Big brother…are we supposed to pay you right away ?) 
 
Shaheeda with her own and her neighbour’s children 
 
(Photograph taken by author)  
 
I assured that they don’t have to pay at all. This assurance led first to disbelief, and then 
such an outburst of joy that it seemed mysterious that any project authority could have 
any possible difficulty in  accommodating the needs and demands of such incredibly 
easy-to-please people.  
 
I promised to Shaheeda and the rest, that I would come back and return the photos so 
they can cherish the time we spent together, and have at least one decent photo of their 
children and themselves. After a little while I bid farewell and started walking away 
from the canal and towards my world in the planned, upper-middle class suburbs of 
 219
Kolkata. I felt much better though. The promise to return the photographs seemed like a 
very credible resettlement and rehabilitation plan for families at that moment, and it 
certainly seemed to satisfy the requirements of citizen participation and enthusiastic 
involvement. 
 
After a few days, I went to return the photos to Shaheeda. I went at around ten in the 
morning and found none of the familiar faces in the area. The cycle vans were still silent 
but the bull-dozers, trucks and cement mixers had woken up. I saw another Muslim 
family standing around a cycle-van on the other side of the road and asked them if they 
knew Shaheeda. They smiled and welcomed me and said that they knew Shaheeda very 
well. But it would be impossible to find her now because she had gone to the market to 
work. They had a lot of fun seeing the photos and recognising the various people in the 
photo. I continued with the good work and took their photos too, which again produced 
a wave of excitement and joy. 
 
Then I asked them, “What if I can’t come back to you before I go back to Norway ? It 
would then take at least one year, before I come back and give you the photos.” 
 
The old man of the family replied with a laugh, “Worry not Babu ! We have been 
evicted before ! We will handle it. Inshallah we will hold on to our land.” 
9.7 Leads from Shaheeda’s Account  
Many interesting and informative points came out of that conversation. The first 
noticeable thing was that even after three years of the massive eviction drive, quite a 
few informal settlers still lived on the Canal East Road, albeit in an even more 
vulnerable situation than before. Secondly, Shaheeda didn’t feel that the eviction drive 
happened out of the blue, without giving adequate time between the announcement and 
the actual eviction. Despite all the hardships her family was suffering from, she 
demonstrated an incredible fortitude and maturity by understanding the limitations of 
the Government also.  
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Thirdly, the informal settlers have responded in diverse ways to the eviction drive. 
Many of the residents had the rest of their extended families in the countryside. After 
the eviction, these people moved back to their respective villages and waited for a better 
opportunity to return. In my later interviews in the same area I learnt that many of the 
residents on Canal east road have their ancestral homes in the Sundarbans area. Some of 
the families shifted to other parts of the city. The third category is of people like 
Shaheeda, for whom the canal bank is the only home, and moving to a different location 
is not a feasible option considering the necessary tasks of earning a living and getting 
their children educated. To prioritise the education of their children in such extreme 
circumstances itself was a remarkable characteristic of Shaheeda’s family. 
 
Regarding support structures in times of distress, Shaheeda mentioned the important 
role played by the local councillor (municipal ward number 29), Subodh Kumar Dey, of 
the All India Forward Bloc (a member of the Left Front coalition), and the 
compassionate acts of individuals such as the watchman and Krishna da. Neither 
Shaheeda nor any of the other people present during the conversation mentioned 
anything about the Uchhed Birodhi Mancha or the Association for Protection of 
Democratic Rights. 
 
There was considerable solidarity among the families still staying on that stretch of the 
canal east road. This was evident from the behaviour of the families towards one 
another during my interactions with them and from the way in which Shaheeda’s canal 
bank neighbour recognised her and her children when I showed him the photographs on 
my second visit. A very important observation was the joyful and confident manner in 
which this same man said, that the people would continue to live on the canal bank in 
the years to come.  
 
Certainly this showed a more complex picture than what I had gathered from the 
secondary sources. Rather than the project happening in clear stages, the various stages 
of the project seemed to overlap. Ideally, according to the plan of the project authorities, 
the canal banks should be completely cleared of all encroachments before initiating the 
dredging process. Following the dredging, the beautification of the green belt along the 
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canal and the widening of Canal East and Canal West roads was to be undertaken. 
However, in reality the dredging process was going on while a substantial number of 
informal settlers continued to reside on various stretches of the canal system, and, as I 
was to discover subsequently in through my investigations, the green belt beautification, 
road widening and even the trial run of launches was initiated without the full eviction 
of informal settlers and even without the completion of the dredging. 
 
Family in informal settlement along Circular canal 
 
(Photograph taken by author) 
 
In order to undertake my detailed field observations and interviews I decided to focus 
on a particular section of the Bagh Bazar canal system - the stretch of the Keshtopur 
canal which flows along the northern edge of the township of Salt Lake. It was not just 
due to the limitations of time and man-power that I decided to narrow the study area. 
Though the severest evictions of informal canal bank settlers had not happened in this 
stretch of the Keshtopur canal, the processes happening here are more revealing than the 
overt and violent confrontations between the settlers and the police along the Circular 
canal.  
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 It is along this stretch of Keshtopur canal that the new ferry route connecting the 
Chitpur lock in the west and the emerging mega-city of ‘New Town’ in the east has 
been proposed. This section of the Bagh Bazaar system passes through that west-east 
axis of the city of Kolkata where most of the planned interventions in the recent past 
have occured (e.g. development of Salt Lake township and the Eastern Metropolitan 
Bypass) and are going to occur in the future (e.g. development of IT industries in the 
eastern sectors of Salt Lake and the development of the ‘New Town’). The spatial 
manifestation of the emerging development trends and priorities in the city of Kolkata 
shall happen most strongly and visibly along this axis of the city. Focussing on this 
stretch, therefore, provides a good opportunity to study such trends at the time when 
they are emerging. 
 
The field interactions mainly took the form of open-ended interviews and group 
discussions with residents of the informal settlements along the canal, residents of the 
middle-class neighbourhoods bordering the canal and officials and elected councilors of 
the municipal wards bordering the canal. 
9.8 Counter-Eviction Strategies of the Informal Settlers along 
Keshtopur Canal 
Despite involuntary evictions being such an intrinsic component of the canal 
improvement projects, the informal settlers living on the banks of these canals have 
always had to live with the perennial fear of eviction. In fact, their whole mode of living 
and working is shaped by this sword of Damocles. Yet, the nature of evictions being 
undertaken as part of the canal improvement projects are bound to be different from the 
typical and continual eviction drives that the informal settlers are used to. In this section 
the various counter-eviction strategies used by the informal settlers living along the 
Baghbazar canal system shall be described. 
 
The first thing I noticed in my interviews with the informal settlers, was the casual 
manner in which they described the many eviction drives that they have lived through 
over the years. Undoubtedly such eviction and demolition drives are incredibly ruthless 
 223
by their very nature, but the descriptions by the settlers themselves contained none of 
the despair, agony and bursting anger which colour much of the accounts of such drives 
in the mainstream media and in the websites and blogs of human rights agencies.  
 
The informal settlers are acutely aware of the paradoxical relationship they have with 
the bureaucratic line departments (who are often the owners of the land which they 
occupy for setting up their shanties), the local government, the local ward office and the 
upper- and middle-class residents who live a stone’s throw away. The green belt along 
the Keshtopur canal, for example, is jointly owned by the Department of Forestry and 
the Irrigation and Waterways Department. This paradoxical relationship that binds them 
to the very urban actors who seek to directly or indirectly evict them from their homes, 
actually provides the informal settlers the many strategies with which to out-smart the 
eviction drives. The nature of the counter-eviction strategies depends on a number of 
factors, such as the location of the informal settlement, size and density of the 
settlement, the degree to which the formal residential settlements adjacent to it have 
been developed in a planned way (the better planned they are, the easier for the informal 
settlements to be spotted and also easier for the bulldozers and the police to find their 
way to carry out the demolitions), the occupational composition of the informal settlers 
and, of course, the particular external opportunity available at the local level. 
 
Interestingly, after the well planned (at least by Kolkata standards) township of Salt 
Lake was established, the main offices of many of the government departments, which 
are associated with the canal improvement projects, were shifted here. The officials 
employed by these departments took up residence in the residential zones of the 
township. To the informal settlers living along  Keshtopur canal, many of whom work 
as household helpers and cleaners, this meant a unique opportunity to have a direct 
access to the very kitchens, living rooms and even bed-rooms of those very officers who 
were drawing up the plans and working out the details of the improvement projects and 
the eviction drives. This opportunity was used by many informal settlers to gather prior 
information about planned eviction drives and also as a way to arrange a kind of 
informal security of tenure. Along a 1.5 kilometre stretch of the Kesthopur canal, 
bordering the northern edge of the Salt Lake township, the informal settlers have 
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constructed their shanties by attaching them to the rear walls of the houses of a 
particular residential block which houses the surveyors and engineers of the urban 
development department who were involved with the planning and construction of the 
township itself. The informal settlers work as household helpers for the families living 
in this block, and the latter, in turn, use their official contacts to ensure that the former 
don’t get evicted from the canal bank. Attaching the shanty to the rear wall of the 
houses also gives an impression, that these are a kind of servant quarters attached to the 
main building. 
 
This is how Lathika Sarkar, one of the informal settlers who lives on the canal bank 
according to this arrangement, described the situation, 
 
“The babu7 who owns the house in front has arranged everything for me. I have just 
arrived here three months back from my village. My sister had come earlier and 
works as a construction worker. It was she who built a cement plinth for my 
hut...otherwise it would have been difficult to stay here. The babu told the local 
police right on the first day not to threaten or bother me in any way.” (Interview 
with Lathika Sarkar, July, 2005). 
 
The other way of arranging such informal security of tenure is through direct of indirect 
negotiations with the political party of the councillor in power in the particular ward. 
The residents of the Baisakhi Kheyapar informal settlement, (located along the 
Keshtopur canal almost at the middle of the northern edge of the Salt lake township) 
live on the canal bank based on such an arrangement. The population of this cluster has 
a mixed Hindu and Muslim population, the latter comprising of extremely poor seasonal 
migrants from Bangladesh who stay in the cluster few months at a time and work with 
garbage collection and segregation. Another important occupation of the men and 
women of the cluster is to set up mobile, road-side tea and snacks stalls. Though the 
                                                 
7 A term in the Bengali language used for an educated person of good social standing, 
but used by the informal settlers both with a tinge of sarcasm and contempt and with 
genuine respect, depending on the nature of interaction with the upper- and middle-
class residents. 
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cluster itself is located on the northern bank of the Keshtopur canal, many of the stalls 
are located on the southern bank. This effectively means that the place of living and 
working of these people lies in two different municipal areas, viz. the Rajarhat-
Gopalpur Municipality to the north and the Salt Lake municipality to the south. The 
place of residence i.e. the informal settlement itself is protected through an arrangement 
with a local neighbourhood club, called the Shiv-Kali club, which is strongly affiliated 
to the CPM.  
 
Baisakhi Kheyapar Informal Settlement 
 
(Photograph taken by author) 
 
The arrangement with the club is not discussed openly by the residents. After a long 
conversation, a resident of the settlement called Meena Ghosh gave me a description of 
the arrangement, 
 
“To tell you the truth, all the residents have to pay a one time fee to the Shiv-Kali club, 
which is located in the Keshtopur neighbourhood in the Rajarhat-Gopalpur 
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municipality. When I settled here four years back, I had to pay Rs. 3000. The fee must 
have increased to about Rs. 5000 - 6000. The club works for the CPM. We are all very 
active during the elections to vote for the party.”  (Interview with Meena Ghosh, Oct., 
2004) 
 
Initially, the residents had been given the hope, that if they stayed politically active in 
favour of the CPM, then their settlement would be granted formal recognition. Meena 
had herself been very active politically till some years back. She said, 
 
“I encouraged the residents to vote. In the last elections we voted like hell ! We cast as 
many proxy votes as we could...sometimes 20 to 25 votes per person on a single day. 
But after the elections nothing really happened. Now my neighbours make fun of me. 
They laugh and say...What happened Meena? You are not campaigning for the party 
anymore?” (ibid.) 
 
Despite all the problems of such an informal arrangement, Meena also mentioned the 
positive aspects. 
 
“It is a hard life without any kind of civic amenities. But we don’t have to pay any rent 
at all. Moreover, so many people in the settlement are involved with garbage collection 
and segregation...how can they possibly do that inside a decent neighbourhood ? Do 
you think they would be allowed to do this kind of work, if they rented a room in a 
formal neighbourhood?” (ibid.) 
 
The role played by the CPM in providing informal security has a history going back to 
the days, when the party was in the opposition and championing the cause of refugees 
from Bangladesh living in Kolkata in abject conditions in the informal settlements. It 
was due to the intervention of the CPM in the early 1980s, that many of the poor 
construction workers involved in the creation of the Salt Lake township could get their 
slum settlements registered and continue to live within the township.  
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Most of the informal residents I interviewed, still saw the CPM and the Left Front as an 
ally, albeit an increasingly disappointing one. Lathika Sarkar told me, 
 
“I used to be a strong supporter of CPM earlier. But now everyone has become just the 
same. They run to us before the elections shouting....My sister, my sister ! Oh, you are 
living in such difficulty ! We feel so sorry for you !... and the moment the elections are 
over...give dear sister a smack on the head !” (Interview with Lathika Sarkar, July, 
2005). 
 
The similarity in the tone and content of Lathika’s impression of CPM bears a strong 
resemblance to the impressions of the workers of the jute mills interviewed by Nandini 
Gooptu, which I quoted in the previous chapter.  
 
Although the arrangement with the Shiv-Kali club protects the settlement from 
demolition, this security doesn’t extend across the canal to protect the road-side stalls 
lying in Salt Lake, which are an important source of livelihood for the residents. Seema, 
a neighbour of Meena Ghosh, runs a tea and snacks stall of her own. In an interview she 
told me that hew stall had been broken and confiscated by the demolition squads of the 
Salt Lake Municipality and the local police many times in the 20 years that she has lived 
and worked in the area.  
 
“After such demolitions, the stall owners have to start from the scratch again...first by 
setting up the stall  on the foot path, then to construct a fixed stand made of 
bamboo...and when enough money has been saved...to procure a mobile stall operated 
from a cycle-van.” (Interview with Seema, Oct., 2004)  
 
However, the stall owners do have a mechanism for avoiding demolition. Seema told 
me, that when a demolition drive takes place in Salt Lake it doesn’t happen in all the 
residential blocks at the same time. When it begins in a certain block, a little kid or a 
teen-ager from the informal settlements there runs to us and informs us of the drive. On 
receiving the information the stall owners quickly move their stalls across the bamboo 
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bridge across the Keshtopur canal into their settlement. If they receive the information 
well in advance and are able to respond quickly then they are able to save their stalls. 
 
A cycle-van on the canal bank. Baisakhi Kheyapar informal settlement in the 
background 
 
(Photograph taken by author) 
 
Most of the informal settlers seemed pretty confident about handling the various local 
actors, which they have to deal with in order to live on the canal bank. The policemen of 
the Salt Lake East police station, which is itself located along the Keshtopur canal have 
a monthly arrangement with most of the informal settlers. This is how, Azad, an 
informal settler who lives on the canal bank with his wife and five children, described 
the arrangement he has with the local police, 
 
“The police never bothers me at all ! I have a monthly arrangement with them. I give 
them Rs. 50 or 60 every month and that settles it.” (Interview with Azad, July, 2005) 
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Some other residents like Lathika dealt with the police in more direct ways by appealing 
to the latter’s humanity. Despite being informed by Lathika’s employer, the police came 
to demolish her hut once. In the argument that ensued Lathika told the policeman, 
 
“Why would you demolish my home ? What have I done to you that you wish to torment 
a poor and lonely woman like me ? What kind of a human being are you ?” (Interview 
with Lathika Sarkar, July, 2005) 
 
The policeman not only changed his mind, but also developed a deep respect for 
Lathika and started addressing her as mashi (the Bengali word for aunt). 
 
“Nowadays that policeman behaves very nicely with me. He visits me often to ask how 
I am and to have a chat. Sometimes I cook lunch for him. He eats and then takes a nice 
long nap in the very home he had intended to demolish !”, Lathika said with a laugh 
(ibid.). 
 
I must admit, that while I was having this conversation with Lathika I myself was 
stuffing myself with delicious food consisting of rice, lentils and vegetable curry cooked 
by her. Like many canal bank settlers she grows green vegetables outside her shanty. 
My refusals to have lunch were totally brushed aside with a very motherly affection. 
This is something I witnessed every time I went out to interview these extremely poor 
canal bank residents. It was impossible to interview them, without being offered a full 
meal, or some snacks or at least a tea. After I had eaten Lathika’s food, I could well 
imagine that the policeman went straight for a nap rather than report back for duty. 
 
Just like the police, the informal settlers were also confident and comfortable in dealing 
with the local municipal councilors. The role played by the municipal councillors during 
the improvement project shall be discussed in the next section. The informal settlers, 
however, were more worried about dealing with extra-local agencies and departments, 
such as the Irrigation and Waterways Department. This is exactly what they had to 
encounter in the canal improvement project. This is what Azad said regarding the threat 
of extra-local agencies, 
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Figure 7Informal Settlements along the Keshtopur Canal 
 
 
(Map drafted by author) 
 
“We are not afraid of the police. But when people come from outside to demolish our 
shanties, then we have a problem. For example, when the canal dredging was going on 
some time back, we decided to vacate our home and shifted to another spot on the canal 
bank. The workers came and told us that they are going to dredge the canal and we 
should move out. We dismantled our home and then set it up after the workers left.” 
(Interview with Azad, July, 2005) 
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Most of the settlers construct their huts with temporary material on top of a cement 
plinth. This way it is easier to dismantle and set it up again. This temporary relocation 
along the canal bank is another way in which many settlers avoided eviction. However, 
despite all these methods, many informal settlers had no choice but to move out of the 
canal bank, once the canal dredging began and their homes were demolished.  
 
Even for the rest of the settlers, who managed to survive the whole dredging process of 
the canal improvement project, the remaining days of living on the canal bank may be 
numbered. One of the reasons why the informal settlements have still remained along 
the canal bank is the realisation by the project authorities and financiers, that if all the 
settlers are evicted right after the dredging they may come back before the second phase 
of the project is completed. The first phase of the improvement project, which involved 
the dredging of the canal, could at worst lead to a temporary eviction. But the second 
phase, which involves land use reclamation and transformation, contains a real threat of 
dispossession. 
 
According to G.P. Bagree, Chief Manager of IWIN,  
 
“The rest of the encroachers on the canal bank have not been removed because if we 
remove them before the works on the canal bank starts then more of them will settle 
down there. So we will clean the canal and as and when we find some possibility for 
development, we will evict them.” (interview with G.P. Bagree, July, 2005). 
 
However, it is obvious that the inability or reluctance to evict all the informal settlers 
from the canal bank had an effect on the dredging process itself. A resident of 
Keshtopur (a neighbourhood in the Rajarhat-Gopalpur municipality), who refused to 
give his name, told me in an interview that, 
 
“While dredging the canal the project authorities could not evict the informal settlers 
which were affiliated to the ruling party. They didn’t even dismantle the many bamboo 
bridges that are built across the Keshtopur canal. If you check the canal, you will see, 
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that even after the dredging, some parts of it are still quite shallow !” (Interview with 
citizen from Keshtopur, July, 2005) 
 
That our man was telling the truth got confirmed when the trial launches got stuck in the 
Keshtopur canal and the IWD was blamed for not completing the dredging process 
completely.  
9.9 Informal settlers and the Middle Class - Bound in eternal 
love-hate 
The upper- and middle-income residents of canal bank neighbourhoods like Salt Lake, 
South Dum Dum, Keshtopur are referred to by the informal settlers as babus. The 
informal settlers know fully well, that no matter how vocal the babus are regarding the 
menace of having dense informal settlements on the canal banks and the various 
environmental problems they generate, they are reliant on these very settlers for a 
number of services ranging from brooming and washing their multi-storied homes, 
cooking their food, collecting their garbage, cleaning the streets and providing them 
with conveniently located tea and snacks stalls.  
 
Despite some extremely energetic persons demanding a quick restoration of the 
Keshtopur canal, most of the middle-class residents have not been able to organise 
themselves into a pressure group to ask the local government and the government 
departments to do something about the canal. One of the most persistent and influential 
voices demanding environmental improvement of the canal has been that of Bhagabati 
Prosad Banerjee, a retired judge of the Kolkata High Court, who lives in Salt Lake. In 
the year 2003, he assisted the residents welfare associations of AA, AB and AC blocks 
(all of which lie adjacent to the canal) to file complaints to the West Bengal Pollution 
Control Board (WBPCB) regarding the delay in dredging the canal. This is how he 
viewed the governmental response to the canal cleaning and the measures that should be 
taken against the informal settlers. 
 
“Nothing is going to be done about the canal. I have personally petitioned the WBPCB 
two times. The moment you try to evict the informal residents it becomes a political 
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issue. If you and me occupy an inch of land we would be thrown out...but nobody 
touches them ! Just because they are poor ! These encroachers have to be thrown out !” 
(Interview with Bhagabati Prosad Banerji, June, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
Middle-class residence in Salt Lake along the Keshtopur canal 
 
(Photograph taken by author) 
 
Whenever the prominent and respectable voices from within the middle-classes spoke, 
the attitude toward the informal settlers remained the same. The residents of Salt Lake, 
further, had strange and unsubstantiated impressions about the identity and character of 
the informal settlers. There was an impression that most of the informal settlers were 
Muslim immigrants from Bangladesh and that they were involved with all kinds of 
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illegal activities. The role of the Left Front in general, and the CPM in particular was 
seen just in terms of the political benefits that came from protecting the informal settlers 
from eviction. This is how Sudhir Dey, the editor of Laban Hrad Sambad,  the most 
important Bengali local newspaper of Salt Lake viewed the situation, 
 
“Well what can you do about these informal settlers ? Ideally there shouldn’t be any 
informal settlements in a planned township like Salt Lake. But ever since CPM came to 
power, these people have been able to stay on. All these people living along the canal 
come from Bangladesh. They live and work here and vote for the CPM:” (Interview 
with Sudhir Dey, July, 2005)  
 
When I asked Lathika Sarkar’s opinion about such impressions she said, 
 
“What a thing to say ? Aren’t half the people of this city originally from East Bengal ? 
How can only the canal bank residents be categorised as outsiders then?” (Interview 
with Lathika, July, 2005) 
 
The paradoxical position of the middle-classes in the context of the canal improvement 
project and the plight of the informal settlers can be summarised in the following points 
- 
1. Eager to see the canal get cleaned, but largely ineffective in creating effective 
pressure groups. 
2. Vocal about the need to evict the informal settlers, convinced about the rampant 
criminality breeding in these settlements, but completely bound with the residents of 
these very settlers for their day to day needs and often assisting sections of the settlers to 
stay on the canal bank (as seen in the case of Lathika). 
3. Largely unaware of the details of the canal improvement projects happening along the 
Keshtopur canal  and the larger Baghbazar Canal System. 
4. Largely unaware of the role and responsibility of the local government institution 
regarding such development projects in the locality. 
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Though far better than the informal settlers in terms of material resources, the middle-
class residents of Salt Lake are poor in the sense of being alienated from and ignorant of 
both the working of such an important development project in their area and also from 
the functioning of local democratic institutions. The very precarious position, that the 
informal settlers are in, forces them to connect strongly with all local actors, and 
particularly the local ward councilors, and also to be aware about the details of the im-
provement projects. The middle-class residents, though praying for the canal do get 
cleaned, have no personal involvement or engagement in the project. 
 
Informal Settler along Keshtopur Canal 
 
(Photograph taken by author) 
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 It is interesting to note, that just as the middle-class residents have their impressions 
about the informal settlers, the latter too have certain unsubstantiated notions about the 
babus. To create stereotypes about the babus, just as the babus create stereotypes about 
them is a way for the informal settlers to assert their dignity and pride while living in 
obviously demeaning material circumstances. This is how Lathika expressed her views 
about the eating habits of the babus who employ her as a household-helper, 
 
“The babus often wish to give me their left-over food knowing that I am a poor person. 
But I always refuse...I don’t like the taste of the babus’ food. Their food has a diluted, 
watererd  down taste. Moreover, they like to store everything in the refrigerator, 
whereas we always eat our food fresh cooked. The babus will cook once and then keep 
on eating small portions for days together. We don’t prefer that system. We have to do 
hard labour you see...it is better for us to cook properly and eat properly.” (Interview 
with Lathika, July, 2005). 
 
Other stereotypes about the middle-classes are regarding their general laziness, their 
general contempt for the canal bank informal settlers and their sheer dependence on the 
informal settlers for doing the most basic of household tasks. Though this dependence is 
the very source of the economic survival of the informal settlers, it also provides them 
with a possibility of asserting their superiority over the babus from below. 
9.10 Role of the Local Government and the Democratic 
Planning Structure 
Though the local government played an important role in every major meeting and the 
in the overall decision making process for the canal improvement projects, it was hard 
to find any trace of the bottom-up-bottom planning process of the democratised 
planning structure of the city. The situation becomes more tragic when one discovers 
that as one moves lower down the hierarchy of the local government structure, from the 
level of the Mayor’s office to the level of the ward office, the ability of these institutions 
of local government to comprehend and grapple with the realities of such large 
development projects becomes lesser and lesser. 
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 While the Mayor of the KMC sat down and discussed the logistics of the projects with 
the officials of the various line departments and even demanded quick action from them, 
the local ward councilors, who were closest to the people considered the improvement 
projects to be quite beyond their capacity or role to deal with. Such an attitude was 
common to the councilors belonging to the Left Front and the opposition political 
parties.  
 
Figure 8The different local government areas the Bagh Bazaar Canal System flows 
through 
 
 
(Map drafted by author) 
 
Due to the inconvenience caused to the residents of the canal side blocks of Salt Lake 
due to the polluted canal, the councilors of all political parties had been requesting the 
Irrigation and Waterways Department to dredge the canal. Tulsi Sinha Roy, the 
councillor of Ward number 12 of Salt Lake (Bidhan Nagar Municipality) and a member 
of the Trinamool Congress Party, told me in an interview, 
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 “Some years back we stepped into the dirty waters of the canal, collected the water 
hyacinth and the garbage that floats on it and barged into the office of the Minister of 
State for Irrigation to give him a present. This was a desperate move by us, as a 
reaction to the apathy of the irrigation department.” (Interview with Tulsi Sinha Roy, 
November, 2004) 
 
However, when the canal improvement project finally started, the councilors didn’t 
consider it necessary to involve themselves in the project any further. According to 
Nandagopal Bhattacharya, the Left Front councillor of Ward number 9,  
“The municipality is not involved with the canal improvement project in any way - 
neither financially nor managerially.” (Interview with Nandagopal Bhattacharya, 
August, 2005) 
 
According to Anita Mondol of the Trinamool Congress, who was the councillor of 
Ward number 11 before the municipal elections of 2005, 
 
“The councilors hardly have any say at all in this project. It is a state government 
project and it is they who decide and do everything. The irrigation department asks for 
our help only when they have to evict the encroachers living on the canal banks...to go 
to the canal bank with the police, demolish the shanties etc. We do that...but the 
encroachers keep trickling in all the time.” (Interview with Anita Mondol, November, 
2004). 
 
Not only were the councilors left out of the decision making process, at some points of 
time during the dredging process they even protested against it for causing substantial 
inconvenience to the residents living in blocks bordering the canal. According to 
Debojyoti Raychowdhuri, who works as an assistant in the office of ward number 9 in 
Salt Lake, 
 
“The contractors of the irrigation department started using heavy trucks for removing 
the silt dredged from the canal. This caused extensive damage to the road bordering the 
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canal. Also, when they dumped the silt on the canal banks, it caused damage to the 
fences and small parks located in some of the neighbourhoods along the canal. They 
never informed our councillor about any of these things in advance. Finally we 
protested and forced the works to be stopped till the fences and the parks were 
repaired.” (Interview with Debojyoti Raychowdhuri, Aug., 2005) 
 
None of the councilors openly said anything in favour of the informal settlers in any of 
the interviews. All of them were of the opinion that the settlers cannot continue to live 
on the canal bank indefinitely. According to the Sudhanshu Shekhar Ganguly, the Left 
Front supported independent councillor of Ward 13 and the Vice-Chairman of Bidhan 
Nagar municipality before the elections of 2005, 
 
“The encroachers have to move out. There is no alternative to that...resettlement may or 
may not work out. Where should we resettle them? Where is the land? Even if there is a 
resettlement planning process, it is the responsibility of the state government. It is 
completely out of our scope. But why should even the state government do it? After all, 
they didn’t invite the encroachers to come and stay here !” (Interview with Sudhanshu 
Shekhar Ganguly, Nov., 2004)  
 
When seen in the context of the municipal elections that were held in Kolkata and Salt 
Lake (Bidhan Nagar Municipality), in the summer of 2005, such rhetoric made sense. It 
has already been noted in the previous chapter that the tremendous victory of the Left 
Front in both the Kolkata Municipal Corporation and the Bidhan Nagar Municipality 
was due to their strategic re-orientation towards a development policy favouring urban 
development and industrialisation. The councilors of the Left Front were eager to show 
that they have finally started addressing issues of urban infrastructure improvement 
seriously and were absolutely not going to repeat the anti-infrastructure rhetoric of the 
past. 
 
However, the actions of the councilors on the ground were very different from the 
answers given to me in the interviews. The Left Front had developed strong mutual 
links with the informal settlers along the canal, most of whom had their settlements 
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within wards under the control of the Left Front. Nandagopal Bhattacharya gave me a 
good idea of the dilemma facing many conscientious councilors in the difficult task of 
balancing the strategic re-orientation of the Left Front and the working relationship with 
the informal settlers at the local level. 
 
“Eventually they would have to move out. It will not be possible...you see...to carry on 
living like this on land belonging to the irrigation department. Anyway, most of them 
have family and some land in the country-side too. They can go back to the village in 
the worst case. Moreover, this township of Salt Lake is the only place in the whole of 
Kolkata which you can consider to be a slightly planned area. After some years the 
planned ‘New Town’ at Rajarhat would get developed too. Under these circumstances, 
we just can’t delay the improvement of the canals for the sake of the informal settlers.” 
(Interview with Nandagopal Bhattacharya, August, 2005). 
 
Immediately after having given the reason for the removal of the settlers, he smiled and 
said, “But you see...the trouble is, that, it is in our very homes that these settlers work. 
The residents of Salt Lake want both the improvement of the canal and also the cheap 
services of the informal settlers.” (ibid.)  
 
At the end of the interview, he told me, without being asked directly, 
 
“But we don’t wish to be too hard on the settlers. We try our best not to evict them in a 
ruthless manner. Sometimes we ask them to move out and undertake an eviction 
drive...after a while they come back again. Regarding those informal settlers who have 
some sort of an identification document such as the voter’s identification card, we 
would not ask them to move out permanently. They can try to find some other area 
within the ward to re-build their home.” (ibid.) 
 
This account provided by Nandagopal showed clearly the macro-economic and extra-
local processes in front of which both the elected leaders and the informal settlers were 
helpless to a substantial extent. Many of the informal settlers themselves described the 
 241
situation in a very similar manner. This is how Sukumar and Parboti, a couple living in 
one of the settlements along Keshtopur canal described the situation, 
 
“We would have to move out. I have stayed here many years, but now it seems that the 
canal and its banks are to be developed properly. If we really have to move out then we 
will go back to our village in the Sundarbans. Normally, when there is an eviction drive, 
then they give us a prior warning...sometime one month in advance, sometimes just a 
week. But we still have a couple of months more for sure...we know that we will not be 
evicted before the autumn festival.” (Interview with Sukumar and Parboti, August, 
2005). 
 
Given this state of affairs at the local level, it is evident that the political strengthening 
of the local government institutions has not evolved into an increased ability to 
understand spatial planning and development processes. Most of the ward councilors 
were unaware of the requirement for preparing the five-year draft development plans, 
which were supposed to consider the annual needs statements of the various wards, and 
amalgamated to form perspective plans at the metropolitan level. The councilors saw 
the limit of their involvement in the democratised planning structure in the preparation 
and submission of annual needs statements, focussing on mundane repair and 
maintenance issues such as road repair, street lighting, garbage collection etc., for which 
an annual ‘councillor-fund’ of Rs. 5 lakhs (approx.) is allotted to the individual wards.  
 
The few councilors who were aware of the overall bottom-up-bottom planning process 
confessed that preparation of draft development plans and their amalgamation had not 
been attempted due to lack of finances and availability of technical and human 
resources for planning. According to Sudhanshu Shekhar Ganguly : 
 
“The planning process has been discontinued by the municipality There aren’t enough 
finances for making a comprehensive development plan. As you know, finance is the life 
of a plan.” (Interview with Sudhanshu Shekhar Ganguly, Nov, 2005) 
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Thus, despite all the wisdom involved in the creation of the new planning structure, in 
reality, it remained a top-down structure, albeit constituted of locally elected leaders 
rather than technocrats. The only plan that was created after the Kolkata Metropolitan 
Planning Committee came into being was the perspective plan for the Kolkata 
Metropolitan Area, prepared by its technical secretariat, the Kolkata Metropolitan 
Development Authority. 
 
Though the councilors were acutely aware of the various issues affecting their 
individual wards and, in general, could feel the pulse of the people, they had no 
resources for any kind of spatial analysis in their offices. During my field work, I did 
not find a single ward office in Salt Lake which had a proper map of the township. This, 
despite the fact, that the office of the National Atlas and Thematic Mapping Or-
ganisation, which sells a 1: 10000 scale map of the Salt Lake township (showing the 
different wards, existing land-use and clear plot boundaries) for a paltry Rs. 25, is 
located bang in the centre of the township at an average distance of just a couple of 
kilometres from all the ward offices in the area. When I showed the councilors the map 
during my interviews, they were delighted to refer to it to have a better spatial 
understanding of their own ward vis-à-vis the neighbouring wards and the Keshtopur 
canal.  
 
In an ideal situation, the plight of the Keshtopur canal and what could be done about it, 
should have been addressed in the various needs statements prepared by the individual 
wards of the various municipalities bordering the canal. The issue of the environmental 
degradation of the canal and the plight of the informal settlers, should then have been 
discussed at a cross-municipality discussion in the process of the amalgamation of the 
needs statements in the preparation of the municipal level draft development plan. The 
available schemes, programmes and finances of the various line departments and special 
agencies could then have been evaluated or developed in the light of the amalgamated 
plan prepared after inter-municipal deliberations. The case of the canal could have even 
formed a component deserving of special attention within this deliberative planning 
process.  
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Needless to say, the real planning and implementation of the canal improvement project 
on the Keshtopur canal had no resemblance to such a democratic planning structure. It 
may be argued in favour of the new planning structure, that the metropolitan planning 
committee has been set up just a few years back, and it would need more time to fully 
activate such a democratic planning structure. However, it is not the time required, but 
the manner of work itself, which must distinguish such a democratic planning body such 
as the Kolkata Metropolitan Planning Committee from the technocratic line departments 
and functional agencies. The main advantage of the democratic and deliberative 
planning process should be its ability to plunge into a planning and development 
process at any point of time and let the discursive process take over. The experience of 
the canal improvement project does not show a tendency towards such a democratic and 
deliberative planning process operating at the local level. 
9.11 For whom is this project ? 
This question inevitably arises in the course of studying and analysing the various 
environmental improvement projects being undertaken on the various stretches of the 
Bagh Bazaar canal. Despite the many problems that beset the planning and 
implementation process and the highly undemocratic and non-participatory nature of in 
which the informal settlers were dealt with, this is not an easy question to answer. It is 
clear that, on the whole, the project reflects the second major strategic re-orientation of 
the Left Front, which is primarily aimed towards attracting industrial investment back to 
the state of West Bengal. Improvement of transport infrastructure, city beautification 
and environmental upgradation are all necessary components of inter-urban competition 
in the context of neoliberal socio-economic policy. Yet, it is also clear that these canals 
did perform a vital environmental function for the city in the past and provides unique 
opportunities for generating environment friendly transport options for this severely 
polluted and severely congested city. The initial focus of the Left Front government on 
rural areas had led to a neglect of the socio-economic and environmental problems of 
the city of Kolkata.  
 
Although, the middle-class population of the various neighbourhoods and townships 
bordering the canal system were also excluded from any consultative or participatory 
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process, it could be argued that the overall developmental intervention comes as a 
response to such basic and long-ignored concerns of the middle-class residents of 
Kolkata, in general, and these neighbourhoods, in particular, that the support of this 
class to such environmental improvement projects is almost guaranteed. In fact, such a 
support from the middle-class was clearly demonstrated in the over-whelming victory 
which the Left Front had in the civic elections and state assembly elections in 2005 and 
2006 respectively. At the same time, it must also be considered, that it was not just a 
narrow interest in holding on to political power in the state that prompted the Left Front 
to initiate such a strategic re-orientation. Despite being one of the most consistent 
opponents and critics of neoliberal policies in the Indian political scene, the Left Front 
realised that its pro-poor policies based on land-reform would run out of steam if the 
achievements in the agricultural sector were not quickly followed up with the 
development of a robust industrial sector. 
 
The urgency to undertake infrastructure upgradation and environmental improvement 
with their consequent negative effects on the poorest strata of the urban poor, have to be 
understood in the light of this economic necessity faced by the Left Front government 
(where it is compelled to revive its industrial base precisely at a time when neoliberal 
economic policies are at their strongest in India) and not by a simplistic and mechanical 
understanding based on the model of a corrupt and anti-poor state tormenting the urban 
poor with apolitical NGOs and civil society organisations as the only possible saviours. 
Though such a simplistic model is part of the received wisdom in many academic 
departments focussing on planning and development studies, it has been seen in the 
context of the present case, that anytime the civil society got into action, it did so as a 
front organisation of the opposition political party (as in the case of the Uchhed Birodhi 
Mancha) or as a voice of the upper- and middle-classes which had no empathy or 
compassion for the plight of the informal settlers. 
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10. Findings and Conclusions 
 
The final part of the thesis is essentially made up three parts, though it is not presented 
as three distinct portions, visibly separated from each other. The first part deals with the 
way in which the findings of this research answer the three research questions. The 
second part describes the way in which such findings re-structure and re-orient existing 
communicative planning theory. The third part uses this re-structured and re-oriented 
communicative planning theory to point out some avenues for practice which could con-
tribute to the strengthening of the democratic planning process set in motion in Kolkata.  
10.1 Answering the Questions..or Questioning the Questions 
The findings ended up serving two purposes vis-à-vis the research questions by the time 
the research process was coming to an end. One of the purposes was definitely to find 
answers to the questions. But the answers, in turn, substantially questioned and altered 
the very intention that underlay the research questions. Though this may sound 
complicated at first, it was actually an inevitable process and shall be elaborated in this 
section. Let us take, for example, the first research question - Has the creation of the 
democratic planning structure in the city of Kolkata made the local planning and 
development process in the city more communicative ?  
 
From the description and analysis of the West Bengal democratic decentralisation 
experiment presented in the preceding chapters it can be concluded that a genuine effort 
was made in the state to democratise the planning structure and make the overall 
development process pro-poor using the twin strategies of democratic decentralisation 
and land reform. As has already been explained, due to a variety of reasons, such a 
development process could not reach out to the poorest sections of the population in 
both the urban and rural areas. But it did initiate a strong process to bring the planning 
and development process under local democratic control and as close to the lowest 
groups as possible. 
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The experiment attacked the age old colonial legacy of top-down, centralised and expert 
dominated dominated planning structure, largely operating independent of local 
democratic control, and replaced it with a planning structure which was not only under 
the control of the newly empowered local government institutions but also driven by a 
deliberative and discursive planning process. This move away from centralised planning 
to decentralised planning; from a process controlled by bureaucrats, technocrats and ex-
perts to a  process controlled by the municipalities and panchayats, therefore, also meant 
a move away from instrumental rationality and toward communicative rationality as the 
basis for guiding planning practice. 
 
So much, for the first part of the question. The second part of the research question is 
more tricky to answer. It would have been simple if the research merely sought to 
analyse the real democratic decentralisation experiment in West Bengal, based on the 
given ideals of communicative planning theory. However, what was attempted in this 
research was exactly the opposite of that - to de-idealise and de-mystify communicative 
planning theory based on the real, historical experience of the democratic de-
centralisation experiment. Therefore, the extent to which the experiment has made the 
planning and development process in Kolkata communicative depends on the manner in 
which this experiment has altered the very meaning, assumptions and ambitions of 
communicative planning theory as it stands today. 
 
Thus, in order to fully answer the second part of the first question, it becomes necessary 
to ask the second research question -  What was the historical process involved in the 
creation of such a planning structure ? 
 
One of the first important points that emerges out of a historical analysis of the struggles 
for democratic decentralisation in India, in general, and in West Bengal, in particular, is 
that of the democratic heritage. Contrary to communicative planning theorists such as 
Healey, who seek the democratic heritage of communicative planning in the ideals of 
the Enlightenment, the activists of the democratic decentralisation process in India seek 
it in the process of the nationalist freedom struggle launched against the British 
imperialists. Indian freedom fighters fully respected the importance of European 
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democratic ideals, but they had to wrest it by demanding genuine democracy from the 
most advanced capitalist and imperialist nation of Europe. The nationalist struggle, thus, 
found an expression in the conflict between the political demand for devolution of 
power and responsibilities to the lower tiers of the government, which the Indians could 
control, and the emphasis put by the British administrators on greater centralisation and 
bureaucratisation of planning and development functions.  
 
This conflict between the proponents of democratic decentralisation and the proponents 
of centralised and bureaucratic planning did not end with the political freedom of India. 
The conflict, in the initial decades after freedom, was between the bourgeois-landlord 
classes on the one hand and the masses of tenant and landless farmers, agricultural 
labourers, lower castes and the urban poor on the other hand. The political 
representative of the former was the powerful Congress Party, which was in control of 
the central government (championing the interests of the bourgeois-landlord classes), 
and that of the latter were the emerging left-of-centre political parties, which did not 
always champion the cause of the rural and urban poor, but nonetheless, launched a 
struggle for democratic decentralisation mainly to oppose the centralising tendencies of 
the Congress party. 
 
The most progressive of all these left-of-centre political parties was the CPM, which 
formed its political and developmental vision based on the understanding that a 
transformation of the existing material relations in the city and the countryside was 
essential to face the challenges of poverty and under-development. 
 
During the 1960s, the strategies of the CPM and its leftist allies was based on launching 
and encouraging open class struggle against the industrial capitalists in the city and 
landlords in the countryside after having assumed democratic control of the state 
government. The experience of the first communist government in Kerala under the 
chief ministership of E.M.S. Namboodiripad and of the two United Front governments 
in West Bengal showed the leftists the enormous difficulties of such a strategy of 
organising open class struggle by assuming democratic control of a couple of states 
within the Indian union. The reactions of the central government and the problems of 
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economic decline forced the new Left Front government, which was elected in West 
Bengal in 1977 to continue its programmes of land reform and altering the property 
relations in the urban and rural areas through a process of democratic decentralisation 
rather than open class confrontation. The more the Left Front attempted to retain its 
political power and implement its pro-poor development policies within the overall 
democratic-capitalist set up of the Indian state, the more it had to tone down its 
confrontational and militant nature and engage in processes of collaboration, negotiation 
and communication with the industrial and financial interests on whom the economy of 
the state desperately depended. 
 
In the light of such observations it is hard to say whether the communicative turn in the 
planning and development process in West Bengal is a progressive or a regressive turn. 
Perhaps it is easier to answer the question if one specifies the question a bit more and 
asks - Progressive or regressive for whom ? For the industrialists and investors who 
would want to make use of the political stability of the state and the necessity driven 
compliance of the Left Front; for the middle-class residents of the city of Kolkata who 
would benefit from the employment opportunities generated by industrial development 
and the consequent improvements in urban envrironment and infrastructure; and even 
for the residents of the hundreds of registered slums in the city, who would benefit from 
the environmental upgradation projects, such a turn would appear advantageous and 
progressive. However, to the traditional allies of the Left Front, from within the formal 
labour force and the residents of the informal settlements, the turn is definitely a painful 
and regressive one.  
 
This understanding provides an answer to the third research question - Does the process 
of creating a more communicative planning process through a democratisation of the 
planning structure increase the capacity of the poor citizens of the city to resist the 
trends of neoliberal urbanisation in Kolkata ? 
 
Addressing issues of poverty and under-development was central to the democratic 
decentralisation experiment in West Bengal. The whole move towards democratisation 
from below was geared towards the overall goals of creating greater social and 
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economic equality in the state. However, as we have seen, the process has had diverse 
effects on the condition of the poor depending on their geographical location (the city or 
the countryside) or the specific labour sector they belong to (formal or informal).  
 
This also shows, rather than the obsolescence of class based struggles, as is assumed by 
theorists like Healey, a combination of economic compulsions faced by the Left Front 
government led to a substantial weakening of the resistance capacity of industrial 
workers in the formal sector and increasing uncertainty for the workers of the informal 
sector. There is a resurgence of class oppression from above and a dissolution of class 
resistance from below. This points to an intensification of class based antagonism and 
contradiction rather than its obsolescence. 
10.2 Turning Communicative Planning Theory on its Head 
Such is the nature of the communicative turn in the planning and development process 
in the state of West Bengal and in its capital city of Kolkata, which emerged out of a 
paradoxical situation of not being guided and inspired by communicative planning 
theory at all.  
 
Such an understanding of the communicative turn in Kolkata provides us with a 
historical materialist understanding of communicative planning theory in general. 
Rather than succumbing to the idealistic fetters that besets the literature on 
communicative planning theory [such as a romantic search for the roots of the 
democratic planning tradition of the west within the ideals of the European 
Enlightenment, while completely overlooking the perversion of such ideals by the rising 
capitalist class and the role of colonial transfers and European imperialism in creating 
the economic conditions favourable for the fostering of liberal democracy in West 
Europe; the subtle corruption of the Marxist understanding of the relationship between 
the economic base and the super-structure by using Giddens’ theory of structuration; 
and the assumption of the historical dissolution of class-based politics and the 
irrelevance of class struggle], the West Bengal experiment shows, that the 
communicative turn in planning and development was not a result of the ingenuity, 
wisdom and pragmatism of individual planners or of communicative planning theorists, 
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but was a contextually determined and conjunctural phenomenon based on particular 
historical circumstances. 
 
In such a situation, the focus of communicative planning theory on an extended political 
society (including all possible urban stakeholders), the role of the individual planner, the 
micro-processes of day to day life and the fine grain of taken for granted assumptions 
lend it the characteristics of a counter-revolutionary theory as described by Harvey. It 
appears ‘logically coherent, easily manipulable, aesthetically pleasing...new and 
fashionable’ and yet, at the same time, remains ‘a perfect device for non-decision 
making.’ (Harvey: 1988, p - 151). 
 
By basing our understanding of the communicative turn in planning on the concrete 
historical experience of the particular context in which it has arisen; by seeing it as a 
product of historical compulsions and not as a creation of the brains of individual 
practitioners or theorists, we take a significant step forward in understanding and 
applying communicative planning theory for what it truly should be - a theorisation of a 
planning situation that came into being as a result of historical processes and will 
definitely go out of being when those historical processes change.  
 
There is a particular irony in the history of the communicative turn in the West Bengal 
experiment, which, on closer inspection, provides communicative planning theory with 
an opportunity to turn into a truly revolutionary theory. We have seen that it was the 
regression of the progressive class based forces in West Bengal which led to the 
communicative turn. However, once the communicative turn has begun, a correct 
appraisal of it can provide us with effective weapons with which to tackle some of the 
extreme consequences of neoliberalism at the local level till the overall macro-economic 
context changes. If properly channelised and theorised, the communicative turn can, in 
fact, become an innovative strategy for class-struggle in contemporary urban 
environments. 
 
The Left Front in West Bengal certainly showed wisdom by quickly opting for 
democratic decentralisation, when they realised that conventional class confrontation 
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was bound to end in failure. Rather than relying on civil society organisations and a 
prioritisation of local governance over local government the West Bengal leftists opted 
to improve upon the existing structure of representative democracy by making it more 
responsive, accountable and involving it directly with the larger political-economic 
programs aimed at social change.  
 
One example of this can be seen in the near absence of religious-fundamentalist trends 
in Kolkata, which often emerge as a result of the breaking up of working class 
movements and organisations and advance side by side with the rise of neoliberal 
economic trends. It is not a mere co-incidence, that the most violent religious riots in the 
recent years in India have happened in the states where right-wing Hindu-chauvinist 
political parties with their usual championing of neoliberalism and intense love for big 
business have been in power.  
 
Based on such a historical materialist analysis of the West Bengal experiment, one can 
now list the main features of a new communicative planning theory, derived out of the 
contextual experience of this third-world region and not out of that of West Europe and 
North America alone. 
 
1. The communicative turn in the planning and development process does not get 
created by focussing on processes aimed at generating inter-subjective understanding 
and consensus or through a focus on the role of the individual planner. 
2.The communicative turn is a contextually determined and conjunctural phenomenon 
based on the particular historical circumstances of the city or region in which it has 
emerged. 
3. It is quite possible that a process of radical structural reform based on class-struggle 
and class-confrontation, rather than one based on fostering inter-subjective 
understanding, can, over time, evolve into a more dialogical and communicative 
planning system. 
4. Rather than being an outcome of or a popular barricade against the forces of 
neoliberal urbanisation, the communicative turn is intrinsically bound with the process 
of the increase in power and influence of the upper classes (the capitalist class and its 
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allies) vis-à-vis the power and influence of organised movements of the lower classes 
(the formal and informal work-force in the city and the share-cropper, landless farmer 
and agricultural labourer in the country-side).  
5. As long as the power and influence of the upper classes remains strong (i.e. as long as 
neoliberal economic policies dominate the macro-economic context), a historical 
materialist understanding of the communicative turn can provide progressive social 
forces with an effective weapon to resist the worst consequences of neoliberal 
urbanisation and contribute to the withdrawal of upper-class power by working at the 
local level. Rather than being based on the understanding that class-struggle has become 
obsolete and irrelevant, communicative planning becomes a new and innovative 
instrument of class struggle in current times. By analysing and informing this new 
strategy of class struggle, communicative planning theory stands a better chance of 
informing and guiding radical planning practice, and goes closer to becoming a 
revolutionary theory. 
11. The Way Ahead 
Ideally, this research should not end with a typical section on recommendations and 
prescriptive policies. The dialectical nature of the analysis and the very theme of the 
research i.e. communicative and democratic planning processes,  automatically imply 
that ideas for future action should not emerge out of the head of the individual 
researcher but should be generated socially through a communicative process. Rather 
than suggesting ideal solutions for improving planning practice, this section attempts to 
see the possible avenues, which the democratisation experiment of Kolkata can be 
channelised into, based on the concrete analysis of its successes and failures that has 
been attempted in this research. 
 
The West Bengal experiment has certainly succeeded in creating a firm institutional and 
legal structure for democratic planning in the state and also used it to a considerable 
degree in undertaking its structural reform programmes. At the same time, it is also true, 
that in the face of the economic realities that the state faces in the current times,  the 
same democratic structure is failing to protect the rights of the poorest groups and is 
actually reverting back to the top-down and expert driven planning process. As the low-
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er tiers within the local government structure are failing to get adequately involved with 
the planning process only the ‘up’ part of the bottom-up-bottom planning structure is 
operating. One of the common reasons cited for the inability to prepare the plans at the 
municipal and sub-municipal levels is the lack of financial and technical resources.  
 
Due to this reason, in a way, this innovative planning structure is falling victim to the 
very same chicken and egg problem of earlier times, when the lack of planning capacity 
was used as an argument by the opponents of decentralisation to postpone the 
devolution of finances and functions indefinitely. The problem of the prevention of 
financial and functional devolution doesn’t exist anymore. However, the total finances 
available are bound to be low and the exercise of the bottom-up-bottom planning 
function has to be initiated somehow using other creative means. The revival of the 
planning process from below has to be based on the understanding that a democratic 
planning process cannot be initiated just with the help of increased finances. First and 
foremost, it demands an engagement by the local people themselves and an eagerness 
on their part to take ownership of the planning process.  
 
The answer to this problem lies in the history of the democratic decentralisation 
experiments of West Bengal and Kerala itself. In both these experiments, the proponents 
of decentralisation didn’t wait indefinitely for the local government institutions to get 
sufficiently trained and experienced. A chunk of the plan funds were transferred to these 
bodies and, at the same time, they were plunged into the crucial tasks of managing and 
implementing the various pro-poor policies and programmes of the state governments. 
A very similar strategy can be adopted, with minor modifications, to activate the 
democratic planning structure in Kolkata. 
11.1 Turning Crisis to Opportunity - Revitalising the Local Level 
Just as a crisis can create widespread misery and suffering among people, it can also 
become a vehicle for quick learning and empowerment if people organise themselves 
with the will and creativity to face it. It is worthwhile to remember, that when the newly 
empowered panchayats in West Bengal were in their infancy, they managed to not only 
pull through a massive development programme such as Operation Barga, but also 
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succeeded in planning and executing successful relief measures in the aftermath of the 
massive floods in 1978. The immensity of the challenges that they were forced to face 
empowered them at a pace much faster than in normal times.  
 
In the same way projects like the environmental improvement of the Baghbazar canal 
system can be turned from crisis generating situations to training grounds for the 
democratic planning process. The largely non-functional ward committees could be 
mobilised by giving them the tasks of collecting and disseminating relevant information 
about such large development projects affecting the area. Public hearings, citizen 
consultations and joint meetings of the representatives of the informal settlements and 
middle-class groups could be held. The idea is to channelise the energy and activities of 
diverse organisations, individuals and civil society groups operating within a spatial unit 
(e.g. the ward)  and rally them around the elected local bodies to generate a process of 
mass participation.  
 
In a way, this is similar to the first of the three aspects of decentralised planning listed 
by Jayati Ghosh - 
1. Mobilisation of the common people. 
2. Organisation or Institution Building. 
3. Planning 
(Ghosh: 2004, p - 57) 
 
The aspect of citizen mobilisation, being based on human initiative and creativity, 
would not necessarily require extra funding. The vibrant cultural milieu of the city of 
Kolkata with its numerous voluntary theatre groups and cultural associations could also 
be used in such a citizen mobilisation process. Though a bit harder to track and identify, 
the wise citizens of the streets, such as Mastaan Baba, could also be indispensible 
resource persons for such a process. In fact, the ideas for revitalising the local level dis-
cussed in this chapter draw on Mastaan’s own notion of ‘setting the beds of sleeping 
people on fire’. Of course, in the case of the canal projects, the ‘fire’ has already been 
set by the forces of neoliberal urbanisation.  
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These processes of mobilisation can begin in those wards, where the councilors have 
already shown an initiative to cooperate with the informal settlers in trying to mitigate 
the negative consequence of the project on their lives. Such a process may not radically 
alter the manner in which such a development process is undertaken or lead to elaborate 
resettlement programmes for the informal settlers who have been evicted and/or those 
who are facing eviction, but it would give the local population a taste for involvement in 
a direct democratic process and also break the general apathy and alienation of the 
middle class groups. In time, the spirit of one ward would influence other neighbouring 
wards. Such a process would also go a long way in breaking the barrier of mis-
information and mis-understanding that exists between the middle-class population and 
the informal settlers.  
 
The experience of the people’s campaign for decentralised planning, undertaken in the 
state of Kerala during the 1990s provides us with a very innovative strategy to enhance 
the technical capacity of the local government institutions to undertake local area level 
planning. Rather than hiring professional consultants, the architects of the Kerala 
decentralised planning process, decided to create a ‘Voluntary Technical Corpse (VTC)’ 
comprised of ‘retired technical experts and professionals’ (Isaac: 2000, p - 18). Any 
retired person with ‘a professional or post-graduate degree or officer level experience in 
a development sector’ could become a member of the VTC and commit ‘himself/herself 
to spending at least one day a week giving technical assistance’ to the ward committees 
and municipalities (ibid.). Given the scores of retired persons with splendid professional 
backgrounds in diverse fields, living in the township of Salt Lake, there is a splendid 
opportunity to create a VTC that could assist enlightened and progressive ward 
councilors to generate alternative plans for the management and development of the 
canal bank land in coordination with surrounding wards. The VTC could also assist in 
the process of identification of available land within the various wards where the most 
vulnerable sections of the informal settlers could be relocated. 
 
One can well imagine the role such VTCs can play in giving these retired people (many 
of whom are eager to get back into the field of practice again) an opportunity to engage 
in an extremely satisfying, meaningful and socially relevant work and also enabling 
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them to get over the alienation that forces them to always remain on the receiving end of 
the planning and development process. 
 
The second aspect of decentralised planning, i.e. organisation or institution building has 
already been accomplished to a large extent. The process could be improved further by 
extending the existing institutions further downwards within a single ward by creating 
provisions for neighbourhood councils.  
 
Regarding the third aspect, the building up of and refining of the experience gained 
from opposing, involving with and interacting with a large and difficult development 
project like the canal improvement one, is necessary. The goal of the democratic 
decentralised planning should be to use the involvement with such a project to set in 
motion a discursive planning process which would be completely ready to face the 
challenge of such interventions of neoliberal urbanisation the next time they appear. In 
time, the ward committees and the planning wings of the various panchayats and local 
government could become so accustomed to such a process of deliberative planning that 
the possibility of such top-down interventions would be eliminated completely. Just as 
neoliberal urbanisation has the tendency to replace socio-economic and spatial planning 
with large urban development projects as the key strategic instruments to re-shape urban 
areas, democratic planning would be able to do exactly the opposite, i.e. re-instate the 
primary position of democratic, bottom-up planning as the key strategic instrument to 
guide the process of urbanisation in a more egalitarian way.  
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